

Philosophy Faculty Reading List and Course Outline 2016-2017

PART IB PAPER 01 METAPHYSICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY

SYLLABUS

- **Mind-dependence:** primary and secondary qualities, idealism.
- **Metaphysics of modality:** modal realism and alternatives.
- **The nature of knowledge:** externalism and internalism; theories of warrant and justification.
- **Scepticism:** the problem of scepticism and responses.
- **Sources of knowledge:** evidence; perception; a priori knowledge; testimony; induction.

COURSE OUTLINE

This course is compulsory for all students taking Part IB. It aims to develop students' knowledge of metaphysics (building on Part IA, paper 1) and to introduce them to the central questions in epistemology, the theory of knowledge.

Metaphysics has traditionally been concerned with the most general aspects of reality. One broad topic on this paper is the question of the extent to which reality is mind-dependent. Some philosophers have argued from the nature of perception that reality must be dependent on our minds. There is also a long tradition that has distinguished between 'primary' qualities which things have quite independently of us, and 'secondary' qualities which are somehow more subjective and therefore mind-dependent.

Another topic on this paper is the nature of modality: that is, possibility and necessity. Are necessities and possibilities genuine features of reality, or are they just dependent on how we think about reality?

The remaining topics on this paper are epistemological. One concerns the nature of knowledge itself. Knowledge has traditionally been understood as requiring justification or warrant or reason for belief. How should justification itself be understood? One debate here is about whether justification must have foundations, or whether it can consist in having a coherent system of beliefs. Another debate is about whether the justification for a belief requires that the knower be aware of this justification: 'internalists' say yes, 'externalists' say no.

Another epistemological topic is scepticism. Sceptical arguments aim to show that we do not have the knowledge we think we have. How should we respond to these arguments?

The third epistemological topic concerns the sources of our knowledge. Empirical

knowledge is knowledge that is based on experience in some way; a priori knowledge is knowledge that is not so based. We also gain knowledge from the testimony of others and from induction.

Prerequisites

None

Objectives

Students taking this paper will be expected to:

1. Acquire a detailed knowledge of some of the concepts, positions and arguments in the central literature on the topics of the course.
2. Acquire some sense of how the positions on different topics relate to each other.
3. Engage closely and critically with some of the ideas studied.
4. Develop their ability to think independently about the topics covered.

Preliminary reading

A useful introduction to some of the metaphysical topics of this paper is:

MACKIE, J.L., *Problems from Locke* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), chs. 1 & 2.
Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/0198750366.001.0001>.

A useful introduction to epistemology is:

FELDMAN, Richard, *Epistemology* (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003).

An excellent collection of reading is:

SOSA, Ernest, *et al.*, eds., *Epistemology: An Anthology*. 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008). Referred to below as SOSA.

READING LIST

Reading on this list is divided into three sections:

- (A) Introductory reading: a good place to start, to familiarise yourself with the issue and the central arguments.
- (B) Essential reading: something that everyone who wants a proper coverage of the subject must read. Note that some things which are on list (B) will also be on list (A).
- (C) Further reading: things to read in order to further develop your views, deepening and broadening your knowledge.

MIND-DEPENDENCE

Primary and Secondary Qualities

(A) Introductory reading

- ARMSTRONG, David M., *A Materialist Theory of the Mind* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968), ch.12 'The Secondary Qualities'. Also available online at: <http://lib.myilibrary.com/?id=5833>.
- BENNETT, Jonathan, *Learning from Six Philosophers* Vol. 2 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), ch. 25 'Secondary Qualities'. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/0198250924.003.0005>.
- BERKELEY, George, *Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous*, Dialogues 1 & 2. Also available online at: www.dawsonera.com.
- LOCKE, John, *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Book 2, ch. 8 'Some further considerations concerning our simple Ideas'.
- MACKIE, J.L., *Problems from Locke* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), ch. 1 'Primary and secondary qualities'. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/0198750366.003.0002>.

(B) Essential reading

- BERKELEY, George, *Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge*, sects. 1-15. Also available online at: www.dawsonera.com.
- GALILEI, Galileo, 'Two Kinds of Properties', in A. Danto and S. Morgenbesser, eds., *Philosophy of Science: Readings* (New York, NY: Meridian Books, 1960), pp. 27-32. Also available on [Moodle](#).
- MCGINN, Colin, *The Subjective View* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), ch. 2 'Some preliminary theses'. Also available on [Moodle](#).

(C) Further reading

- BOLTON, Derek, 'Life-Form and Idealism', in G. Vesey, ed., *Idealism Past and Present*. Cambridge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 269-84. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1017/S0957042X00001656>.
- FOSTER, John, *A World for Us: The Case for Phenomenalist Idealism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199297139.001.0001>.
- SMITH, A.D., 'Berkeley's Central Argument against Material Substance', in H. Robinson and J. Foster, eds., *Essays on Berkeley: A Tercentennial Celebration* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), pp. 37-57.
- STROUD, Barry, *The Quest for Reality: Subjectivism and the Metaphysics of Colour* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), chs. 1 & 2. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/0195151887.001.0001>.

Idealism

(A) Introductory reading

- RUSSELL, Bertrand, *The Problems of Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), ch. 4 'Idealism'. Also available online at: www.dawsonera.com.
- SPRIGGE, T.L.S., 'Idealism', in R.M. Gale, ed., *Blackwell Guide to Metaphysics* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), pp. 219-41. Also available online at: www.dawsonera.com.

(B) Essential reading

- BERKELEY, George, *Principles of Human Knowledge*.
- BERKELEY, George, *Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous*.

Both these works are reprinted in M. Ayers, ed., *George Berkeley: Philosophical Works* (London: Everyman, 1994) or in Howard Robinson, ed., and with his introduction, *Principles of Human Knowledge and Three dialogues* (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1996), which is also available online at: www.dawsonera.com.

- FOSTER, John, 'The Succinct Case for Idealism', in H. Robinson, ed., *Objections to Physicalism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), pp. 293-313. Also available on [Moodle](#).

- STOVE, David C., *Plato Cult and Other Philosophical Follies* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), ch. 6 'Idealism: A Victorian Horror-Story (Part Two)'. Also available on [Moodle](#).

(C) Further reading

- BOLTON, Derek, 'Life-Form and Idealism', in G. Vesey, ed., *Idealism Past and Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 269-84. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1017/S0957042X00001656>.
- FOSTER, John, *A World for Us: The Case for Phenomenalist Idealism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199297139.001.0001>.
- SMART, J.J.C., 'Realism V. Idealism', *Philosophy*, 61, no. 237 (1986): 295-312. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3750295>. Reprinted in his *Essays Metaphysical and Moral* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), pp. 169-86.
- SMITH, A.D., 'Berkeley's Central Argument against Material Substance', in H. Robinson and J. Foster, eds., *Essays on Berkeley: A Tercentennial Celebration* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), pp. 37-57.

METAPHYSICS OF MODALITY

Modal Realism and Alternatives

(A) Introductory reading

- LEWIS, David, *On the Plurality of Worlds* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), ch. 1, sect. 1 & 2; ch. 2; ch. 3, sects. 1-2; ch. 4, sects. 1-2.
- MELIA, Joseph, *Modality* (London: Acumen, 2003), chs. 4-7. Also available online at: <http://lib.myilibrary.com/?id=292135>.
- PLANTINGA, Alvin, *The Nature of Necessity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974), chs. 1 & 4. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/0198244142.001.0001>.

(B) Essential reading

- FORBES, Graeme, *The Metaphysics of Modality* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), ch. 1 'Propositional Modal Logic'. Also available on [Moodle](#).
- FRENCH, P.A., T.E. UEHLING, and H.K. WETTSTEIN, eds., *Studies in Essentialism, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 11*. (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1986). Also available online at: <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/misp.1986.11.issue-1/issuetoc>. [Papers by Adams, Stalnaker and Van Inwagen]
- KRIPKE, Saul, *Naming and Necessity* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980). [Look in the index for the references to 'possible worlds']
- LOUX, Michael, *The Possible and the Actual* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1979). [Loux's introduction and the papers by Adams, Lewis, Plantinga and Stalnaker]

(C) Further reading

- ARMSTRONG, D.M., *A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
- BALDWIN, Thomas, 'The Inaugural Address: Kantian Modality', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Suppl. Vol.*, 76 (2002): 1-24. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4106963>
- BENNETT, Karen, 'Two Axes of Actualism', *The Philosophical Review*, 114, no. 3 (2005): 297-326. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/30043678>
- LOWE, E.J., *A Survey of Metaphysics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), ch. 7 'Possible Worlds'.
- ROSEN, Gideon, 'Modal Fictionalism', *Mind*, 99 (1990): 327-54. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2255102>

THE NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE

NB There are a number of themes here: the definition of knowledge in terms of justified true belief; whether knowledge has foundations; whether knowledge can be defined at all. Ask your supervisor for guidance on which readings to pursue.

Introductory reading

- ARMSTRONG, D.M., *Belief, Truth, and Knowledge* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973). Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511570827>.
- CRAIG, Edward J., *Knowledge and the State of Nature* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990). Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/0198238797.001.0001>.
- FELDMAN, Richard, *Epistemology* (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003), chs. 2 & 3. [but see also for foundationalism and coherentism, pp. 49-60; and pp. 60-70]
- GETTIER, Edmund, 'Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?' *Analysis*, 23 (1963): 121-23. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3326922> [Famous discussion of the definition of knowledge]
- NOZICK, Robert, *Philosophical Explanations* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), ch. 3, sects. 1, 'Knowledge'.

Further reading

- NAGEL, Jennifer, 'Knowledge as a Mental State' in T. Szabó Gendler and J. Hawthorne, eds., *Oxford Studies in Epistemology*. Vol 4 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 275-310.

Externalism and Internalism, Theories of Warrant and Justification

For the definitions of these terms, see the course outline at the beginning of this reading list.

(A) Introductory reading

- BONJOUR, Laurence, 'Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge', in S. Bernecker and F. Dretske, eds., *Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). Reprinted in H. Kornblith, ed., *Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001) and in SOSA.
- FELDMAN, Richard, and Earl CONEE, 'Internalism Defended', *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 38 (2001): 1-18. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20010019>. Reprinted in H. Kornblith, ed., *Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001).

(B) Essential reading

- GOLDMAN, Alvin, 'Internalism Exposed', *Journal of Philosophy*, 96 (1999): 271-93. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2564679>. Reprinted in H. Kornblith, ed., *Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001). Also in E. Sosa et al., eds., *Epistemology: An Anthology* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008).

- GOLDMAN, Alvin, 'What Is Justified Belief?' in G. Pappas, ed., *Justification and Knowledge* (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1979), pp. 1-23. Also available on [Moodle](#). Reprinted in SOSA. Also in D. Pritchard and R. Neta, eds., *Arguing about Knowledge* (London: Routledge, 2009).
- SOSA, Ernest, *Knowledge in Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 270-95 'Intellectual Virtue in Perspective'. Also available on [Moodle](#).
- STROUD, Barry, 'Understanding Human Knowledge in General', in H. Kornblith, ed., *Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001). Reprinted in B. Stroud, ed., *Understanding Human Knowledge* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/0199252130.001.0001>.
- ZAGZEBSKI, Linda, 'The Inescapability of Gettier Problems', *The Philosophical Quarterly*, 44, no. 174 (1994): 65-73. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2220147>

(C) Further reading

- BONJOUR, Laurence, and Ernest SOSA, *Epistemic Justification* (Malden, MA Blackwell, 2003).
- PLANTINGA, Alvin, *Warrant: The Current Debate* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/0195078624.001.0001>.
- SOSA, Ernest, 'The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence versus Foundations in the Theory of Knowledge', *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, 5 (1980): 3-26. <http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4975.1980.tb00394.x>
- WEDGWOOD, Ralph, 'Internalism Explained', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 65, no. 2 (2002): 349-69. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3070996>
- WILLIAMSON, Timothy, *Knowledge and Its Limits* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), chs. 1 & 9. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/019925656X.001.0001>.

SCEPTICISM

The Problem of Scepticism

(A) Introductory reading

- DESCARTES, René, *Meditations on First Philosophy*, Meditations 1 and 2. [Any edition]
- HUME, David, *Treatise on Human Nature*. Any ed., Book I, part IV, sect. 2. Also available online at: <http://pm.nlx.com>.
- STROUD, Barry, *The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), ch. 1 'The Problem of the external World'. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/0198247613.003.0001>.
- WILLIAMS, Michael, 'Skepticism', in J. Greco and E. Sosa, eds., *The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), pp. 35-69.

(B) Essential reading

- DRETSKE, Fred, 'Epistemic Operators', *Journal of Philosophy*, 67 (1970): 1007-23. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2024710>. Reprinted in K. DeRose and T. Warfield, eds., *Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
- NOZICK, Robert, *Philosophical Explanations* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), ch. 3, sects. 1 & 2, pp. 167-247.
- UNGER, Peter, 'A Defense of Skepticism', *Philosophical Review*, 80 (1971): 198-219. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2184030>. Reprinted in S. Bernecker and F. Dretske, eds., *Knowledge* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

(C) Further reading

- VOGEL, Jonathan, 'The Refutation of Skepticism', in M. Steup and E. Sosa, eds., *Contemporary Debates in Epistemology* (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2005; 2nd ed. 2014), pp. 72-84. Also available online at: www.dawsonera.com.
- WILLIAMSON, Timothy, *Knowledge and Its Limits* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), ch. 8 'Scepticism'. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/019925656X.003.0009>.
- WILLIAMSON, Timothy, 'Knowledge and Scepticism', in F. Jackson and M. Smith, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199234769.003.0023>.

Responses to Scepticism

NB This section contains a number of different kinds of response to the sceptical problem: 'Moorean' (dogmatic) and contextualist solutions are among the proposals listed below.

(A) Introductory reading

- DEROSE, Keith, 'Introduction: Responding to Scepticism', in K. DeRose and T. Warfield, eds., *Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
- MOORE, G. E., *Extracts From "Proof of an External World", "Four Forms of Scepticism" And "Certainty"*. In SOSA.
- PRITCHARD, Duncan, *What Is This Thing Called Knowledge?* (London: Routledge, 2006), chs. 11 & 12.

(B) Essential reading

- COHEN, Stewart, 'Contextualist Solutions to Epistemological Problems', *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 76 (1998): 289-306. <http://doi.org/10.1080/00048409812348411>. Reprinted in SOSA.
- DRETSKE, Fred, 'Externalism and Modest Contextualism', *Erkenntnis*, 61 (2004): 173-86. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20013286>

KELLY, Thomas, 'Moorean Facts and Belief Revision or Can the Skeptic Win?' *Philosophical Perspectives*, 19 (2005): 179-209.

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/3840894>

PRYOR, James, 'The Skeptic and the Dogmatist', *Noûs*, 34, no. 4 (2000): 517-49.

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/2671880>

(C) Further reading

HAWTHORNE, John, 'Sensitive Moderate Invariantism', in J. Hawthorne, ed., *Knowledge and Lotteries* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), ch. 4. Also available online at:

<http://doi.org/10.1093/1099269556.003.0004>. Reprinted in SOSA.

MACFARLANE, John, 'The Assessment Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions', *Oxford Studies in Epistemology*, 1 (2005): 197-233.

<http://www.johnmacfarlane.net/reknow.pdf>. Reprinted in SOSA.

PRYOR, James, 'What's Wrong with Moore's Argument?' *Philosophical Issues*, 14 (2004): 349-78. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3050634>

RINARD, Susanna, 'Why Philosophy Can Overturn Common-Sense', *Oxford Studies in Epistemology*, 4 (2013): 185-213. <http://philpapers.org/archive/RINWPC.pdf>

SOSA, Ernest, 'How to Defeat Opposition to Moore', *Philosophical Perspectives*, 13 (1999): 141-53. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2676100>. Reprinted in SOSA.

WHITE, Roger, 'Problems for Dogmatism', *Philosophical Studies*, 131 (2006): 525-57.

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/25471823>

SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE

Evidence

(A) Introductory reading

KELLY, Thomas, 'Evidence', in E.N. Zalta, ed., *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2014 Edition)* [Online]. Available at:

<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/evidence/> (Accessed: 22 July 2016).

KELLY, Thomas, 'Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence', in I. Alvin, I. Goldman and D. Whitcomb, eds., *Social Epistemology: Essential Readings* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), ch. 9, pp. 183-217. Also available online at:

www.dawsonera.com.

WILLIAMSON, Timothy, *The Philosophy of Philosophy* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008), ch. 7 'Evidence in philosophy'.

(B) Essential reading

CHRISTENSEN, David, 'Higher-Order Evidence', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 81 (2010): 185-215. <http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00366.x>

ELGA, Adam, 'Reflection and Disagreement', *Noûs*, 41 (2007): 478-502.

<http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00656.x>

KELLY, Thomas, 'The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement', *Oxford Studies in Epistemology*, 1 (2005): 167-96. <https://www.princeton.edu/~tkelly/esod.pdf>

(C) Further reading

CHRISTENSEN, David, 'Epistemology and Disagreement: the Good News', *Philosophical Review*, 116 (2007): 187-217. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20446955>

ELGA, Adam, 'Lucky to Be Rational'. (unpublished ms.). Available online at:

<http://www.princeton.edu/~adame/papers/bellingham-lucky.pdf>.

WHITE, Roger, 'You Just Believe That Because...' *Philosophical Perspectives*, 24 (2010): 573-615. <http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1520-8583.2010.00204.x>

Perception

(A) Introductory reading

BERKELEY, George, *Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous*, Dialogues 1 & 2.

CRANE, Tim, 'The Problem of Perception', in E.N. Zalta, ed., *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2014 edition)* [Online]. Available at:

<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/perception-problem> (Accessed: 22 July 2016).

MARTIN, M.G.F., 'Perception', in A.C. Grayling, ed., *Philosophy 1: A Guide through the Subject* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 26-42.

MACPHERSON, Fiona, 'Perception, Philosophical Perspectives', in T. Bayne, A. Cleeremans and P. Wilken, eds., *The Oxford Companion to Consciousness* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 502-8. Also available online at:

www.oxfordreference.com/views/BOOK_SEARCH.html?book=t313.

(B) Essential reading

ARMSTRONG, D. M., *A Materialist Theory of the Mind* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968), ch. 10 'Perception and belief'. Also available online at

<http://lib.myilibrary.com/?id=5833>. Reprinted in J. Dancy, ed., *Perceptual knowledge* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).

ROBINSON, Howard, *Perception* (London: Routledge, 1994), chs. 2, 3, 5, 8 & 9.

SEARLE, John, *Intentionality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), ch.2. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139173452>.

SMITH, A. D., *The Problem of Perception* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002).

SNOWDON, Paul F., 'Perception, Vision and Causation', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 81 (1980): 175-92. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4544972>

STRAWSON, P.F., 'Perception and Its Objects', in G.F. MacDonald, ed., *Perception and Identity: Essays Presented to A.J. Ayer* (London: Macmillan, 1979), pp. 41-60. Also available on [Moodle](http://www.moodle.org). Reprinted in J.Dancy, ed., *Perceptual Knowledge* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).

(C) Further reading

- BYRNE, Alex, and Heather LOGUE, eds., *Disjunctivism* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009). Also available online at: www.dawsonera.com. [Introduction and essays by Martin, Snowdon and Hinton]
- GENDLER, Tamar Szabó, and John HAWTHORNE, *Perceptual Experience* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). Also available online at: <http://lib.myilibrary.com/?id=87011>. [Essays by Chalmers and Crane]
- HADDOCK, Adrian, and Fiona MACPHERSON, eds., *Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 'Introduction: Varieties of Disjunctivism'. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231546.003.0001>.
- SIEGEL, Susanna, 'Subject and Object in the Contents of Visual Experience', *Philosophical Review*, 115, no. 3 (2006): 355-88. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20446911>

A Priori Knowledge

(A) Introductory reading

- AYER, A.J., *Language, Truth and Logic* (London: Gollancz, 1936; 2nd ed. 1946), ch. 4 'The A Priori'. Reprinted in P. Moser, ed., *A Priori Knowledge* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).
- BONJOUR, Laurence, *In Defense of Pure Reason* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), ch. 1 'Introduction: the problem of a priori justification'.
- CASSAM, Quassim, *The Possibility of Knowledge* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), ch. 6 'A Priori Knowledge'. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199208319.003.0006>.
- JENKINS ICHIKAWA, Carrie, 'A Priori Knowledge: Debates and Developments', *Philosophy Compass*, 3, no. 3 (2008): 436-50. Available online only at: <http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2008.00136.x>.

(B) Essential reading

- BOGHOSIAN, Paul, 'Analyticity Reconsidered', *Noûs*, 30 (1996): 360-91. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2216275>. Also published as 'Analyticity' in B. Hale and C. Wright, eds., *A Companion to the Philosophy of Language* (Oxford: Blackwell 1999).
- GIAQUINTO, Marcus, 'Non-Analytic Conceptual Knowledge', *Mind*, 105 (1996): 249-68. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2254561>
- KANT, Immanuel, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Introduction I-IV.
- KRIPKE, Saul, 'Identity and Necessity', in A.W. Moore, ed., *Meaning and Reference* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), ch. 10. Also available on [Moodle](http://moodle.org). Reprinted in T. Honderich & M. Burnyeat, eds., *Philosophy As It Is* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979).
- MOSER, Paul K., ed., *A Priori Knowledge* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987). [Essays by Quine and Putnam]

(C) Further reading

- ANTONY, Louise, 'A Naturalized Approach to the a Priori', *Philosophical Issues*, 14 (2004): 1-17. <http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1533-6077.2004.00017.x>
- CASULLO, Albert, 'Revisability, Reliabilism and a Priori Knowledge', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 49 (1988): 187-213. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2107973>
- DEVITT, Michael, 'There Is No a Priori', in M. Steup and E. Sosa, eds., *Contemporary Debates in Epistemology* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005; 2nd ed. 2014), pp. 105-15 (1st ed.); pp. 05-15 (2nd ed.). Also available online at: www.dawsonera.com.
- FIELD, Hartry, 'Recent Debates About the a Priori', *Oxford Studies in Epistemology*, 1 (2005): 69-88. Also available online at: www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/field/papers/RecentDebates.pdf.
- KITCHER, Philip, 'A Priori Knowledge', *Philosophical Review*, 89 (1980): 3-23. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2184861>
- WILLIAMSON, Timothy, *The Philosophy of Philosophy* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008), chs. 4, 6-7.

Testimony

(A) Introductory reading

- ADLER, Jonathan, 'Epistemological Problems of Testimony', in E.N. Zalta, ed., *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition)* [Online]. Available at: <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/testimony-episprob> (Accessed: 01 July 2015).
- LACKEY, Jennifer, 'Introduction', in J. Lackey and E. Sosa, eds., *The Epistemology of Testimony* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 1-21. Also available online at: www.dawsonera.com.

(B) Essential reading

- FAULKNER, Paul, 'The Social Character of Testimonial Knowledge', *The Journal of Philosophy*, 97 (2000): 581-601. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2678453>
- FRICKER, Elizabeth, 'Telling and Trusting: Reductionism and Anti-Reductionism of Testimony', *Mind*, 104 (1995): 393-411. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2254797>
- HUME, David, *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, (1748 or any edition), sect. X.
- LACKEY, Jennifer, 'It Takes Two to Tango: Beyond Reductionism and Non-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony', in J. Lackey and E. Sosa, eds., *The Epistemology of Testimony* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 160-89. Also available online at: www.dawsonera.com.
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- REID, Thomas, *An Inquiry into the Human Mind and the Principles of Common Sense*, (1764). Excerpts in 1975 ed. (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1975), ch. 6, sect. 24.

(C) Further reading

- BURGE, Tyler, 'Content Preservation', *The Philosophical Review*, 102 (1993): 457-88.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/2185680>
- COADY, C.A., *Testimony: A Philosophical Study* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).
Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/0198235518.001.0001>.
- ELGIN, Catherine, 'Take it from Me', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 65 (2002): 291-308. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3070993>
- FRICKER, Elizabeth, 'Second-Hand Knowledge', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 73, no. 3 (2006): 592-618. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40041012>
- FRICKER, Miranda, *Epistemic Injustice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), chs. 1-4.
Also available online at:
<http://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198237907.001.0001>.
- LACKEY, Jennifer, *Learning from Words* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), ch. 5 'A Critique of Reductionism and Non-Reductionism'. Also available online at:
<http://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199219162.003.0006>.

Induction

(A) Introductory reading

- RUSSELL, Bertrand, *The Problems of Philosophy* (London: Williams and Norgate, 1912), chs. 6 & 7. Also available online at: <http://www.wmcarey.edu/crockett/russell/>.

(B) Essential reading

- HUME, David, *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, Part IV. Also available online at: <http://lib.myilibrary.com/?id=116084>.
- GOODMAN, Nelson, 'The New Riddle of Induction', in *Fact, Fiction and Forecast* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1955; 4th ed. 1983), pp. 63-86 (pp. 59-83 in 4th ed.). Also available on [Moodle](#).

(C) Further reading

- STOVE, D.C., *The Rationality of Induction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).
- MELLOR, D.H., 'The Warrant of Induction', in his *Matters of Metaphysics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 254-68. Also available online at:
<http://www.dspace.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/3475>.

Classical induction is now frequently subsumed under the broader notion of inference to the best explanation. For an introduction to this see:

- LIPTON, Peter, *Inference to the Best Explanation*. 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2004).
Also available online at: <http://www.myilibrary.com?ID=11209>.

For discussion of whether deduction suffers from the same kinds of difficulties as induction see:

- DUMMETT, Michael, *The Justification of Deduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974). Reprinted in his *Truth and Other Enigmas* (London: Duckworth, 1978), pp. 290-318.
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