

Philosophy Faculty Reading List and Course Outline 2017-2018

PART IB PAPER 01 METAPHYSICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY

SYLLABUS

- **Qualities:** the primary and secondary distinction; response-dependence; dispositions.
- **Metaphysics of modality:** modal realism and alternatives.
- **The nature of knowledge:** externalism and internalism; theories of warrant and justification.
- **Scepticism:** the problem of scepticism and responses.
- **Sources of knowledge:** evidence; perception; *a priori* knowledge; testimony; induction.

COURSE OUTLINE

This course is compulsory for all students taking Part IB. It aims to develop students' knowledge of metaphysics (building on Part IA, paper 1) and to introduce them to the central questions in epistemology, the theory of knowledge.

Metaphysics has traditionally been concerned with the most general aspects of reality. One broad topic on this paper is the nature of qualities. There is also a long tradition that has distinguished between 'primary' qualities, which are quite independent from us, and 'secondary' qualities, which are somehow more subjective and therefore mind-dependent. Another central debate concerns the nature of dispositions.

Another topic on this paper is the nature of modality: that is, possibility and necessity. Are necessities and possibilities genuine features of reality, or are they just dependent on how we think about reality?

The remaining topics on this paper are epistemological. One concerns the nature of knowledge itself. Knowledge has traditionally been understood as requiring justification or warrant or reason for belief. How should justification itself be understood? One debate here is about whether justification must have foundations, or whether it can consist in having a coherent system of beliefs. Another debate is about whether the justification for a belief requires that the knower be aware of this justification: 'internalists' say yes, 'externalists' say no.

Another epistemological topic is scepticism. Sceptical arguments aim to show that we do not have the knowledge we think we have. How should we respond to these arguments?

The third epistemological topic concerns the sources of our knowledge. Empirical knowledge is knowledge that is based on experience in some way; a priori knowledge is knowledge that is not so based. We also gain knowledge from the testimony of others and from induction. Each of these raise their own specific challenges.

Prerequisites

The course builds on material developed in paper 1 of IA and as such presupposes familiarity with the material covered there.

Objectives

Students taking this paper will be expected to:

1. Acquire a detailed knowledge of some of the concepts, positions and arguments in the central literature on the topics of the course.
2. Acquire some sense of how the positions on different topics relate to each other.
3. Engage closely and critically with some of the ideas studied.
4. Develop their ability to think independently about the topics covered.

Preliminary Reading

A useful introduction to some of the metaphysical topics of this paper is:

MACKIE, J.L., *Problems from Locke* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), chs. 1 & 2. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/0198750366.001.0001>.

A useful introduction to epistemology is:

NAGEL, Jennifer, *Knowledge: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/acrade/9780199661268.001.0001>.

An excellent collection of reading is:

SOSA, Ernest, *et al.*, eds., *Epistemology: An Anthology*. 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008). Referred to below as SOSA.

READING LIST

QUALITIES

The Primary and Secondary Distinction

Locke distinguishes between primary qualities, like shape and size and secondary qualities, like colour and sound. What is his argument for the distinction?

The original argument can be found in:

*LOCKE, John, *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Book 2, ch. 8 'Some further considerations concerning our simple Ideas'.

See also:

*GALILEO, 'Two Kinds of Properties', in A. Danto and S. Morgenbesser, eds., *Philosophy of Science: Readings* (New York, NY: Meridian Books, 1960), pp. 27-32. Also available on [Moodle](#).

For criticism by Berkeley, see:

*BERKELEY, George, *Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge*, sects. 1-15. Also available online at: www.dawsonera.com.

*BERKELEY, George, *Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous*, Dialogues 1 & 2. Also available online at www.dawsonera.com.

For attempted reconstructions of Locke's argument and discussion:

*BENNETT, Jonathan, *Learning from Six Philosophers* Vol. 2 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), ch. 25 'Secondary Qualities'. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/0198250924.003.0005>.

*MACKIE, J.L., *Problems from Locke* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), ch. 1 'Primary and secondary qualities'. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/0198750366.003.0002>.

*WILSON, Margaret D., 'History of Philosophy in Philosophy Today; and the Case of the Sensible Qualities', *The Philosophical Review*, 101, no. 1 (1992): 191-243. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2185046>. [Section 2, pp. 209–33 for a survey of interpretations of Locke's argument for the primary-secondary quality distinction and Section 3, pp. 234–43 for some philosophical questions raised by Locke's discussion]

BOLTON, Martha Brandt, 'Locke and Pyrrhonism: The Doctrine of Primary and Secondary Qualities', in M. Burnyeat, ed., *The Sceptical Tradition* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1983), pp. 353-75.

JACOVIDES, Michael, 'Locke's Resemblance Theses', *The Philosophical Review*, 108 (1999): 461-96. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2998285>

SMITH, A.D., 'Berkeley's Central Argument against Material Substance', in H. Robinson and J. Foster, eds., *Essays on Berkeley: A Tercentennial Celebration* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), pp. 37-57.

Dispositions

One important question is whether we can analyse disposition ascriptions in terms of conditional statements.

*LEWIS, David, 'Finkish Dispositions', *The Philosophical Quarterly*, 47 (1997): 143-58. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00052>

*MELLOR, D.H., 'In Defense of Dispositions', *The Philosophical Review*, 83 (1974): 157-81. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2184136>

*PRIOR, Elizabeth, Robert PARGETTER, and Frank JACKSON, 'Three Theses about Dispositions', *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 19 (1982): 251-57. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20013964>.

BIRD, Alexander, 'Dispositions and Antidotes', *The Philosophical Quarterly*, 48 (1998): 227-34. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00098>

MANLEY, David, and Ryan WASSERMAN, 'On Linking Dispositions and Conditionals', *Mind*, 117 (2008): 59-84. <https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzn003>

MARTIN, C. B., 'Dispositions and Conditionals', *The Philosophical Quarterly*, 44 (1994): 1-8. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2220143>

PRIOR, Elizabeth, 'The Dispositional/Categorical Distinction', *Analysis*, 42 (1982): 93-96. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3327934>

Regress Problem

Another concern is whether all dispositions have causal bases.

BIRD, Alexander, 'The Regress of Pure Powers', *The Philosophical Quarterly*, 57 (2007): 513-34. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4543263>

BLACKBURN, Simon, 'Filling in Space', *Analysis*, 50 (1990): 62-65. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3328847>

HOLTON, Richard, 'Dispositions All the Way Round', *Analysis*, 59 (1999): 9-14. <https://doi.org/10.1093/analysis/59.1.9>

MCKITRICK, Jennifer, 'The Bare Metaphysical Possibility of Bare Dispositions', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 66, no. 2 (1999): 349-69. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20140540>

Dispositions and their Ontology

For some further questions about the nature of dispositions, see:

ARMSTRONG, David, 'Four Disputes About Properties', *Synthese*, 144 (2005): 309-20. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20118566>

ARMSTRONG, David, *A World of States of Affairs* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), chs. 3 & 4. Also available online at: <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511583308>.

BIRD, Alexander, *Nature's Metaphysics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199227013.001.0001>.

HEIL, John, *From an Ontological Point of View* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), ch. 11 'The identity theory'. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/0199259747.003.0011>.

Response-Dependence

Response-dependent concepts are those whose extension is in some way essentially determined by human responses. Some have thought that colours are response-dependent. Are response-dependent properties less objective?

- *JOHNSTON, Mark, 'Explanation, Response-Dependence, and Judgement-Dependence', in P. Menzies, ed., *Response Dependent Concepts. Working Papers in Philosophy No. 1* (Canberra, ACT: Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1991).
- *JOHNSTON, Mark, 'How to Speak of the Colors', *Philosophical Studies*, 68 (1992): 221-63. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4320356>
- *PETTIT, Philip, 'Realism and Response-Dependence', *Mind*, 100 (1991): 587-626. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2255012>
- *SMITH, Michael, David LEWIS, and Mark JOHNSTON, 'Dispositional Theories of Value', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes*, 63 (1989): 89-111, 13-37 & 39-74. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4106918>
- HOLTON, Richard, 'Intentions, Response-Dependence and Immunity from Error', in P. Menzies, ed., *Response Dependent Concepts. Working Papers in Philosophy No. 1* (Canberra, ACT: Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1991), pp. 83-121.
- JOHNSTON, Mark, 'Are Manifest Qualities Response-Dependent?' *The Monist*, 81 (1998): 3-43. <https://doi.org/10.5840/monist199881110>
- PETTIT, Philip, *The Common Mind* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/0195106458.001.0001>.
- ROSEN, Gideon, 'Objectivity and Modern Idealism: What Is the Question?' in J. O'Leary-Hawthorne and M. Michael, eds., *Philosophy in Mind* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994), pp. 277-319. Also available on [Moodle](#).
- WEDGWOOD, Ralph, 'The Essence of Response-Dependence', *European Review of Philosophy*, 3 (1997): 31-54. Also available on [Moodle](#).

METAPHYSICS OF MODALITY

Modal Realism and Alternatives

What is the nature of modality? For an overview over the philosophical terrain, see:

MELIA, Joseph, *Modality* (London: Acumen, 2003), chs. 4-7. Also available online at: <http://lib.myilibrary.com/?id=292135>.

Central debates concern the nature of possible world, the analysis of our modal concepts and whether we can give a fully reductive account of modal language.

- *FORBES, Graeme, *The Metaphysics of Modality* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), ch. 1 'Propositional modal logic'. Also available on [Moodle](#).
- *FRENCH, P.A., T.E. UEHLING, and H.K. WETTSTEIN, eds., *Studies in Essentialism, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 11* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1986). Also available online at: <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/misp.1986.11.issue-1/issuetoc>. [Papers by Adams, Stalnaker and Van Inwagen]
- *KRIPKE, Saul, *Naming and Necessity* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980). [Look in the index for the references to 'possible worlds']
- *LEWIS, David, *On the Plurality of Worlds* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), ch. 1, sect. 1-2; ch. 2; ch. 3, sects. 1-2; ch. 4, sects. 1-2.
- *LOUX, Michael, *The Possible and the Actual* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1979). [Loux's introduction and the papers by Adams, Lewis, Plantinga and Stalnaker]
- *PLANTINGA, Alvin, *The Nature of Necessity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974), chs. 1 & 4. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/0198244142.001.0001>.
- ARMSTRONG, D.M., *A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). Also available online at: <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139172226>.
- BALDWIN, Thomas, 'The Inaugural Address: Kantian Modality', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Suppl. Vol.*, 76 (2002): 1-24. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4106963>
- BENNETT, Karen, 'Two Axes of Actualism', *The Philosophical Review*, 114, no. 3 (2005): 297-326. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/30043678>
- LOWE, E.J., *A Survey of Metaphysics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), ch. 7 'Possible worlds'.
- ROSEN, Gideon, 'Modal Fictionalism', *Mind*, 99 (1990): 327-54. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2255102>

THE NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE

What is knowledge and how should we study it? Once central question is whether it is possible to give an account of knowledge in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions.

- *GETTIER, Edmund, 'Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?' *Analysis*, 23 (1963): 121-23. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3326922> [Famous discussion of the definition of knowledge]
- *NOZICK, Robert, *Philosophical Explanations* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), ch. 3, sects. 1, 'Knowledge'.
- *WILLIAMSON, Timothy, *Knowledge and Its Limits* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), Introduction & ch. 1. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/019925656X.001.0001>.
- *ZAGZEBSKI, Linda, 'The Inescapability of Gettier Problems', *The Philosophical Quarterly*, 44, no. 174 (1994): 65-73. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2220147>
- FELDMAN, Richard, *Epistemology* (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003), chs. 2 & 3. [But see also for foundationalism and coherentism, pp. 49-60; and pp. 60-70]

GOLDMAN, Alvin I., 'A Causal Theory of Knowing', *The Journal of Philosophy*, 64, no. 12 (1967): 357-72. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2024268>

Others have suggested that rather than trying to analyse the concept of knowledge, we should examine its function.

*CRAIG, Edward J., *Knowledge and the State of Nature* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990). Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/0198238797.001.0001>.

HASLANGER, Sally, 'What Knowledge Is and What It Ought to Be: Feminist Values and Normative Epistemology', *Noûs*, 33, no. 13 (1999): 459-80. <http://doi.org/10.1111/0029-4624.33.s13.20>

Yet others have suggested we study knowledge as a "natural kind":

*KORNBLITH, Hilary, *Knowledge and Its Place in Nature* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), chs. 1 & 2.

NAGEL, Jennifer, 'Knowledge as a Mental State', in T.S. Gendler and J. Hawthorne, eds., *Oxford Studies in Epistemology*. Vol. 4 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 275-310.

QUINE, Willard. V.O., 'Epistemology Naturalized', in his *Ontological Relativity and Other Essays* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1969), pp. 69-90.

Virtue epistemologists argue that we should study knowledge by focussing on intellectual virtues:

SOSA, Ernest, *A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge*. Vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), chs. 2 & 5. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199297023.001.0001>.

ZAGZEBSKI, Linda, *Virtues of the Mind*. Vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Also available online at: <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139174763>. [Particularly, Part I]

Externalism and Internalism, Theories of Warrant and Justification

A central disagreement in epistemology concerns the nature of epistemic justification. Does justification depend only on an agent's mental states or also on what is going on in the 'external' environment? A second, related dispute concerns whether we always have access to what justifies our beliefs.

*BONJOUR, Laurence, 'Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge', in S. Bernecker and F. Dretske, eds., *Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). Reprinted in H. Kornblith, ed., *Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001) and in SOSA.

*FELDMAN, Richard, and Earl CONEE, 'Internalism Defended', *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 38 (2001): 1-18. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20010019>. Reprinted in H. Kornblith, ed., *Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001).

*GOLDMAN, Alvin, 'Internalism Exposed', *Journal of Philosophy*, 96 (1999): 271-93. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2564679>. Reprinted in H. Kornblith, ed., *Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001). Also in E. Sosa et al., eds., *Epistemology: An Anthology* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008).

*GOLDMAN, Alvin, 'What Is Justified Belief?' in G. Pappas, ed., *Justification and Knowledge* (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1979), pp. 1-23. Also available on [Moodle](#). Reprinted in SOSA. Also in D. Pritchard and R. Neta, eds., *Arguing about Knowledge* (London: Routledge, 2009).

BONJOUR, Laurence, and Ernest SOSA, *Epistemic Justification* (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2003).

PLANTINGA, Alvin, *Warrant: The Current Debate* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/0195078624.001.0001>.

SOSA, Ernest, *Knowledge in Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 270-95 'Intellectual Virtue in Perspective'. Also available on [Moodle](#).

SOSA, Ernest, 'The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence Versus Foundations in the Theory of Knowledge', *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, 5 (1980): 3-26. <http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4975.1980.tb00394.x>

STROUD, Barry, 'Understanding Human Knowledge in General', in H. Kornblith, ed., *Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001). Reprinted in B. Stroud, ed., *Understanding Human Knowledge* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/0199252130.001.0001>.

WEDGWOOD, Ralph, 'Internalism Explained', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 65, no. 2 (2002): 349-69. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3070996>

WILLIAMSON, Timothy, *Knowledge and Its Limits* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), ch. 9 'Evidence'. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/019925656X.001.0010>.

SCEPTICISM

The Problem of Scepticism

What is the best argument for scepticism?

*DESCARTES, René, *Meditations on First Philosophy*, Meditations 1 and 2. [Any edition]

*HUME, David, *Treatise on Human Nature*. Any ed., Book I, part IV, sect. 2. Also available online at: <http://pm.nlx.com>.

*STROUD, Barry, *The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), ch. 1 'The Problem of the external World'. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/0198247613.003.0001>.

*UNGER, Peter, 'A Defense of Skepticism', *The Philosophical Review*, 80 (1971): 198-219. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2184030>. Reprinted in S. Bernecker and F. Dretske, eds., *Knowledge* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

WILLIAMS, Michael, 'Skepticism', in J. Greco and E. Sosa, eds., *The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), pp. 35-69.

WILLIAMSON, Timothy, 'Knowledge and Scepticism', in F. Jackson and M. Smith, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 2005). Also available online at:
<http://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199234769.003.0023>.

Responses to Scepticism

There are many different strategies for responding to scepticism. For a general overview, see:

DEROSE, Keith, 'Introduction: Responding to Scepticism', in K. DeRose and T. Warfield, eds., *Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

Moorean responses:

*KELLY, Thomas, 'Moorean Facts and Belief Revision or Can the Sceptic Win?' *Philosophical Perspectives*, 19 (2005): 179-209.

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/3840894>

*MOORE, G. E., *Extracts From "Proof of an External World", "Four Forms of Scepticism" And "Certainty"*. In SOSA.

PRYOR, James, 'What's Wrong with Moore's Argument?' *Philosophical Issues*, 14 (2004): 349-78. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3050634>

RINARD, Susanna, 'Why Philosophy Can Overturn Common-Sense', *Oxford Studies in Epistemology*, 4 (2013): 185-213. <http://philpapers.org/archive/RINWPC.pdf>

SOSA, Ernest, 'How to Defeat Opposition to Moore', *Philosophical Perspectives*, 13 (1999): 141-53. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2676100>. Reprinted in SOSA.

Dogmatist responses:

*PRYOR, James, 'The Sceptic and the Dogmatist', *Noûs*, 34, no. 4 (2000): 517-49.

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/2671880>

WHITE, Roger, 'Problems for Dogmatism', *Philosophical Studies*, 131 (2006): 525-57. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25471823>

Contextualist responses:

*COHEN, Stewart, 'Contextualist Solutions to Epistemological Problems', *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 76 (1998): 289-306.

<http://doi.org/10.1080/00048409812348411>. Reprinted in SOSA.

*DRETSKE, Fred, 'Externalism and Modest Contextualism', *Erkenntnis*, 61 (2004): 173-86. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20013286>

HAWTHORNE, John, 'Sensitive Moderate Invariantism', in J. Hawthorne, ed., *Knowledge and Lotteries* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), ch. 4. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/1099269556.003.0004>. Reprinted in SOSA.

MACFARLANE, John, 'The Assessment Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions', *Oxford Studies in Epistemology*, 1 (2005): 197-233. <http://www.johnmacfarlane.net/reknow.pdf>. Reprinted in SOSA.

Denying closure:

*DRETSKE, Fred 'Epistemic Operators', *Journal of Philosophy*, 67 (1970): 1007-23. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2024710>. Reprinted in K. DeRose and T. Warfield, eds., *Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

*NOZICK, Robert, *Philosophical Explanations* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), ch. 3, sects. 1 & 2. 167-247.

Inference to the best explanation:

FUMERTON, Richard, 'The Challenge of Refuting Skepticism', in M. Steup and E. Sosa, eds., *Contemporary Debates in Epistemology* (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2005; 2nd ed. 2014), pp. 85-97. Also available online at: www.dawsonera.com.

VOGEL, Jonathan, 'The Refutation of Skepticism', in M. Steup and E. Sosa, eds., *Contemporary Debates in Epistemology* (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2005; 2nd ed. 2014), pp. 72-84. Also available online at: www.dawsonera.com.

SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE

Evidence

What is the nature of evidence? Can disagreement be a source of evidence?

*CHRISTENSEN, David, 'Epistemology and Disagreement: The Good News', *The Philosophical Review*, 116 (2007): 187-217. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20446955>

*ELGA, Adam, 'Reflection and Disagreement', *Noûs*, 41 (2007): 478-502. <http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00656.x>

*KELLY, Thomas, 'The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement', *Oxford Studies in Epistemology*, 1 (2005): 167-96. <https://www.princeton.edu/~tkelly/esod.pdf>

*KELLY, Thomas, 'Evidence', in E.N. Zalta, ed., *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition)* [Online]. Available at: <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/evidence/> (Accessed: 20 September 2017).

CHRISTENSEN, David, 'Higher-Order Evidence', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 81 (2010): 185-215. <http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00366.x>

ELGA, Adam, 'Lucky to Be Rational'. (unpublished ms.). Available online at: <http://www.princeton.edu/~adame/papers/bellingham-lucky.pdf>.

KELLY, Thomas, 'Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence', in I. Alvin, I. Goldman and D. Whitcomb, eds., *Social Epistemology: Essential Readings* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 183-217. Also available online at: www.dawsonera.com.

WHITE, Roger, 'You Just Believe That Because...' *Philosophical Perspectives*, 24 (2010): 573-615. <http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1520-8583.2010.00204.x>

Perception

- *ARMSTRONG, D. M., *A Materialist Theory of the Mind* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968), ch. 10 'Perception and belief'. Also available online at <http://lib.myilibrary.com/?id=5833>. Reprinted in J. Dancy, ed., *Perceptual Knowledge* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
- *ROBINSON, Howard, *Perception* (London: Routledge, 1994), chs. 2, 3, 5, 8 & 9.
- *SEARLE, John, *Intentionality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), ch.2 'The intentionality of perception'. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139173452>.
- *SMITH, A. D., *The Problem of Perception* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002).
- *SNOWDON, Paul F., 'Perception, Vision and Causation', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 81 (1980): 175-92. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4544972>
- *STRAWSON, P.F., 'Perception and Its Objects', in G.F. MacDonald, ed., *Perception and Identity: Essays Presented to A.J. Ayer* (London: Macmillan, 1979), pp. 41-60. Also available on [Moodle](#). Reprinted in J.Dancy, ed., *Perceptual Knowledge* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
- BERKELEY, George, *Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous*, Dialogues 1 & 2. Also available online at www.dawsonera.com.
- BYRNE, Alex, and Heather LOGUE, eds., *Disjunctivism* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009). Also available online at: www.dawsonera.com. [Introduction and essays by Martin, Snowdon and Hinton]
- CRANE, Tim, and Craig FRENCH, 'The Problem of Perception', in E.N. Zalta, ed., *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2017 edition)* [Online]. Available at: <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/perception-problem> (Accessed: 20 September 2017).
- GENDLER, Tamar Szabó, and John HAWTHORNE, *Perceptual Experience* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). Also available online at: <http://lib.myilibrary.com/?id=87011>. [Essays by Chalmers and Crane]
- HADDOCK, Adrian, and Fiona MACPHERSON, eds., *Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 'Introduction: Varieties of Disjunctivism'. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231546.003.0001>.
- MACPHERSON, Fiona, 'Perception, Philosophical Perspectives', in T. Bayne, A. Cleeremans and P. Wilken, eds., *The Oxford Companion to Consciousness* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 502-8. Also available online at: www.oxfordreference.com/views/BOOK_SEARCH.html?book=t313.
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A Priori Knowledge

A *a priori* knowledge is knowledge that is in some sense independent of sense experience. But what exactly does this "independence" amount to? And do we have any *a priori* knowledge?

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