§1. Veridical perception and hallucination

Another common sense objection…

P1 If all bodies are ideas in our minds, all sense perception is hallucination.
P2 Not all sense perception is hallucination.
C Some bodies are not ideas in our minds.

T1 ‘…the distinction between realities and chimeras [i.e. imaginary things] retains its full force.’ (PHK §34 p.114)

T2 ‘…whatever power I have over my own thoughts, I find the ideas actually perceived by sense have not a like dependence on my will…’ (PHK §29 p.113)

T3 ‘The ideas of sense are more strong, lively, and distinct than those of the imagination… they have likewise a steadiness, order, and coherence, are not excited at random… but in a regular train or series…’ (PHK §30, p.113)

P1 My idea of X is an hallucination if and only if it doesn’t cohere with my other ideas.
P2 My idea of the clown at the back of the room doesn’t cohere with my other ideas, but my idea of the lectern does cohere with my other ideas.
C My idea of the clown at the back of the room is an hallucination, but my idea of the lectern is a veridical perception.

§2. The sense perception argument

P1 Houses, mountains, rivers etc. are objects that we perceive by means of our senses.
P2 We do not perceive houses, mountains, rivers etc. indirectly by means of our senses.
P3 Whatever we perceive by means of our senses we perceive either directly or indirectly.
C1 Houses, mountains, rivers etc. are objects that we perceive directly by means of our senses.
P4 The only objects that we directly perceive by means of our senses are ideas (or collections of ideas).
C2 Houses, mountains, rivers etc. are ideas (or collections of ideas).
The indirect realist objection... P4 is true but P2 is false.

The direct realist objection... C1 is true but P4 is false.

§3. The pleasure/pain argument

T4 ‘...sensible things are those only which are immediately perceived by sense.’
(DHP, p.62)

T5 ‘Sensible things... are nothing else but so many sensible qualities, or combinations of sensible qualities.’ (DHP, p.63)

Remember that Locke and Berkeley use the language of primary and secondary qualities very differently...

Secondary qualities...

T6 ‘Seeing... the fire affects you only with one simple, or uncompounded idea, it follows that this same simple idea is both the intense heat... and the pain... and consequently, that the intense heat... is nothing distinct from a particular sort of pain.’ (DHP, p.64)

T7 ‘And is not warmth... a pleasure?’ (DHP, p.65)

P1 Extreme heat is a type of pain and moderate heat is a type of pleasure.
P2 Pleasure and pain are ideas.
P3 Heat is either extreme or moderate.
C Heat is an idea.

T8 ‘Is a sweet taste a particular kind of pleasure... or is it not? ...And is not bitterness some kind of uneasiness or pain.’ (DHP, p.67)

Why think that secondary qualities are identical to pleasures and pains...?

§4. The perceptual relativity argument

T9 ‘...it is proved that sweetness is not really in the sapid thing, because the thing remaining unaltered the sweetness is changed into bitter, as in the case of a fever or otherwise vitiated palate.’ (PHK, p.107)

T10 ‘...in case colours were real properties or affections inherent in external bodies, they could admit of no alteration, without some change wrought in the bodies themselves: but is it not evident... that upon the of microscopes, or
upon a change of humours of the eye… the colours of any object are either changed, or totally disappear? (DHP, p.73)

P1 Between the first Pringle and the last, they stop being sweet and salty.
P2 If the Pringles stop being sweet and salty, and sweetness and saltiness are properties of objects outside the mind, the properties of objects outside the mind have changed.
P3 The properties of objects outside the mind have not changed.
C1 Sweetness and saltiness are not properties of objects outside the mind.
P4 If sweetness and saltiness are not properties of objects outside the mind, they must be ideas in the mind.
C2 Sweetness and saltiness are ideas in the mind.

Two varieties of Subjectivism About Secondary Qualities

Dispositionalism To be sweet is to have a disposition to cause a particular sensation under certain circumstances.

Lockeanism To be sweet is to cause a particular sensation.

Primary qualities...

T11 ‘…I desire any one to reflect and try, whether he can… conceive the extension and motion of a body, without all other sensible qualities…. [It] is not in my power to frame an idea of a body extended and moved, but I must withal give it some colour or other sensible quality which is acknowledged to exist only in the mind.’ (PHK §10, p.106)

P1 Secondary qualities are ideas.
P2 We cannot conceive primary qualities apart from secondary qualities.
P3 If secondary qualities are ideas, but primary qualities are not, we can conceive primary qualities apart from secondary qualities.
C Primary qualities are ideas.

More on this next week…

Berkeley also thinks the perceptual relativity argument works for primary qualities…

Against the direct realist…

P1 The only objects that we directly perceive by means of our senses are sensible qualities (or collections of sensible qualities).
P2 All sensible qualities are either primary qualities or secondary qualities.
P3 Secondary qualities are ideas.
P4 Primary qualities are ideas.
C1 All sensible qualities are ideas.
The only objects that we directly perceive by means of our senses are ideas (or collections of ideas).

§5. *The Likeness Principle*

Against indirect realism…

P1 We perceive houses, mountains, rivers etc. indirectly by means of our sense only if our ideas of houses, mountains, rivers etc. resemble objects that are not ideas.

P2 An idea cannot resemble anything other than an idea.

C We do not perceive houses, mountains, rivers etc. indirectly by means of our senses.

T12 ‘But say you… there may be things like [our ideas] whereof they are copies or resemblances, which things exist without the mind… I answer, an idea can be like nothing but an idea. If we look but ever so little into our thoughts, we shall find it impossible for us to conceive a likeness except only between our ideas.’ (*PHK*, p.105)

T13 ‘A man cannot compare 2 things without perceiving them each, ergo he cannot say any thing which is not an idea is like or unlike an idea.’ (*Philosophical Commentaries*)

P1 X and Y can be compared only if they can both be directly perceived.

P2 The only things that we can directly perceive are ideas.

C1 We cannot know that an idea resembles something other than an idea.

C2 An idea cannot resemble anything other than an idea.

What is it for X to resemble Y…? X resembles Y if and only if we can directly perceive that X has the same properties as Y…?

References