Lecture 6: Berkeley’s Idealism II
The plan for today…

1. Veridical perception and hallucination
2. The sense perception argument
3. The pleasure/pain argument
4. The perceptual relativity argument
5. The likeness principle
§1. Veridical perception and hallucination
If I am hallucinating a clown at the back of the room…

…the clown is just an idea in my mind.

By contrast, if my perception of the clown is veridical…

…the clown is something more than just an idea in my mind.
Another common sense objection…

P1  If all bodies are ideas in our minds, all sense perception is hallucination.

P2  Not all sense perception is hallucination.

C   Some bodies are not ideas in our minds.
‘...the distinction between realities and chimeras [i.e. imaginary things] retains its full force.’ (PHK §34 p.114)

Berkeley rejects P1.

So what is the difference between hallucination and veridical perception...?
‘…whatever power I have over my own thoughts, I find the ideas actually perceived by sense have not a like dependence on my will…’ *(PHK §29 p.113)*

This doesn’t help…

I can’t choose not to perceive the clown at the back of the room…
‘The ideas of sense are more strong, lively, and distinct than those of the imagination… they have likewise a steadiness, order, and coherence, are not excited at random… but in a regular train or series…’ (PHK §30, p.113)

The first claim doesn’t help…

…the clown is pretty lively and distinct…
P1
My idea of X is an hallucination if and only if it doesn’t cohere with my other ideas.

P2
My idea of the clown at the back of the room doesn’t cohere with my other ideas, but my idea of the lectern does cohere with my other ideas.

C
My idea of the clown at the back of the room is an hallucination, but my idea of the lectern is a veridical perception.
§2. The sense perception argument
The sense perception argument...

P1 Houses, mountains, rivers etc. are objects that we perceive by means of our senses.

P2 We do not perceive houses, mountains, rivers etc. indirectly by means of our senses.

P3 Whatever we perceive by means of our senses we perceive either directly or indirectly.
The sense perception argument continued...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>C1</th>
<th>Houses, mountains, rivers etc. are objects that we perceive <em>directly</em> by means of our senses.</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>P4</td>
<td>The only objects that we <em>directly</em> perceive by means of our senses are ideas (or collections of ideas).</td>
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<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>Houses, mountains, rivers etc. are ideas (or collections of ideas).</td>
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The indirect realist objection...

P4 is true but P2 is false.

We perceive houses, mountains, rivers etc. *indirectly* by means of our senses.

We perceive ideas by means of our senses and then infer the existence of houses, mountains, rivers etc. by means of our intellect.
The direct realist objection...

C1 is true but P4 is false.

Houses, mountains, rivers etc. are not ideas (or collections of ideas)...

...but we nonetheless directly perceive them by means of our senses.
§3. The pleasure/pain argument
‘...sensible things are those only which are immediately perceived by sense.’ (*DHP*, p.62)

‘Sensible things... are nothing else but so many sensible qualities, or combinations of sensible qualities.’ (*DHP*, p.63)

P1 The only objects that we *directly* perceive by means of our senses are sensible qualities (or collections of sensible qualities).
All sensible qualities are either primary qualities or secondary qualities.

Remember that Locke and Berkeley use the language of primary and secondary qualities very differently...
According to Berkeley, primary qualities \textit{just are} the properties of size, shape, motion, number, solidity, etc.

\ldots and secondary qualities \textit{just are} the properties of colour, taste, smell, sound, etc.

According to Locke, primary qualities, unlike secondary qualities, are properties that are (1) inseparable from the bodies that possess them, and that (2) resemble the ideas they produce in us, and are (3) more than just powers to produce ideas in us.
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<th>Berkeley</th>
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‘Seeing… the fire affects you only with one simple, or uncompounded idea, it follows that this same simple idea is both the intense heat… and the pain… and consequently, that the intense heat… is nothing distinct from a particular sort of pain.’ (DHP, p.64)
‘And is not warmth… a pleasure?’ (DHP, p.65)

P1 Extreme heat is a type of pain and moderate heat is a type of pleasure.

P2 Pleasure and pain are ideas.

P3 Heat is either extreme or moderate.

C Heat is an idea.
The same goes for other tactile qualities…

And for tastes or gustatory qualities…

‘Is a sweet taste a particular kind of pleasure… or is it not? …And is not bitterness some kind of uneasiness or pain.’ (DHP, p.67)

And for smells or olfactory qualities (DHP, p.69).

What about auditory and visual qualities?
Why think that secondary qualities are identical to pleasures and pains…?

Suppose I taste a fine Stilton…

The taste and the pleasure are distinct…

It is perfectly possible for someone to experience the taste without the pleasure…
§4. The perceptual relativity argument
‘...it is proved that sweetness is not really in the sapid thing, because the thing remaining unaltered the sweetness is changed into bitter, as in the case of a fever or otherwise vitiated palate.’ (PHK, p.107)

‘...in case colours were real properties or affections inherent in external bodies, they could admit of no alteration, without some change wrought in the bodies themselves: but is it not evident... that upon the of microscopes, or upon a change of humours of the eye... the colours of any object are either changed, or totally disappear? (DHP, p.73)
P1 Between the first Pringle and the last, they stop being sweet and salty.

P2 If the Pringles stop being sweet and salty, and sweetness and saltiness are properties of objects outside the mind, the properties of objects outside the mind have changed.

P3 The properties of the objects outside the mind have not
C1  Sweetness and saltiness are not properties of objects outside the mind.

P4  If sweetness and saltiness are not properties of objects outside the mind, they must be ideas in the mind.

C2  Sweetness and saltiness are ideas in the mind.
Two varieties of *Subjectivism About Secondary Qualities*

*Dispositionalism About Secondary Qualities*

To be sweet is to have a *disposition* to cause a particular sensation *under certain circumstances*.

*Lockeanism About Secondary Qualities*

To be sweet is to *cause* a particular sensation.
How would a *dispositionalist* respond…?

P2 and P3 are true, but P1 is false.

The Pringles still have the same dispositions to cause particular sensations under certain circumstances.

How would a *Lockean* respond…?

The Pringles no longer cause particular sensations.
‘...I desire any one to reflect and try, whether he can... conceive the extension and motion of a body, without all other sensible qualities...

...[It] is not in my power to frame an idea of a body extended and moved, but I must withal give it some colour or other sensible quality which is acknowledged to exist only in the mind.’ (PHK §10, p.106)
P1  Secondary qualities are ideas.

P2  We cannot conceive primary qualities apart from secondary qualities.

P3  If secondary qualities are ideas, but primary qualities are not, we can conceive primary qualities apart from secondary qualities.

C   Primary qualities are ideas.
Against the direct realist…

P1 The only objects that we *directly* perceive by means of our senses are sensible qualities (or collections of sensible qualities).

P2 All sensible qualities are either *primary qualities* or *secondary qualities*.

P3 Secondary qualities are ideas.
P4  Primary qualities are ideas.

By P2, P3 and P4,

C1  All sensible qualities are ideas.

By P1 and C1,

C2  The only objects that we *directly* perceive by means of our senses are ideas (or collections of ideas).
§5. The likeness principle
Against indirect realism...

P1 We perceive houses, mountains, rivers etc. indirectly by means of our sense only if our ideas of houses, mountains, rivers etc. resemble objects that are not ideas.

P2 An idea cannot resemble anything other than an idea.

C We do not perceive houses, mountains, rivers etc. indirectly by means of our senses.
Against indirect realism…

‘But say you… there may be things like [our ideas] whereof they are copies or resemblances, which things exist without the mind… I answer, an idea can be like nothing but an idea. If we look but ever so little into our thoughts, we shall find it impossible for us to conceive a likeness except only between our ideas.’ (PHK, p.105)
The Likeness Principle…

Distinguish the *vehicle* of representation from the *content*, i.e. the *representing* thing from the *represented* thing.

Perhaps the *vehicle* of representation cannot resemble anything other than an idea…

…but why can’t the *content* of the representation resemble something other than an idea…?
Can a painting resemble anything other than a painting…?

This painting resembles Napoleon, but Napoleon is not a painting.

The *content* of the painting resembles something other than a painting.
‘A man cannot compare 2 things without perceiving them each, ergo he cannot say any thing which is not an idea is like or unlike an idea.’ (*Philosophical Commentaries*)

**P1**  
X and Y can be compared only if they can both be directly perceived.

**P2**  
The only things that we can directly perceive are ideas.
C1 We cannot know that an idea resembles something other than an idea.

C2 An idea cannot resemble anything other than an idea.

What is it for $X$ to resemble $Y$…?

$X$ resembles $Y$ if and only if we can directly perceive that $X$ has the same properties as $Y$…?
Putting it all together…

P1  Houses, mountains, rivers etc. are objects that we perceive by means of our senses.

P2  We do not perceive houses, mountains, rivers etc. *indirectly* by means of our senses.

P3  Whatever we perceive by means of our senses we perceive either *directly* or *indirectly*. 
Putting it all together…

C1 Houses, mountains, rivers etc. are objects that we perceive directly by means of our senses.

P4 The only objects that we directly perceive by means of our senses are ideas (or collections of ideas).

C2 Houses, mountains, rivers etc. are objects that we perceive directly by means of our senses.
Next week…
Berkeley (and Locke)
on Abstract Ideas