Global Political Issues

Lecture 4: Cosmopolitanism
The plan for today...

1. Justice beyond borders

2. Cosmopolitanism

3. The law of peoples

4. Moral equality
§1. Justice beyond borders
The Prime Minister...

‘Does the British state have duties to other states?

Does it have duties of to citizens of other states?’
The Chancellor of the Exchequer...

‘The British state has no duties to other states...

...or to citizens of other states.
Normative Realism

States have the right to do whatever is in the national interest.

This is a liberty-right.

States have a duty to their citizens to do whatever is in the national interest.
An international state of nature...

‘...every Soveraign hath the same Right, in procuring the safety of his People, that any particular man can have, in procuring his own safety.’ (Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, p.244)
Explanatory Realism

States always do whatever they think is in the national interest.

Cf. the distinction between psychological egoism and ethical egoism.
The Foreign Secretary...

‘We have exactly the same duties to citizens of other states as we have to British citizens.’

This is *Cosmopolitanism*. 
Individualism

Duties are ultimately owed by and to individuals...

We are, ‘in the first instance, human beings living in a world of human beings and only incidentally members of polities.’ (Brian Barry, Statism and Nationalism, p.35)
Egalitarianism

Individuals owe and are owed the same duties regardless of their nationality or which state they are citizens of...

Cosmopolitanism ‘does not recognize any categories of people as having more or less moral weight; and it includes all human beings.’ (Brian Barry, *Statism and Nationalism*, p.36)
Institutional Cosmopolitanism

We ought to create international political institutions...

...e.g. a world state...

...or a league of nations.
Moderate Cultural Cosmopolitanism

A good life *may* involve experience of diverse cultures, languages, etc.

Extreme Cultural Cosmopolitanism

A good life *must* involve experience of diverse cultures, languages, etc.
The Home Secretary...

‘I agree with the Foreign Secretary that we have duties to citizens of other states...

...but I think that we have *special* duties to British nationals.’
Nationalism

Just as we have special duties to our friends and to members of our family...

...so we have special duties to members of the same nation as ourselves.

This is compatible with Individualism, but not with Egalitarianism.
When do two people belong to the same *nation*...?

When they have the same ethnic background...?

When they are citizens of the same state...?

When they share a language and culture...?
The Environment Secretary...

‘I agree with the Chancellor that the British state has no duties to *citizens* of other states...

...but I do think it has duties to other *states*.’
Society of states

States have duties to other states...

...but these are not reducible to the duties that individuals have to one another...

This is compatible with Egalitarianism, but not with Individualism.
§2. Cosmopolitanism
Justice requires that rights/liberties/income/wealth are equally distributed among British people unless moving to an unequal distribution would be a Pareto improvement...

Justice requires that no British person is worse off than any other as a result of brute bad luck...

Justice requires that the happiness of British people is maximized...
Why doesn’t justice require that rights/liberties/income/wealth are equally distributed among people in the world unless moving to an unequal distribution would be a Pareto improvement...?

Why doesn’t justice require that no person in the world is worse off than any other as a result of brute bad luck...?

Why doesn’t justice require that the happiness of people in the world is maximized...?
Moderate Distributive Justice Cosmopolitanism

There are principles of justice governing the distribution of goods among people in the world.

Extreme Distributive Justice Cosmopolitanism

There are no principles of justice governing the distribution of goods among British people that are not also principles governing the distribution of goods among people in the world.
What if animals are people too...?

What if there are people on other planets...?

It depends on how hard we lean on the concept of a global society...
§3. The law of peoples
Rawls denies that the principles of social justice apply globally...

He doesn’t deny that there are principles of global justice...

But he thinks these principles are very different...

...and that they govern the relations among peoples, not people...
‘Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings.

Peoples have the right of self-defense but no right to instigate war for reasons other than self-defense.

Peoples are to honor human rights.

Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavorable conditions that prevent their having a just or decent political and social regime.’

C  We should accept the Equal Liberties Principle and the Difference Principle.

P1  The Equal Liberties Principle and the Difference Principle are the principles of social justice that would be chosen in the Original Position.

P2  We should choose whichever principles of social justice would be chosen in the Original Position.
We should choose whichever principles of social justice would be chosen in the Original Position.

The principles of social justice that would be chosen in the Original Position are the *fair* principles of social justice.

We should choose the *fair* principles of social justice.
‘...a society is a cooperative venture for mutual advantage... typically marked by a conflict as well as by an identity of interests...’ (John Rawls, *Theory of Justice*, p.4)

So is the global application of the difference principle inappropriate because there is no global society in this sense...?
Beitz defends a global version of Rawls’ theory precisely on the grounds that there is such a society...

‘...evidence of global economic and political interdependence shows the existence of a global scheme of social cooperation...’

(Charles Beitz, *Justice and International Relations*, p.376)
Rawls is concerned to solve a particular practical problem...

To find principles of global justice that will be acceptable to people – and peoples – with different comprehensive moral doctrines...

He is after a *political* conception of global justice...
One feature of a political conception of social justice is that it exploits...

‘...certain fundamental ideas seen as implicit in the public political culture of a democratic society...’ (John Rawls, *Political Liberalism*, p.13)

So a political conception of global justice will exploit the fundamental ideas seen as implicit in global political culture...
Cosmopolitanism is a comprehensive moral doctrine...

It is not widely shared...

The idea of a global society of world citizens cannot guide the selection of a political conception of global justice...
§4. Moral equality
P1  Human beings have equal moral worth.

P2  If human beings have equal moral worth, then if it is unjust that one British person is less well off than another as a result of brute bad luck, it is also unjust that a Congolese person is less well off than a British person as a result of brute bad luck.

C  It is unjust that a Congolese person is less well off than a British person as a result of brute bad luck.
What does P1 mean…?

That we have precisely the same moral obligations towards every human being…?

This would be implausible…

...we have very different moral obligations to human beings as a result of promising to do things and having other people consenting to our doing things…
That we have precisely the same *basic* moral obligations towards every human being...?

P1  My basic moral obligation to save my father from drowning outweighs my moral obligation to save a complete stranger from drowning.

C  It is not the case that I have the same basic moral obligations towards every human being.
That we have precisely the same *basic negative* moral obligations towards every human being...? 

I have no lesser moral obligation to keep my promises to a Congolese person than I do to keep my promises to a British person... 

I have no lesser moral obligation not to kill a Congolese person than I do not to kill a British person...
‘An equal consideration principle that would rule out [these] kinds of behaviour... would be accepted by almost everyone (with the exception perhaps of a few extreme racists), so if that were all moral cosmopolitanism meant, we could safely say that we are all cosmopolitans now.’

(David Miller, *Global Justice and National Responsibility*, p.27)
‘...compatriotism makes no difference to our most important negative duties...’
(Thomas Pogge, *Cosmopolitanism: A Defence*, p.87)

Negative duties are duties not to impose harms...

Positive duties are duties to provide benefits or assistance...
‘As citizens, we have a fundamental duty of justice: not to collaborate in imposing an unjust institutional order upon them.’ (Thomas Pogge, *Cosmopolitanism: A Defence*, p.88)

Here an institutional order is unjust if it either violates human rights...

...or produces gross inequalities...
P1  We have the same negative duties towards all human beings.

P2  We have a negative duty towards other British people not to collaborate in imposing upon them human-rights-violating or gross-inequality-producing institutions.

C   We have a negative duty towards Congolese people not to collaborate in imposing upon them human-rights-violating or gross-inequality-producing institutions.
‘The accident of where one is born is just that, an accident; any human being might have been born in any nation...

Recognizing this... we should not allow differences of nationality or class or ethnic membership or even gender to erect barriers between us and our fellow human beings...

We should recognize humanity wherever it occurs, and give its fundamental ingredients, reason and moral capacity, our first allegiance and respect.’

(Martha Nussbaum, *Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism*)
P1 That a person is Congolosese rather than British is morally arbitrary.

P2 It is unjust if people’s distributive shares are influenced by morally arbitrary factors.

C It is unjust if a person’s distributive share is influenced by their being Congolese rather than British.
Next week

Nationalism