Global Political Issues

Lecture 5:
Cosmopolitanism (again)
The plan for today...

1. Varieties of cosmopolitanism

2. Moral equality

3. Pogge on global justice

4. Moral arbitrariness
§1. Varieties of cosmopolitanism
**Moderate Distributive Justice Cosmopolitanism**

There are principles of justice governing the distribution of goods among people in the world.

**Extreme Distributive Justice Cosmopolitanism**

There are no principles of justice governing the distribution of goods among British people that are not also principles governing the distribution of goods among people in the world.
Moderate Cultural Cosmopolitanism

A good life *may* involve experience of diverse cultures, languages, etc.

Extreme Cultural Cosmopolitanism

A good life *must* involve experience of diverse cultures, languages, etc.
Moderate Institutional Cosmopolitanism

We ought to create international political institutions alongside our national political institutions.

Extreme Institutional Cosmopolitanism

We ought to replace our national political institutions with international political institutions.
A  There are principles of justice governing the distribution of goods among a group of people only if these people are part of the same society/socio-economic system.

B  There are principles of justice governing the distribution of goods among all of the people in the world.

C  It is not the case that all of the people in the world are part of the same society/socio-economic system.
All cosmopolitans accept B...

Some cosmopolitans want to hang on to A...

So they have to reject C...

Other cosmopolitans don’t accept A...
§2. Moral equality
Human beings have *equal moral worth*...

Does this mean that we have precisely the same moral duties towards every human being...?

That would be implausible...

Our moral duties to human beings differ as a result of our promising to do things and other people consenting to our doing things...
Call moral duties arising in this way *non-basic* duties...

Do we have precisely the same *basic* moral duties towards every human being...?

Peter Singer famously argues that distance has no bearing on our *positive duty* to assist others in need...
‘...suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad...’

‘...if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it...’

(Peter Singer, *Famine, Affluence and Morality*, p.231)
‘The fact that a person is physically near to us... may make it more likely that we shall assist him...

...but this does not show that we ought to help him rather than another who happens to be further away...

...If we accept any principle of impartiality, universalizability, equality, or whatever, we cannot discriminate against someone merely because he is far away from us...’ (Peter Singer, Famine, Affluence and Morality, p.232)
P1 We have the same positive duties towards all human beings.

P2 We have a positive duty to help a nearby British person in need if we do not thereby sacrifice anything of comparable moral importance.

C We have a positive duty to help a distant Malawian person in need if we do not thereby sacrifice anything of comparable moral importance.
P1 We have a stronger positive duty to help a friend or family member in need than we have to help a stranger in need.

C We do not have the same positive duties towards all human beings.
Human beings have *equal moral worth*...

Do we have precisely the same *negative* moral duties towards every human being...?

I have no less of a moral duty to keep my promises to a Malawian person than I do to keep my promises to a British person...

I have no less of a moral duty not to kill a Malawian person than I do not to kill a British person...
‘An equal consideration principle that would rule out [these] kinds of behaviour... would be accepted by almost everyone (with the exception perhaps of a few extreme racists), so if that were all moral cosmopolitanism meant, we could safely say that we are all cosmopolitans now.’

(David Miller, *Global Justice and National Responsibility*, p.27)
§3. Pogge on global justice
‘...compatriotism makes no difference to our most important negative duties...’

(Thomas Pogge, Cosmopolitanism: A Defence, p.87)

But how exactly does this bear on questions of global justice...?
‘As citizens, we have a fundamental duty of justice: not to collaborate in imposing an unjust institutional order upon them.’

(Thomas Pogge, *Cosmopolitanism: A Defence*, p.88)

Here an institutional order is unjust if it either violates human rights or produces gross inequalities...
P1 We have the same negative duties towards all human beings.

P2 We have a negative duty towards other British people not to collaborate in imposing upon them human-rights-violating or gross-inequality-producing institutions.

C We have a negative duty towards Malawian people not to collaborate in imposing upon them human-rights-violating or gross-inequality-producing institutions.
Are British people *currently* collaborating in the imposition upon Malawian people of human-rights-violating or gross-inequality-producing institutions...?

Pogge thinks we are...

‘...severe poverty is an ongoing harm we inflict upon the global poor.’

(Thomas Pogge, *World Poverty and Human Rights*, p.1)
P1  The global framework is a human-rights-violating/gross-inequality-producing institution.

P2  British people are partly responsible for the imposition of this framework upon Malawian people.

C  British people are partly responsible for the imposition of a human-rights-violating/gross-inequality-producing institution upon Malawian people.
Against P1...

The main causes of global inequality/human rights violations do not include the global institutional framework...

The main causes of these bad things are geographical differences...

...incompetence and corruption...
The least well off states in terms of HDI...

Central African Republic

Niger

Burkina Faso

Chad

Burundi
Affluenza is poor in the present because it foolishly binged on its natural resources in the past...

Ecologia is rich in the present because it sensibly conserved its natural resources in the past...

Procreatia is poor in the present because it foolishly encouraged population growth in the past...

Condominium is rich in the present because it sensibly limited population growth in the past...
Rich states have helped keep corrupt and incompetent elites in charge of poor states in return for natural resources...

These elites have an interest in maintaining the threat of intra-state conflict...

...and in preventing the growth of a healthy and affluent population...
The main causes of global inequality/human rights violations do include the global institutional framework...

...but British people are not responsible for the preservation of this framework...

...because this framework is the result of permanent features of international politics...
Perhaps British people are not currently collaborating in the imposition upon Malawian people of human-rights-violating or gross-inequality-producing institutions...

...but previous generations of British people collaborated in the imposition upon Malawian people of human-rights-violating or gross-inequality-producing institutions...
P1 The current generation of British people benefits from the failure of previous generations of British people to discharge their negative duty not to impose gross-inequality-producing/human-rights-violating institutions upon previous generations of Malawian people.

P2 The current generation of Malawian people suffers as a result of this same failure of previous generations of British
P3 If Michael wrongs Boris...

...and Theresa receives a benefit as a result of Michael wronging Boris...

...but Sajid suffers a loss as a result of Michael wronging Boris...

...then Theresa has a duty of justice to compensate Sajid.
Enjoyed visit to Charford First School this morning, discussing democracy and British values with Year 4.
The current generation of British people has a duty of justice to compensate the current generation of Malawian people.

What is required for the British people to discharge this duty of compensation...?
§4. Moral arbitrariness
‘The accident of where one is born is just that, an accident...

...any human being might have been born in any nation...

Recognizing this... we should not allow differences of nationality or class or ethnic membership or even gender to erect barriers between us and our fellow human beings...’
‘We should recognize humanity wherever it occurs, and give its fundamental ingredients, reason and moral capacity, our first allegiance and respect.’

(Martha Nussbaum, *Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism*)
‘...persons should... face worse opportunities because of their nationality or their citizenship...

To do so would also be to penalize people for morally arbitrary reasons.’

(Simon Caney, Cosmopolitan Justice, p.395)
P1 It is unjust if people’s distributive shares are influenced by morally arbitrary factors.

P2 A person’s nationality is morally arbitrary.

‘Nationality is just one further deep contingency (like genetic endowment, race, gender, and social class).’
(Thomas Pogge, Realizing Rawls, p.287)

C It is unjust if people’s distributive shares are influenced by their nationality.
An aspect of a person is *morally arbitrary in the no responsibility sense* if and only if...

...it is something for which this person cannot be held morally responsible.

An aspect of a person is *morally arbitrary in the no discrimination sense* if and only if...

...it is unjust if this person’s distributive share is affected by this aspect of them.
P1  It is unjust if people's distributive shares are influenced by morally arbitrary factors.

P2  A person's nationality is morally arbitrary in the no responsibility sense.

P3  If a factor is morally arbitrary in the no responsibility sense then it is also morally arbitrary in the no discrimination sense.

C   It is unjust if people's distributive shares are influenced by their nationality.
‘Virtually everyone thinks that people with greater needs should be given additional resources.’
(David Miller, *National Responsibility and Global Justice*, p.33)

P1  Physical impairment is morally arbitrary in the no responsibility sense.

P2  Physical impairment is not morally arbitrary in the no discrimination sense.
Physical impairment is not morally arbitrary in the no discrimination sense.

This is plausible if the discrimination that is permitted is additional resources...

But it is surely false if the discrimination that is permitted is additional well-being/opportunities, etc.
Next week...

Nationalism