Empiricism notes for Fall 2011.

The Powerpoint slides from which I talked at the first meeting are now visible at:

http://www.phil.cam.ac.uk/~swb24/notes/Locke/Locke%201.ppt.htm

This was very introductory, stressing one or two points about Locke’s closeness to rationalism, which we are going to return to talk about in week 5.

Week 2.

Christy talked us through the use of ideas in Locke, and the vexed question of how ideas related to qualities, given the obstacle that the first seems to be a mental category, while the second is a worldly one, so the “gap” to be bridged seems to yawn in front of Locke.

We then got onto the primary/secondary distinction. I think the best paper that I know, on this in the literature is:

Of Primary and Secondary Qualities

A. D. Smith The Philosophical Review Vol. 99, No. 2 (Apr., 1990), pp. 221-254

The early modern debate on this issue was formulated by Descartes, and Galileo. D. thought that “sensation” gives no knowledge of things, and secondary quality experience seems easily categorized as sensational rather than perceptual. Galileo has a rather lovely illustration of the difficulty

I think, therefore, that these tastes, odors, colors, etc., so far as their objective existence is concerned, are nothing but mere names for something which resides exclusively in our sensitive body (corpo sensitivo), so that if the perceiving creatures were removed, all of these qualities would be annihilated and abolished from existence. But just because we have given special names to these qualities, different from the names we have given to the primary and real properties, we are tempted into believing that the former really and truly exist as well as the latter.

An example, I believe, will clearly explain my concept. Suppose I pass my hand, first over a marble statue, then over a living man. So far as the hand, considered in itself, is concerned, it will act in an identical way upon each of these objects; that is, the primary qualities of motion and contact will similarly affect the two objects, and we would use identical language to describe this in each case. But the living body, which I subject to this experiment, will feel itself affected in various ways, depending upon the part of the body I happen to touch; for example, should it be touched on the sole of the foot or the kneecap, or under the armpit, it will feel, in addition to simple contact, a further affection to which we have given a special name: we call it "tickling." This latter affection is altogether our own, and is not at all a property of the hand itself. And it seems to me that he would be gravely in error who would assert that the hand, in addition to movement and contact, intrinsically possesses another and different faculty which we might call the "tickling faculty," as though tickling were a resident property of the hand per se. Again, a piece of paper or a feather, when gently rubbed over any part of our body whatsoever, will in itself act everywhere in an identical way; it will, namely, move and contact. But we, should we be touched between the eyes, on the tip of the nose, or under the nostrils, will feel an almost intolerable titillation--while if touched in other places, we will scarcely feel anything at all. Now this titillation is completely ours and not the feather's, so that if the living, sensing body were removed, nothing would remain of the titillation but an empty name. And I believe that many other qualities, such as taste, odor, color, and so on, often predicated of natural bodies, have a similar and no greater existence than this….

I return to my first proposition, having now shown how some affections, often reputed to be indwelling properties of some external body, have really no existence save in us, and apart from us are mere names. I confess myself to be very much inclined to believe that heat, too, is of this sort, and that those materials which produce and make felt in us the sense of heat and to which we give the general name "fire" consist of a multitude of tiny particles of such and such a shape, and having such and such a velocity.

Locke doesn’t use or cite the same thought experiment, but his view seems undeniably close to Galileo (Il Saggitore was written in 1623)

The problem seems to be this. Suppose we are happy with the real existence of bodies with primary qualities (mass, figure, motion, extension…?number ?unity) and suppose we believe that other ‘qualities are dispositions whose power is entirely co-relative to the sensitivity of the recipient —in the case of color, the very particular and in many respects peculiar nature of our optical systems. We are the recipients, and the exercise of the power is to create—so Galileo thought—a modification in us, akin to a pain or a tickle.

Galileo is unquestionably an error theorist. Is Locke? Tricky. There is the contested comma at II, 8, xiv: ‘…which, whatever reality we by mistake attribute to them, are in truth nothing in the objects themselves, but powers to produce various sensations in us; and depend on those primary qualities, viz. bulk, figure, texture, and motion of parts and therefore I call them SECONDARY QUALITIES’.

Does this mean ‘nothing in the object, although there are….

Or does it mean ‘nothing in the object other than…

The first is an error theory, the second proceeds by identifying the secondary qualities with powers. But it is hard to keep these apart. To use Galileo’s example, a sensation of a tickle is a response to a set of primary qualities of a feather, but it can scarcely be said to be a perception of anything ‘real’ about the feather it would be queer to identify it with a quality of the feather.

Week 3

Patrick has kindly provided the following very helpful and insightful notes from his class:

Locke’s Idea(s) of Power

Why is the idea of power important?

- 2.21 (‘Of Power’) is the longest chapter in the Essay

- 2.21 also underwent the greatest number of revisions

- the idea of power is also critical for understanding several key Lockean doctrines

- free will and voluntary action

- the will is a power

- primary/secondary quality distinction

- qualities are powers

- causal theory of perception

- substances have the power to produce ideas in us

- substances

- most of the ideas which comprise ideas of substances are ideas of powers

- causation

- the analysis of causation makes appeal to powers

Given that the idea of power is really important in the Essay, a clear and coherent account of the idea of power is highly desirable. Unfortunately, there seem to be some obstacles to such an account.

Three Problems for the Idea of Power

Here are three problems for Locke’s account of power which are discussed in the secondary literature

Simplicity Problem

The Simplicity Problem asks whether the idea of power is simple or complex. The problem is that Locke seems to equivocate.

First, a bit of review about the distinction between simple and complex ideas:

At the beginning of Book II Locke lays out a seemingly critical distinction between simple and complex ideas. The simple ideas are supposed to be perfectly simple: “being each in itself uncompounded, contains in it nothing but one uniform appearance, or conception in the mind, and is not distinguishable into different ideas.” 2.2.1 So the simple ideas are basic mental units. They are basic insofar as they are minimal units of mental content and basic insofar as they are structurally simple, the are the building blocks for other ideas. Complex ideas, by contrast, display diversity of content and complexity in their structure; they are composed of several different simple ideas. Simple and complex ideas also differ with regard to their origin. Simple ideas are received in experience: sensation and reflection. Complex ideas are created by the mind, which combines the simples together.

The Simplicity Problem takes these Lockean commitments and applies them to Locke’s statements about the idea of power to generate problems. There are three ways to do this:

1) Locke explicitly says the idea of power is simple (2.7.7, 2.7.8, 2.21.3, 2.18.6, 2.22.10) but Locke also explicitly says the idea of power is complex (2.23.7)

2) Locke often says that the idea of power is simple, but Locke also says that the idea of power contains a relation (2.21.3, 2.31.8). But Locke is explicit that our ideas of relations are complex ideas (2.12.3, 2.12.7, 2.25.9, 2.29.1). No simple idea can contain a complex idea.

3) Locke sometimes claims that the idea of power comes from experience (2.7) which would make it a simple idea. But sometimes he claims that the mind creates it (2.21.1) which would make it a complex idea.

So Locke seems to be confused about whether the idea of power is simple or complex.

Circularity Problem

The Circularity Problem suggests that there is a circularity between Locke’s account of the idea of power and his account of the ideas of cause and effect.

The thought is that the idea of power is a fundamentally causal idea. Knowing what a power is means knowing that it is a power to produce an effect. But knowing about the power to produce an effect is just knowing about causation. The two concepts are just conceptually extremely close. There will be a vicious circularity if Locke’s account of power appeals to a causal notion but then his account of causation appeals to powers.

Some of the motivation for this concern comes from noting that the language of 2.21.1 and 2.26.1 is virtually identicate.

Are all circularities vicious? Many philosophers have thought that some of our most basic or primitive notions will have to be interdefined: truth and meaning, meaning and reference, existence and reality or actuality... What is wrong with Locke just admitting that the relationship between cause and power is like these others?

The answer has to do with Locke’s reductive empiricism. Locke is trying to show that all of our ideas, however complex, reduce to simples. But if the analysis of power involves the idea of cause and the analysis of cause involves the idea of power then Locke will be caught in a regress. This reduction will not be possible.

So Locke’s account of power seems to face a circularity.

The Origin Problem

The Origin Problem asks whether there is empirical justification for the idea of power. Specifically, it asks whether we ever actually experience the idea of power. Locke suggests that we do, but others have disagreed.

Hume undertook a long search for the idea of power in experience and got negative results. His train of thought went something like this: Imagine one billiard ball, A, moving toward another billiard ball, the two touching, and the second billiard ball, B, moving away. All we see in this situation is the movement of the two billiard balls and their spatiotemporal conjunction. We do not see A’s power to move B.

Of course, Locke never got to read Hume. But Locke did read Malebranche (and some other writers) who prefigured Hume in making this point. And, to add to the confusion, Locke seems to admit that perhaps we don’t get a clear idea of power in experience, or at least we don’t get a clear idea of active power from bodies (2.21.2, 2.21.4).

We can construct a dilemma for Locke based on the routes taken by his successors. Locke should either:

1) side with Hume and admit that we actually do not get the idea of power in experience

OR

2) side with Berkeley and admit that we get an idea of power in experience, but only in the mental realm, not in the physical realm

A Possible Solution, Distinguishing Between Two Different Ideas

One solution to these problems might be to recognize a distinction between two different types of ideas of power in Locke’s Essay. Let’s call them them the simple idea of power and ideas of specific powers.

The simple idea of power is perfectly simple. Given this, there is not very much to say about it. It doesn’t admit of analysis or description. This is the idea which gets introduced at 2.7. Locke says that this idea is received in sensation and reflection. And we can know it is simple because the machinery for generating complex ideas hasn’t yet been introduced (that doesn’t come till 2.12).

Ideas of specific powers are complex. Some examples might be hemlock’s power to kill humans or a magnets power to move iron filings. These ideas display some complexity insofar as they are tied to a substance (the hemlock or the iron) and are targetted toward a specific end which is knowable by their sensible effects (the cessation of life or the movement of the iron). They’re also complex insofar as we can differentiate between different ideas of specific powers. It is ideas of specific powers, not the simple idea of power, which get introduced at 2.21.

Solving the Simplicity Problem

The Simplicity Problem is the easiest problem to solve once this distinction is up and running. Locke does not equivocate over whether the idea of power is simple or complex because there is no one idea of power. The simple idea of power is simple and the ideas of specific powers are complex.

Similarly, Locke does not equivocate over whether the idea contains or doesn’t contain a relation or whether it is received in sensation or constructed by the mind. The simple idea of power is received in experience and does not contain a relation. The ideas of specific powers are constructed by the mind and do contain a relation.

Solving the Circularity Problem

Once we have a simple idea of power which is received in experience we can also solve the circularity problem. The simple idea of power is one of the simple ideas which goes into our ideas of specific powers and it is one of the simple ideas which goes into our idea of causes. So we are able to ground out both of these complex ideas without each of the analyses appealing to the other.

Solving the Origin Problem

To solve the Origin Problem we should return to the billiard ball case. Do we see ‘in experience’ A’s power to move B? Now can conclude that Locke’s answer to this question is ‘no.’ The idea of A’s power to move B is an idea of a specific power, and these ideas are constructed by the mind, not received in experience.

So all Locke needs is the far more defensible claim that somewhere in experience we get the simple idea of power. And that this simple idea of power is one of the ideas we use when we construct our complex ideas of things like billiard balls.

Some Further Reading:

Ayers, Michael. 1975. “The Ideas of Power and Substance in Locke’s Essay” Philosophical Quarterly. 25: 1-27.

Chappell, Vere. 2007. “Power in Locke’s Essay” in Lex Newman [ed] The Cambridge Companion to Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Coventry, Angela. 2003. “Locke, Hume, and the Idea of Causal Power” Locke Studies 3: 93-111.

Jacovides, Michael. 2003. “Locke’s Construction of the Idea of Power” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science. 34: 329-350.

Mattern, Ruth. 1980. “Locke on Active Powers and the Obscure Idea of Active Power from Bodies” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 11: 39-77.

Week 4

Notes from week 4 are not yet available

Week 5

Will be conducted by Matt Priselac. He has suggested the following article might be useful, by Lex Newman, from the Cambridge Companion to Locke. Newman

Week 8

The paper “Hume and Thick Connexions” is visible as a .pdf file HERE