

Philosophy Faculty Reading List and Course Outline 2017-2018

PART II PAPER 01: METAPHYSICS

SYLLABUS

- **Realism and idealism:** varieties of realism; conceptual schemes; transcendental arguments.
- **Particulars and properties:** the contrast of particular and universal, and of abstract and concrete; realism about universalism and alternatives.
- **Causation:** causation and agency; realism about causation, for and against; direction of causation.
- **Time:** dynamic versus block conceptions; the direction of time; the existence and persistence of entities in time.
- **Persons:** their persistence and unity; animalism and alternatives.

COURSE OUTLINE

Many of the topics in the syllabus will be familiar to those who have taken Philosophy IA and IB, but some are new.

The topic of realism and its alternatives is central. The basic issues are to what extent the world is independent of our cognition of it and whether there is a unique true story of the world or whether there are many non-equivalent stories, all equally correct.

Another new topic is particulars and properties. A third is time, where the issue of what belongs to the world, and what to our perspective on the world, is again central.

Another subtopic here is about how we should understand the persistence of objects over time. This links in turn to the section on persons, which introduces some metaphysical questions about the nature and persistence of persons.

Prerequisites

Students who have not taken Philosophy in IA and IB will need to study some introductory texts in metaphysics and epistemology (see below).

Objectives

Students taking this paper will be expected to:

1. Acquire a more thorough and detailed knowledge of some of the main metaphysical claims and arguments than in Part IB.

2. Acquire an understanding of how these claims and arguments relate to one another.
3. Engage in close criticism with the claims and arguments studied.
4. Develop their own powers of philosophical analysis and argument through the study of metaphysics.
5. Develop their ability to think independently about philosophical problems and arguments.
6. Understand and engage critically with the principal metaphysical theses of the set text.

Preliminary Reading

Introductory texts and guides for those new to the subject (recommended to others as well!):

- CARROLL, John, and Ned MARKOSIAN, *An Introduction to Metaphysics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
CRANE, Tim, and Katalin FARKAS, eds., *Metaphysics: A Guide and Anthology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
LOWE, E.J., *A Survey of Metaphysics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

Additional suggestions:

- ARMSTRONG, David M., *Universals: An Opinionated Introduction* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1989).
VAN INWAGEN, Peter, *Metaphysics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). Also available online at: <http://lib.myilibrary.com/?id=313762>.

READING LIST

An *asterisk** indicates an important or classic item.

REALISM AND IDEALISM

Varieties of Realism

- *PUTNAM, Hilary, *Reason, Truth and History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), chs. 1-3. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511625398>. [Readable defence of 'internal realism']
- *VAN INWAGEN, Peter, *Metaphysics* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2002), ch. 5 'Objectivity'. Also available online at: <http://lib.myilibrary.com/?id=313762>. [A good introduction from a strong realist perspective]
- ALSTON, William P., *A Realist Conception of Truth* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), chs. 2 & 6.
- BLACKBURN, Simon, 'Truth, Realism, and the Regulation of Theory', *Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Studies in Epistemology*, 5 (1980): 353-72. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4975.1980.tb00412.x>. Reprinted in his *Essays in*

Quasi-Realism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). Also available online at: <http://lib.myilibrary.com/?id=52667>. [Difficult]

BUTTON, Tim, *The Limits of Realism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), chs. 1 & 8-11. Also available online at:

<http://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672172.001.0001>. [Chs. 1 and 8 discuss "external" or "metaphysical realism"; chs. 9-11 survey alternatives]

DUMMETT, Michael, 'Realism', in his *Truth and Other Enigmas* (London: Duckworth, 1978), pp. 145-65. [Difficult]

WRIGHT, Crispin, *Realism, Meaning and Truth* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), Introduction (pp. 1-43). [Difficult]

Relativism and Alternative Conceptual Schemes

*DAVIDSON, Donald, *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), ch. 13 'On the very idea of a conceptual scheme' (pp. 183-198). Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/0199246297.003.0013>.

*CARNAP, Rudolf, 'Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology', *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*, 4 (1950): 20-40. Reprinted in his *Meaning and Necessity* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947), pp. 205-21; and in L. Linsky, ed., *Semantics and the Philosophy of Language* (Urbana, IL: Illinois University Press, 1952), pp. 208-28. Also available on [Moodle](#).

*PUTNAM, Hilary, 'Truth and Convention: On Davidson's Refutation of Conceptual Relativism', *Dialectica*, 41, no. 1-2 (1987): 69-77. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-8361.1987.tb00880.x>. [Reply to Davidson]

AHMED, Arif, 'W. V. Quine', in C. Misak, ed., *Oxford Handbook of American Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), sect. 3.2 'Ontological Relativity'. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199219315.003.0016>.

BAGHRAMIAN, Maria, 'Why Conceptual Schemes', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 98 (1998): 287-306. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4545288>

BUTTON, Tim, *The Limits of Realism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), chs. 18 & 19. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672172.001.0001>

CASE, Jennifer, 'On the Right Idea of a Conceptual Scheme', *The Southern Journal of Philosophy*, 35 (1997): 1-18. <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.2041-6962.1997.tb02205.x/epdf>. [Discusses the exchange between Davidson and Putnam]

GOODMAN, Nelson, 'The Way the World Is', *Review of Metaphysics*, 14 (1960): 48-56. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20123803>. Reprinted in his *Problems and Projects* (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1972), pp.24-32.

GOODMAN, Nelson, *Ways of Worldmaking* (Indianapolis, IN: Harvester, 1978), chs. 1, 6 & 7.

HIRSCH, Eli, 'Physical-Object Ontology, Verbal Disputes, and Common Sense', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 70, no. 1 (2005): 67-97. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40040780>

QUINE, W. V., 'Ontological Relativity' in his *Ontological Relativity and Other Essays* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1969), pp.26-68.

QUINE, W. V., 'On the very idea of a third dogma', in his *Theories and Things* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), pp. 38-42.

RORTY, Richard, 'The World Well Lost', *Journal of Philosophy*, 69 (1972): 649-65.

Reprinted in *Consequences of Pragmatism* (Brighton: Harvester, 1982) and in R. Talisse and S. Aiken, eds., *The Pragmatism Reader* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), pp. 353-66. [Fairly difficult]

Transcendental Arguments

*KANT, Immanuel, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B274-9 and the footnote to Bxxxix, 'The Refutation of Idealism'. [Ideally the N. Kemp Smith translation] Also available online: <http://www.phil.pku.edu.cn/resguide/Kant/CPR/contents.html>

*PUTNAM, Hilary, *Reason, Truth and History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), ch. 1 'Brains in a vat'. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511625398>. [Putnam's famous brains-in-vat argument]

*STERN, Robert, *Transcendental Arguments: Problems and Prospects* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), Introduction, pp. 1-11. Also available on [Moodle](#). [Nice introduction to the very idea of transcendental arguments]

*STROUD, Barry, 'Transcendental Arguments', *Journal of Philosophical*, 65 (1968): 241-56. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2024395>. [Classic criticism of the very idea of a transcendental argument]

BENNETT, Jonathan, 'Analytic Transcendental Arguments', in P. Bieri, ed., *Transcendental Arguments and Science* (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1979), pp. 45-64. [Difficult, but offers an interesting transcendental argument and a subtle take on the accusation of verificationism]

BRUECKNER, Anthony, 'Modest Transcendental Arguments', *Noûs*, 30 (1996): 265-80. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2216247>. [This is a reply to the Stroud's paper (1994) below]

BRUECKNER, Anthony, 'Transcendental Arguments I', *Noûs*, 17, no. 4 (1983): 551-75. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2215082>. [Difficult discussion of the very idea of transcendental arguments]

BUTTON, Tim, *The Limits of Realism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), chs. 12 - 14. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672172.001.0001>. [Fairly readable exegesis and defence of Putnam's brain-in-vat argument, and a comparison with a similar argument from Davidson; all opposed to the idea of 'modest' transcendental arguments]

CASSAM, Quassim, 'Transcendental Arguments, Transcendental Synthesis and Transcendental Idealism', *Philosophical Quarterly*, 37 (1987): 355-78. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2219565>. [Difficult exploration of Kant's arguments and goals; best suited for candidates sitting *European Philosophy from Kant*]

HARRISON, Ross, 'Transcendental Arguments and Idealism', in G. Vesey, ed., *Idealism Past and Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 211-24. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1017/S0957042X00001620>. [Considers whether transcendental arguments depend upon idealism]

- STERN, Robert, 'Transcendental Arguments: A Plea for Modesty', *Grazer Philosophische Studien*, 74 (2007): 143-61. http://doi.org/10.1163/9789401204651_008. [Fairly readable explanation of why transcendental arguments must aim for modesty]
- STRAWSON, Peter F., *Skepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties* (London: Methuen, 1985), ch. 1 'Scepticism, naturalism and transcendental arguments'. [Attempts to give a Humean response to scepticism with a place for transcendental arguments]
- STROUD, Barry, 'Kantian Argument, Conceptual Capacities, and Invulnerability', in P. Parrini, ed., *Kant and Contemporary Epistemology* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994), pp. 231-51. Reprinted in B. Stroud, *Understanding Human Knowledge* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/0199252130.003.0011>. [See Brueckner's 1996 paper, above, for an excellent response]

Related Recent Material

- CHALMERS, David, David MANLEY, and Ryan WASSERMAN, *Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). Also available online at: www.dawsonera.com. [This excellent volume contains recent discussions, some inspired by Carnap, about whether traditional disagreements about realism and ontology are 'merely verbal'. Many of the chapters are relevant, including Amie Thomasson, 'Answerable and Unanswerable Questions', Stephen Yablo, 'Must Existence-Questions Have Answers?', Huw Price, 'Metaphysics after Carnap: The Ghost Who Walks?', Eli Hirsch, 'Ontology and Alternative Languages', and Karen Bennett, 'Composition, Colocation, and Metaontology']

PARTICULARS AND PROPERTIES

General

- *ARMSTRONG, David M., *Universals: An Opinionated Introduction* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1989).
- *MACBRIDE, Fraser, 'Universals: the Contemporary Debate', in R. Le Poidevin, et al., eds., *The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics* (London: Routledge, 2009), pp. 276-85. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.4324/9780203879306.ch27>.
- *MELLOR, D.H., and Alex OLIVER, eds., *Properties* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), Introduction (pp. 1-33).
- ARMSTRONG, David M., *A Theory of Universals* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978).
- ARMSTRONG, David M., *Universals and Scientific Realism. Vol. 1: Nominalism and Realism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978).
- OLIVER, Alex, 'The Metaphysics of Properties', *Mind*, 105 (1996): 1-80. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2254537>

The Contrast of Particular and Universal, and of Abstract and Concrete

- *LEWIS, David, *On the Plurality of Worlds* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), sects. 1.7 & 2.4.
- *LOUX, Michael, *Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction*. 3rd ed. (London: Routledge, 2006), ch. 3 'Concrete particulars I: substrata, bundles, and substances'. Also available online at: <http://lib.myilibrary.com/?id=54342>.
- *LOWE, E.J., *A Survey of Metaphysics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), ch. 20 'The abstract and the concrete' (pp. 366-85). Also available on [Moodle](http://www.moodle.org).
- BURGESS, John P., and Gideon ROSEN, *A Subject with No Object* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), Part IA: 'Introduction'. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/0198250126.003.0001>.
- HALE, Bob, *Abstract Objects* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987).
- MACBRIDE, Fraser, 'The Particular-Universal Distinction: A Dogma of Metaphysics?' *Mind*, 114 (2005): 565-614. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3489007>
- RAMSEY, Frank P., 'Universals', *Mind*, 34 (1925): 401-17. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2249716>. Reprinted in his *Philosophical Papers* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 8-30. Also in D.H. Mellor and A. Oliver, eds., *Properties* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 57-73.
- SIMONS, Peter, 'Ramsey, Particulars and Universals', *Theoria*, 57 (1991): 150-61. <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1755-2567.1991.tb00835.x/epdf>
- STRAWSON, Peter F., *Subject and Predicate in Logic and Grammar* (London: Methuen, 1974), ch. 1, sects. 1 & 2.

Realism about Universals and Alternatives

- *ARMSTRONG, David M., 'Against "Ostrich Nominalism": A Reply to Devitt', *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*, 61 (1980): 440-49. Reprinted in D.H. Mellor and A. Oliver, eds., *Properties* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 101-11. [A reply to Devitt's article below]
- *CAMPBELL, Keith, 'The Metaphysics of Abstract Particulars', *Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Foundations of Analytic Philosophy*, 6 (1981): 477-78. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4975.1981.tb00453.x>. Reprinted in D.H. Mellor and A. Oliver, eds., *Properties* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 125-39.
- *DEVITT, Michael, 'Ostrich Nominalism or Mirage Realism', *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*, 61 (1980): 433-39. Reprinted in D.H. Mellor and A. Oliver, eds., *Properties* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 93-100. Also on [Moodle](http://www.moodle.org).
- *PRICE, H.H., *Thinking and Experience* (London: Hutchinson, 1953), ch. 1 'Universals and Resemblances' (pp. 7-32). Reprinted in C. Landesman, ed., *The Problem of Universals* (London: Basic, 1971). Also on [Moodle](http://www.moodle.org).
- *QUINE, W.V., 'On What There Is', *Review of Metaphysics*, 2 (1948): 21-28. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20123117>
- *RUSSELL, Bertrand, *The Problems of Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1912), chs. 9 & 10. Also available online: <https://www.dawsonera.com/abstract/9780191509025>
- BAMBROUGH, Renford, 'Universals and Family Resemblances', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 61 (1960-61): 207-22. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4544648>

- CAMPBELL, Keith, *Abstract Particulars* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990).
- HOCHBERG, Herbert, 'Nominalism, General Terms and Predication', *The Monist*, 61, no. 3 (1978): 460-75. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27902550>
- JUBIEN, Michael, *Contemporary Metaphysics* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), chs. 2 & 3.
- LEWIS, David, 'New Work for a Theory of Universals', *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 61 (1983): 343-77. <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00048408312341131>
- MACBRIDE, Fraser, 'Predicate Reference', in E. Lepore and B.C. Smith, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 422-74. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199552238.003.0019>.
- QUINTON, Anthony, *The Nature of Things* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973), chs. 1, 3 & 9.
- WILLIAMS, Donald C., 'On the Elements of Being: I', *Review of Metaphysics*, 7 (1953): 3-18. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20123348>. Reprinted in D.H. Mellor and A. Oliver, eds., *Properties* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 112-24.

CAUSATION

General

- *HUME, David, *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, sect. 4. [Any edition] Also available online: <http://lib.myilibrary.com/Open.aspx?id=116084>
- *HUME, David, *Treatise of Human Nature*, Book I, part 3, sects. 2 & 14. Also available online at: www.gutenberg.org/etext/4705. Reprinted in P. Van Inwagen and D.W. Zimmerman, eds., *Metaphysics: The Big Questions* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998).
- CRANE, Tim, 'Causation', in A.C. Grayling, ed., *Philosophy: A Guide through the Subject* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 184-94. [A useful introduction]
- LEWIS, David, 'Causation', *Journal of Philosophy*, 70 (1973): 556-67. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2025310>. Reprinted in E. Sosa and M. Tooley, eds., *Causation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 193-204.
- MACKIE, J.L., *The Cement of the Universe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974), chs. 1 & 2. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/0198246420.001.0001>.
- WOODWARD, James, ed., *Making Things Happen* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), chs. 1-3. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199279739.001.0001>

Causation and Agency

- GASKING, Douglas, 'Causation and Recipes', *Mind*, 64 (1955): 479-87. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2251235>.
- MENZIES, Peter, and Huw PRICE, 'Causation as a Secondary Quality', *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, 44 (1993): 187-203. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/687643>

- PEARL, Judea, *Causality: Models, Reasoning, and Inference* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000; 2nd ed. 2009), Epilogue 'The art and science of cause and effect', pp. 401-28. Also available online at: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511803161.014>.

Realism about Causation, for and against

- CARTWRIGHT, Nancy, 'Causal Laws and Effective Strategies', *Noûs*, 13 (1979): 419-37. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2215337>
- PRICE, Huw, 'Agency and Probabilistic Causality', *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, 42 (1991): 157-76. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/688050>
- RUSSELL, Bertrand, 'On the Notion of a Cause', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 13 (1913): 1-26. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4543833>. Reprinted in his *Mysticism and Logic and Other Essays* (London: Longmans Green, 1917), pp. 173-99.

Direction of Causation

- ELGA, Adam, 'Statistical Mechanics and the Asymmetry of Counterfactual Dependence', *Philosophy of Science, Suppl. Vol.*, 68, no. PSA 200 (2000): 313-24. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3080955>. [Difficult]
- FIELD, Hartry, 'Causation in a Physical World', in M. Loux and D. Zimmerman, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 435-60. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199284221.003.0015>.
- LEWIS, David, *Philosophical Papers*. Vol. 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), ch. 17 'Counterfactual dependence and time's arrow' (pp. 32-52). Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/0195036468.003.0002>.
- MACKIE, J.L., *The Cement of the Universe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974), ch. 7 'The Direction of Causation'. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/0198246420.003.0008>.
- PRICE, Huw, and Brad WESLAKE, 'The Time-Asymmetry of Causation', in H. Beebe, C. Hitchcock and P. Menzies, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Causation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 414-43. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199279739.001.0001>.

TIME

Dynamic versus Block Conceptions

- *DUMMETT, Michael, 'A Defence of McTaggart's Proof of the Unreality of Time', in his *Truth and Other Enigmas* (London: Duckworth, 1978), pp. 351-57.
- *PRICE, Huw, *Time's Arrow & Archimedes' Point* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). Also available online at: <https://www.dawsonera.com/abstract/9780198026136> [Especially ch. 1]
- *PRIOR, Arthur N., *Papers on Time and Tense* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), ch. 1 'Changes in events and changes in things'. Also available on [Moodle](http://moodle.org).

- Reprinted in R. LePoidevin and M. MacBeath, eds., *The Philosophy of Time* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 35-46. [Defends a tensed view]
- DAINTON, Barry, *Time and Space* (Chesham: Acumen, 2001; 2nd ed. 2010), chs. 1-6. Also available online at: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/UPO9781844654437>. [A readable yet sophisticated introduction]
- DYKE, Heather, 'The Pervasive Paradox of Tense', *Grazer Philosophische Studien*, 62 (2001): 103-24. <https://ourarchive.otago.ac.nz/bitstream/handle/10523/1745/paradox%20of%20tense.pdf>
- MCTAGGART, J.M.E., *The Nature of Existence*. Vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1927), ch. 33 'Time'. Reprinted in R.M. Gale, ed., *The Philosophy of Time: A Collection of Essays* (London: Macmillan, 1968), pp. 86-97. Also on [Moodle](#). [Classic attack on tense. Difficult. The next item is an alternative]
- MCTAGGART, J.M.E., 'The Unreality of Time', *Mind*, 17 (1908): 457-74. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2248314>
- MELLOR, D.H., *Real Time II* (London: Routledge, 1998), chs. 1-4, 7 & 8. Also available online at: <http://lib.myilibrary.com/?id=33721>.
- PRICE, Huw, 'The Flow of Time', in C. Callender, ed., *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Time* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 276-311. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199298204.003.0010>.
- WILLIAMS, Donald C., 'The Myth of Passage', *Journal of Philosophy* (1951): 457-72. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2021694>. Reprinted in R. Gale, ed., *The Philosophy of Time* (London: Macmillan, 1968), pp. 98-116.

The Direction of Time

- EARMAN, John, 'An Attempt to Add a Little Direction to "the Problem of the Direction of Time"', *Philosophy of Science*, 41 (1974): 15-47. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/187375>
- EDDINGTON, Arthur S., *The Nature of the Physical World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1928), especially chs. 3-5. Also available online at: <http://archive.org/details/natureofphysical00eddi>.
- HORWICH, Paul, *Asymmetries in Time* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987).
- MAUDLIN, Tim, *The Metaphysics within Physics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218219.001.0001>.
- MAUDLIN, Tim, 'Remarks on the Passing of Time', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 102 (2002): 232-72. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4545373>
- MELLOR, D.H., 'The Direction of Time', in R. Le Poidevin, et al., eds., *The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics* (London: Routledge, 2009), pp. 449-58. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.4324/9780203879306.ch42>.
- SKLAR, Lawrence, 'Up and Down, Left and Right, Past and Future', *Noûs*, 15 (1981): 111-29. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2215319>. Reprinted in his *Philosophy and Spacetime Physics* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985); and in R. Le Poidevin and M. MacBeath, eds., *The Philosophy of Time* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).

The Existence and Persistence of Entities

- HASLANGER, Sally, 'Persistence through Time', in M.J. Loux and D.W. Zimmerman, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 315-54. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199284221.003.0012>.
- HAWLEY, Katherine, *How Things Persist* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199275434.001.0001>.
- HOFWEBER, Thomas, 'The Meta-Problem of Change', *Noûs*, 43, no. 2 (2009): 286-314. <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2009.00707.x/full>

PERSONS

Their Persistence

- *HUME, David, *Treatise of Human Nature*, Book 1, parts iv.2 & iv.6, and Appendix. Partly reprinted in A. Rorty, ed., *The Identities of Persons* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1976).
- *PARFIT, Derek, *Reasons and Persons* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), chs. 10-13. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/019824908X.001.0001>. Reprinted in *R. Martin and J. Barresi, eds., *Personal Identity* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002).
- *SHOEMAKER, Sidney, *Personal Identity* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984). Excerpts reprinted in P. van Inwagen and D. W. Zimmerman, eds., *Metaphysics: The Big Questions* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998). [Still the best introductory book]
- NOONAN, Harold, *Personal Identity*. 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2003), chs. 1, 7-11. Also available online at: <http://lib.myilibrary.com/?id=9511>.
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