

Philosophy Faculty Reading List and Course Outline 2018-2019

PART IA PAPER 01: METAPHYSICS AND MIND

SYLLABUS

- Causation: Hume's view; Humean successors
- Free will: freedom and determinism; fatalism
- Induction and miracles
- Personal identity
- Dualism and functionalism

Course Outline

This course examines a wide range of metaphysical topics of perennial interest.

The primary question about causation is simply: what is it for one thing to cause another? Your alarm clock may go off every morning just before sunrise; but it doesn't cause the sun to rise; so what is missing?

The question of free will is immediately related: what is it to have free will? Certain accounts of free will suggest that there is a tension between the existence of free will and the existence of (deterministic) laws of nature.

But if there are these laws of nature, what are they, how do we learn about them, and what would it mean for them to be broken? These are the questions raised in the topic of induction and miracles.

The final two topics concern minded beings. The question of personal identity asks what we are, metaphysically speaking, and what it takes for us to persist through time? Relatedly, one might ask what it is to have a mind, and here we consider two classic views: dualism and functionalism.

Prerequisites

None

Objectives

Students will be expected to:

1. Acquire knowledge of some of the main metaphysical claims and arguments.
2. Acquire an understanding of how these claims and arguments relate to one another.

3. Engage in close criticism with the claims and arguments studied.
4. Develop their own powers of philosophical analysis and argument through study of metaphysics.

Preliminary Reading

DESCARTES, René, *Meditations on First Philosophy*.

HUME, David, *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*.

RUSSELL, Bertrand, *The Problems of Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980; 2nd ed. 1998). Also available online at: www.dawsonera.com.

VAN INWAGEN, Peter, *Metaphysics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). Also available online at: <http://lib.myilibrary.com/?id=313762>.

CAUSATION

You might start with these introductory texts:

CRANE, Tim, 'Causation', in A.C. Grayling, ed., *Philosophy 1: A Guide through the Subject* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 184-94. Also available on [Moodle](#).

SALMON, Wesley, 'Causation', in R. Gale, ed., *The Blackwell Guide to Metaphysics* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), pp. 19-42. Also available online at: www.dawsonera.com.

Hume's View

(A) Basic Reading

Start with Hume himself:

HUME, David, *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, sect. 4. Also available online at: <http://lib.myilibrary.com/?id=116084>.

HUME, David, *Treatise of Human Nature*, Book 1.iii., sects. 1, 2 & 14. Also available online at: www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/4705.

The proper interpretation of Hume has been much disputed. For a brief survey, see:

BEEBEE, Helen, 'Causation and Necessary Connection', in D. O'Brien and A. Bailey, eds., *Continuum Companion to Hume* (London: Bloomsbury, 2012), pp. 131-45. Also available on [Moodle](#).

(B) Further Reading

For a more detailed discussion of the proper way to read Hume, see:

BEEBEE, Helen, *Hume on Causation* (London: Routledge, 2006).

Hume's account is contested in:

ANSCOMBE, G.E.M., *Causality and Determination* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971). Reprinted in P. van Inwagen and D. W. Zimmerman, eds., *Metaphysics: The Big Questions* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998); also in E. Sosa and M. Tooley, eds., *Causation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 88-104; and in E. Sosa, ed., *Causation and Conditionals* (London: Oxford University Press, 1975). [More difficult]

Humean Successors

(A) Basic Reading

An alternative account of causation, picking up on another idea of Hume's, is developed in:

LEWIS, David, 'Causation', *Journal of Philosophy*, 70 (1973): 556-67. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2025310>. Reprinted in E. Sosa and M. Tooley, eds., *Causation (Oxford Readings in Philosophy)* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 193-204. [Difficult]

For criticism see:

HORWICH, Paul, *Asymmetries in Time*. pp. 167-76 'Lewis's Programme' vols. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987). Also available on [Moodle](#). Reprinted in E. Sosa and M. Tooley, eds., *Causation (Oxford Readings in Philosophy)* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 208-16.

KIM, Jaegwon, 'Causes and Counterfactuals', *Journal of Philosophy*, 70 (1973): 570-72. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2025312>.

Many contemporary descendants of Hume have understood causes as events that lawfully suffice for their effects. One such account is advanced by Mackie:

MACKIE, J.L., 'Causes and Conditions', *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 2 (1965): 245-64. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20009173>. Reprinted in E. Sosa, ed., *Causation and Conditionals*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), pp. 15-38.

(B) Further Reading

For criticism of Mackie, see:

KIM, Jaegwon, 'Causes and Events: Mackie on Causation', *The Journal of Philosophy*, 68 (1971): 426-41. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2025175>. Reprinted in E. Sosa, ed., *Causation and Conditionals* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), pp. 48-62.

A clear review of the contemporary debate, and of the vast set of examples (preemption, overdetermination, omission etc.) that have come to dominate it, can be found in:

PAUL, L.A., and Ned HALL, *Causation: A User's Guide* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). Also available online at: www.dawsonera.com.

FREE WILL

Freedom and Determinism

(A) Basic Reading

You should probably start with two classic defences of compatibilism:

HUME, David, *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, sect. VIII. Also available online at: <http://lib.myilibrary.com/?id=116084>.

SCHLICK, Moritz, 'When Is a Man Responsible?' in his *Problems of Ethics* (New York, NY: Prentice-Hall, 1939), pp. 143-58. Reprinted in B. Berofsky, ed., *Free Will and Determinism* (New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1966). Also available on [Moodle](#). [Another version of compatibilism. Quite readable]

Before you consider some criticism:

CHISHOLM, Roderick, 'Human Freedom and the Self', in G. Watson, ed., *Free Will*. 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 26-37. Also in P. van Inwagen and D. W. Zimmerman, eds., *Metaphysics: The Big Questions* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998). Also available on [Moodle](#). [Classic statement of agent-causation view]

VAN INWAGEN, Peter, 'The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism', *Philosophical Studies*, 27 (1975): 185-99. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4318929>. Reprinted in G. Watson, ed., *Free Will*, 1st ed. only (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 46-58. [Fairly difficult. More ambitious readers may want to consult his *An Essay on Free Will* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983)]

And some interesting alternative takes:

FRANKFURT, Harry, 'Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility', *Journal of Philosophy*, 66 (1969): 829-39. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2023833>.

FRANKFURT, Harry, 'Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person', *Journal of Philosophy*, 68 (1971): 5-20. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2024717>. Reprinted in G. Watson, ed., *Free Will*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 322-36. [Influential attempt to account for freedom in terms of second-order desires]

STRAWSON, P.F., *Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays* (London: Methuen, 1974), pp. 1-28 'Freedom and Resentment'. Also available online at: <http://lib.myilibrary.com/?id=178684>. Reprinted in G. Watson, ed., *Free Will*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 72-93.

(B) Further Reading

For a clear presentation of a range of contemporary views see:

FISCHER, John Martin, *et al.*, *Four Views on Free Will* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007). Also available online at: www.dawsonera.com.

For a recent defence of a compatibilist position, see:

LIST, Christian, 'Free Will, Determinism, and the Possibility of Doing Otherwise', *Noûs*, 48 (2014): 156-78. <https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12019>.

Fatalism

(A) Basic Reading

Here is a classic statement of the issue:

ARISTOTLE, *De Interpretatione*. Reprinted in R. Gale, ed., *The Philosophy of Time* (London: Macmillan, 1968), pp. 179-82. Also available on [Moodle](#).

With some influential 20th century discussions as follows:

AYER, A.J., 'Fatalism', in his *The Concept of a Person and Other Essays* (London: Macmillan, 1963), pp. 235-68. Also available on [Moodle](#).

RYLE, Gilbert, 'It Was to Be', in his *Dilemmas* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964), pp. 15-35. Also available on [Moodle](#).

TAYLOR, Richard, 'Fate', in his *Metaphysics* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1992), pp. 55-67. Also available on [Moodle](#). An earlier version is 'Fatalism', *Philosophical Review*, 71 (1962): 56-66. Also available online at: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2183681>. Also in R. Gale, ed., *The Philosophy of Time* (London: Macmillan, 1968). [Readable defence of fatalism]

For a discussion of more recent work see:

BERNSTEIN, Mark, 'Fatalism', in R. Kane, ed., *The Oxford Handbook of Free Will*. 1st ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). Also available online at: <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195178548.003.0003>.

(B) Further Reading

CICERO, M. T., 'De Fato (on Fate)', in his *On the Orator: Book 3*, translated by H. Rackham (London: Loeb Classical Library, 1942), pp. 189-249. Also available online at: <http://www.loebclassics.com/view/LCL349/1942/volume.xml>. Also in L. Zagzebski and T.D. Miller, eds., *Readings in Philosophy of Religion: Ancient to Contemporary* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2009), pp. 244-59.

VAN INWAGEN, Peter, *An Essay on Free Will* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), ch. 2 'Fatalism'. Also available on [Moodle](#). [Difficult but worth attempting]

A demanding, but important, paper is:

DUMMETT, Michael, 'Bringing About the Past', *Philosophical Review*, 73 (1964): 338-59. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2183661>. Reprinted in his *Truth and Other Enigmas* (London: Duckworth, 1978), pp. 333-50; and in R. LePoidevin and M. MacBeath, eds., *The Philosophy of Time* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 252-74.

INDUCTION AND MIRACLES

Induction

(A) Basic Reading

The initial puzzle of induction is:

HUME, David, *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, Part IV. Also available online at: <http://lib.myilibrary.com/?id=116084>.

With further detail by:

RUSSELL, Bertrand, *The Problems of Philosophy* (London: Williams and Norgate, 1912), chs. 6 & 7. Also available online at: <http://www.wmcarey.edu/crockett/russell/>.

Classical induction is now frequently subsumed under the broader notion of inference to the best explanation. For an introduction to this see:

LIPTON, Peter, *Inference to the Best Explanation* (London: Routledge, 2004), chs. 6 & 7. Also available online at: <http://www.myilibrary.com?ID=11209>.

For further exploration of the problem of induction, see:

MELLOR, D.H., 'The Warrant of Induction', in his *Matters of Metaphysics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 254-68. Also available online at: <http://www.dspace.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/3475>.

SALMON, Wesley C., 'Inductive Inference', in B.A. Brody, ed., *Readings in the Philosophy of Science* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1970), pp. 597-617. Also available on [Moodle](#).

STOVE, D.C., *The Rationality of Induction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).

(B) Further Reading

Goodman posed a new riddle of induction:

GOODMAN, Nelson, 'The New Riddle of Induction', in his *Fact, Fiction and Forecast* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1955; 4th ed. 1983), pp. 59-83 (in 4th ed.). Also available on [Moodle](#).

It is a real question, why the 'new riddle' should be considered different from the old one. For an ingenious suggestion, try:

PUTNAM, Hilary, 'Reichenbach and the Limits of Vindication', in his *Words and Life* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), pp. 131-48. Also available on [Moodle](#).

For discussion of whether deduction suffers from a similar problem, see:

DUMMETT, Michael, *The Justification of Deduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974). Reprinted in his *Truth and Other Enigmas* (London: Duckworth, 1978), pp. 290-318. Also available on [Moodle](#).

Miracles

(A) Basic Reading

The classic philosophical challenge concerning miracles is laid down here:

HUME, David, *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, sect. 9 'Of Miracles'. Also available online at: <http://lib.myilibrary.com/?id=116084>.

For exploration, see:

HOLLAND, R. F., 'The Miraculous', *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 2 (1965): 43-51. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20009151>.

MILLICAN, Peter, 'Hume's Theorem' Concerning Miracles', *Philosophical Quarterly*, 43 (1993): 489-95. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2219988>.

SWINBURNE, Richard, ed., *Miracles* (London: Collier Macmillan, 1989).

(B) Further Reading

MCGREW, Timothy, 'Miracles', in E.N. Zalta, ed., *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 ed.)* [Online]. Available at: <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/miracles/> (Accessed: 9 August 2018).

PERSONAL IDENTITY

(A) Basic Reading

Useful introductory readings include:

GARRETT, Brian, *Personal Identity and Self-Consciousness* (London: Routledge, 1998). [A very readable account of the recent debate]

OLSON, Eric, 'Personal Identity', in S. Stich and T. Warfield, eds., *The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), pp. 352-68. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1002/9780470998762.ch15>. [A useful overview. A similar essay can be found online in the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* at: <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal>.

But the classic statements of initial positions are:

HUME, David, *Treatise of Human Nature*, Book 1 part 4 sect. 6 and Appendix. Also available online at: www.gutenberg.org/etext/4705.

LOCKE, John, *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Book II, ch. I, sects. 10-12, and ch. 27. Partly reprinted in J. Perry, ed., *Personal Identity* (Berkeley: California University Press, 1975). The Clarendon edition is available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/actrade/9780198243861.book.1>. [Important historical source. Difficult.]

OLSON, Eric, 'An Argument for Animalism', in R. Martin and J. Barresi, eds., *Personal Identity* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), pp. 318-3348. Available online from the White Rose site at: <http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/734/1/olsonet5.pdf>.

PARFIT, Derek, 'Personal Identity', *Philosophical Review*, 80 (1971): 3-27. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2184309>. Reprinted in J. Perry, ed., *Personal Identity* (Berkeley: California University Press, 1975). [Classic statement of the view that 'identity doesn't matter'. More ambitious readers can consult his *Reasons and Persons* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), chs. 10-13. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/019824908X.001.0001>].

WILLIAMS, Bernard, 'The Self and the Future', *Philosophical Review*, 79 (1970): 161-80. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2183946>. Reprinted in his *Problems of the Self: Philosophical Papers 1956-1972* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 46-63; also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511621253.006>.

(B) Further Reading

NOONAN, Harold, *Personal Identity*. 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2003), chs. 1, 7 & 10. Also available online at: <http://lib.myilibrary.com/?id=9511>. [A useful survey, but difficult in places]

OLSON, Eric, *The Human Animal* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/0195134230.001.0001>. [A fuller presentation of his view]

PERRY, John, ed., *Personal Identity* (Berkeley, CA: California University Press, 1975). [Selections from Locke, Butler, Reid, and Hume]

- SHOEMAKER, Sydney, and Richard SWINBURNE, *Personal Identity* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984). Excerpts also in P. van Inwagen and D.W. Zimmerman, eds., *Metaphysics: The Big Questions* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998).
- WILLIAMS, Bernard, 'Personal Identity and Individuation', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 57 (1956): 229-52. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4544578>. Reprinted in his *Problems of the Self: Philosophical Papers 1956-1972* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 1-18. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511621253.003>.

DUALISM AND FUNCTIONALISM

Useful introductory works include:

- CRANE, Tim, *The Mechanical Mind*. 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2003). Also available online at: <http://lib.myilibrary.com/?id=2275>.

For a clear and comprehensive survey of different positions and questions in Philosophy of Mind, see:

- KIM, Jaegwon, *Philosophy of Mind*. 3rd ed. (Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 2011). Also available online at: <https://ezp.lib.cam.ac.uk/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nlebk&AN=421116&site=ehost-live&scope=site>

Most of the readings listed below can be found in the following excellent anthology:

- CHALMERS, David, ed., *Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

Dualism

(A) Basic Reading

A central question in Philosophy of Mind is about how Mind and Body relate to each other. Are the mind and body identical? Or are they distinct? Substance dualists take mind and body to be two distinct substances.

- DESCARTES, René, *Meditations on First Philosophy*, chs. 2 & 6. The relevant bits are reprinted in D.M. Rosenthal, ed., *The Nature of Mind* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991). [Classic source on dualism]
- ELISABETH, PRINCESS OF BOHEMIA, and René DESCARTES, 'Selections of the Descartes-Elisabeth Correspondence' in M. Atherton, ed., *Women Philosophers of the Early Modern Period* (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1994), pp. 9-21.

(B) Further Reading

- BENNETT, Karen, 'Mental Causation', *Philosophy Compass*, 2, no. 2 (2007): 316-337. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00063.x>. Sections 1-4.
- KIM, Jaegwon, *Philosophy of Mind*. 3rd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2011), chs. 1 & 2. Also available online at: <https://ezp.lib.cam.ac.uk/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nlebk&AN=421116&site=ehost-live&scope=site>
- RYLE, Gilbert, 'Descartes' Myth' in his *The Concept of Mind* (London: Hutchinson, 1949). Also available online at: <http://lib.myilibrary.com/?id=215319>. Also reprinted in D. Chalmers, ed., *Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 32-39.

Functionalism

Functionalists model the mind on a machine.

(A) Basic Reading

- LEWIS, David, 'Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications' in D. Chalmers, ed., *Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 88-94.
- LEWIS, David, 'Mad Pain and Martian Pain', in N. Block, ed., *Readings in Philosophy of Psychology*. Vol. I (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), pp. 216-22. Reprinted in D. Lewis, *Philosophical Papers*. Vol. I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983). Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/0195032047.003.0009>.
- PUTNAM, Hilary, 'The Nature of Mental States' in D. Chalmers, ed., *Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 73-79.

(B) Further Reading

- BENNETT, Karen, 'Mental Causation', *Philosophy Compass*, 2, no. 2 (2007): 316-337. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00063.x>. Sects. 4-6.
- BLOCK, Ned, 'Troubles with Functionalism' in D. Chalmers, ed., *Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 94-8.
- KIM, Jaegwon, *Philosophy of Mind*. 3rd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2011). chs. 5 & 6. Also available online at: <https://ezp.lib.cam.ac.uk/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nlebk&AN=421116&site=ehost-live&scope=site>
- SEARLE, John, 'Can Computers Think?' in D. Chalmers, ed., *Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 669-75.

Many of our experiences – feeling pain, seeing blue, tasting chocolate – have a phenomenal quality. There's something it's like to have those experiences. A thorny

problem for Functionalists (and Philosophers of Mind more generally) is how to account for this feature of our experience.

(A) Basic Reading

GERTLER, Brie, 'In Defense of Mind Body Dualism' in J. Feinberg & R. Schafer-Landau, eds., *Reason and Responsibility*, 16th ed. (Belmont, MA: Wadsworth, 2016), pp. 285-97.

JACKSON, Frank, 'Epiphenomenal Qualia', *Philosophical Quarterly*, 32 (1982): 127-36. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2960077>. Reprinted in D. Chalmers, ed., *Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 273-80.

NAGEL, Thomas, 'What Is It Like to Be a Bat?' *Philosophical Review*, 83 (1974): 435-50. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2183914>. Reprinted in his *Mortal Questions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 165-80.

(B) Further Reading

AKINS, Kathleen, 'What is it Like to Be Boring and Myopic?' in B. Dahlbom, ed., *Daniel Dennett and His Critics* (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1993), pp. 124-60. Also available on [Moodle](#).

CHALMERS, David, 'Consciousness and Its Place in Nature' in his *The Character of Consciousness* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). Also available online at: <https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195311105.003.0005>. Also reprinted in his *Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp.247-72.

DENNETT, Daniel, 'Quining Qualia' in A. J. Marcel and E. Bisiach, eds., *Consciousness in Contemporary Science* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 43-77. Also available on [Moodle](#).

KIM, Jaegwon, *Philosophy of Mind*. 3rd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2011), chs. 9 & 10. Also available online at: <https://ezp.lib.cam.ac.uk/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nlebk&AN=421116&site=ehost-live&scope=site>

LEWIS, David, 'What Experience Teaches', in W. Lycan, ed., *Mind and Cognition* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), pp. 499-518. Also available on [Moodle](#).

We welcome your suggestions for further readings that will improve and diversify our reading lists, to reflect the best recent research, and important work by members of under-represented groups. Please email your suggestions to phillib@hermes.cam.ac.uk including the relevant part and paper number. For information on how we handle your personal data when you submit a suggestion please see <https://www.information-compliance.admin.cam.ac.uk/data-protection/general-data>.