

Philosophy Faculty Reading List and Course Outline 2018-2019

PART II PAPER 02: PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

SYLLABUS

- **Epistemology of mind:** knowledge of one's own mind; unity of consciousness;
- **Consciousness:** varieties of consciousness; intentional theories of consciousness; the explanatory gap;
- **Intentionality and mental representation:** the nature of intentionality intentional objects; reductive theories of content; externalism and internalism;
- **Mental faculties:** intention and the will; imagination, mind-reading.

COURSE OUTLINE

This course considers a variety of problems about the nature of mental phenomena and their relationship to the rest of reality.

Two types of mental phenomena which have given rise to philosophical debate are consciousness and intentionality. Consciousness is often said to be the stumbling-block for physicalist or materialist theories of the mind. But consciousness is also of intrinsic interest: what does it mean to say that a creature is or is not conscious? What is the difference between the conscious and the unconscious? How is human consciousness unified?

'Intentionality' is a philosophical term for the representational power of mental states (it therefore does not just refer to intentions to do things). Intentional mental states are those that are 'about' things in the world. This is sometimes described as their having representational content. What does it mean to have content? Can this be explained by a naturalistic conception of the world?

Another group of problems is epistemological: how do we acquire knowledge of our own minds and the minds of others? Is our knowledge of other minds based wholly on theoretical reasoning or does it also require empathy and imagination? Do we possess privileged knowledge of our own minds and if so, how is that explained?

Addressing problems about the nature of mental phenomena often requires philosophical study of specific mental faculties: the faculties of the will (including decision and intention), imagination and mind-reading for example. These phenomena all give rise to their own specific philosophical problems.

Prerequisites

This course presupposes some knowledge of basic metaphysics and epistemology, as covered in Part IA paper 1, and Part IB paper 1. Those who are coming into Philosophy Part II after another Tripos would do well to start by looking at some of the reading recommended for the Mind and Matter' section of Part IA, Paper 01.

Objectives

Students taking this paper will be expected to:

1. Acquire a detailed knowledge of some of the concepts, positions and arguments in the central literature on the topics of the course.
2. Acquire an understanding of how different topics of the syllabus fit together.
3. Engage closely and critically with some of the ideas studied.
4. Develop their ability to think independently about the philosophical problems and arguments studied.

Preliminary Reading

On consciousness:

CRANE, Tim, *The Mechanical Mind*. 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2003; 3rd ed. 2016), ch. 6 'Consciousness and the mechanical mind' (ch. 18 in 3rd ed.).

On intentionality and mental content:

CRANE, Tim, *Elements of Mind* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), ch. 1 'Mind'.
DAVIES, Martin, and Tony STONE, eds., *Folk Psychology* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995). [On other minds: see the introduction to this collection]

On the epistemology of mind:

CASSAM, Quassim, ed., *Self-Knowledge* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). [On knowledge of one's own mind: see the introduction to this collection]

On mental faculties:

KENNY, Anthony, *Action, Emotion and Will* (London: Routledge, 1963; reprinted with a new preface in 2003).

READING LIST

Material marked with an asterisk is important

GENERAL BOOKS

There are a number of good anthologies of essays in the philosophy of mind. Here are two:

- CHALMERS, David, ed., *Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). [This contains many useful readings for a number of areas of the paper. Referred to below as CHALMERS]
- GERTLER, Brie, and Larry SHAPIRO, eds., *Arguing About the Mind* (London: Routledge, 2007). [A more unusual anthology, with some good pieces that are not found in the normal textbooks]

On consciousness, a classic collection of readings is:

- BLOCK, Ned, et al., eds., *The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997). [Contains many classic papers on consciousness, though now showing its age a bit. Referred to below as BLOCK]

An excellent up-to-date anthology of commissioned pieces is:

- MCLAUGHLIN, Brian, Ansgar BECKERMANN, and Sven WALTER, *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199262618.001.0001> [Intended as state-of-the-art accounts of the main issues in the area. Referred to below as MCLAUGHLIN]

EPISTEMOLOGY OF MIND

Knowledge of One's Own Mind: First-Person Thought

Many take there to be something special about first-personal language and thought. Arguments for this often appeal to the special role first-personal language and thought plays in explanations of actions.

- *FREGE, Gottlob, 'Thoughts', in his *Collected Papers* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984), pp. 351-72. Also available on [Moodle](#). Reprinted in P.F. Strawson, ed., *Philosophical Logic* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967). Also in P. Yourgrau, ed., *Demonstratives* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).
- *KAPLAN, David, 'Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and Other Indexicals', in J. Almog, J. Perry and H. Wettstein, eds., *Themes from Kaplan* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 481-563. Also available online at: <http://lib.mylibrary.com/?id=44019>

- *MELLOR, D.H., 'I and Now', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 89 (1989): 79-94. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4545093>. Reprinted in his *Matters of Metaphysics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
- *PERRY, John, 'The Problem of the Essential Indexical', *Noûs*, 13 (1979): 3-21. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2214792>. Reprinted in Q. Cassam, ed., *Self-Knowledge* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), and in N. Salmon and S. Soames, eds., *Propositions and Attitudes* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988).
- BOËR, Stephen E., and W.G. LYCAN, 'Who, Me?' *Philosophical Review*, 89 (1980): 427-66. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2184397>
- EVANS, Gareth, 'Self-Identification', in Q. Cassam, ed., *Self-Knowledge* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 184-209 'Essay 6'. This is a reprint of chapter 6 of his *The Varieties of Reference* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982).
- LEWIS, David, 'Attitudes De Dicto and De Se', *Philosophical Review*, 88 (1979): 513-43. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2184843>. Reprinted in his *Philosophical Papers*. Vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 133-59.
- NAGEL, Thomas, *The View from Nowhere* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), ch. 4 'The objective self'.
- REICHENBACH, Hans, *Elements of Symbolic Logic* (New York: Macmillan, 1948), sect. 50 'Token-reflexive words'.
- WITTGENSTEIN, Ludwig, *The Blue and Brown Books* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1958). Also available online at: <http://pm.nlx.com>. [*The Blue Book*, especially pp. 60-70]

Knowledge of One's Own Mind: First-Person Authority

Does our knowledge of our own mental states differ in fundamental ways from our knowledge of the external world, either epistemically or psychologically? Do we have privileged access to our own minds? How do we acquire self-knowledge?

- *BURGE, Tyler, 'Our Entitlement to Self-Knowledge', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 96 (1996): 91-116. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4107077>
- *CASSAM, Quassim, ed., *Self-Knowledge* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). [Introduction and essays by Ryle, Shoemaker (both), Chisholm, Armstrong and Evans]
- *SMITHIES, Declan, and Daniel STOLJAR, eds., *Introspection and Consciousness* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). [The introduction provides a very helpful overview over the philosophical terrain. See also essays by Schwitzgebel, Dretske, Gertler, Sosa, Byrne, Moran]
- HEAL, Jane, 'On 'First Person Authority'', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 102 (2001): 1-19. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4545360>
- MORAN, Richard, *Authority and Estrangement* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).
- SCHWITZGEBEL, Eric, 'The Unreliability of Naive Introspection', *Philosophical Review*, 117 (2008): 245-28-73. <http://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2007-037>

CONSCIOUSNESS

Varieties of Consciousness

What is the difference between access and phenomenal consciousness? Do both kinds give rise to the “hard problem” of consciousness?

- *BLOCK, Ned, 'On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness', *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 18, no. 2 (1995): 227-47.
<http://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00038188>. Reprinted in BLOCK, above.
- *DENNETT, Daniel, 'Towards a Cognitive Theory of Consciousness', in his *Brainstorms* (Brighton: Harvester, 1981), pp. 149-73. Also available on [Moodle](#)
- *PHILLIPS, Ian, 'Perception and Iconic Memory: What Sperling Doesn't Show', *Mind & Language*, 26 (2011): 381-411. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0017.2011.01422.x>
- *ROSENTHAL, David, 'Two Concepts of Consciousness', *Philosophical Studies*, 49 (1986): 329-59. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4319832>
- HILL, Christopher, *Consciousness* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511804274>
- SHOEMAKER, Sydney, 'Qualia and Consciousness', *Mind*, 100 (1994): 507-24.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/2255008>. Reprinted in his *The First Person Perspective and Other Essays* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
- SIEWERT, Charles, *The Significance of Consciousness* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998). Also available online at:
<http://www.degruyter.com/view/product/451091>

The Explanatory Gap

What is the “hard” problem of consciousness?

- *AKINS, Kathleen, 'What Is It Like to Be Boring and Myopic?' in B. Dahlbom, ed., *Dennett and His Critics*. 2nd ed. (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1993), pp. 124-60. Also available on [Moodle](#)
- *CHALMERS, David, *The Conscious Mind* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). Also available online at: <http://lib.myilibrary.com/?id=45275>
- *JACKSON, Frank, 'Epiphenomenal Qualia', *Philosophical Quarterly*, 32 (1982): 127-36.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/2960077>. Reprinted in W.G. Lycan, ed., *Mind and Cognition* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), and in CHALMERS, above.
- *LEWIS, David, 'What Experience Teaches', in W.G. Lycan, ed., *Mind and Cognition* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), pp. 499-519. Also in BLOCK and CHALMERS, above.
- *NAGEL, Thomas, 'What Is It Like to Be a Bat?' *The Philosophical Review*, 83 (1974): 435-50. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2183914>. Reprinted in his *Mortal Questions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp.165-80. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107341050>
- ALTER, Torin, and Sven WALTER, *Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). Also available online at:
<http://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195171655.001.0001>

JOHNSTON, Mark, 'Objective Mind and the Objectivity of Our Minds', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 75 (2007): 233-268.

<https://www.jstor.org/stable/40041108>

LUDLOW, Peter, ed., *There's Something About Mary* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004). [A collection of essays on Jackson's 'knowledge argument'. See the essays by Stoljar, Hellie and Robinson]

PAPINEAU, David, *Thinking About Consciousness* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/0199243824.001.0001>

Intentional Theories of Consciousness

Intentionalist theories of consciousness argue that what it is for a mental state to be phenomenally conscious just is for it to have a particular type of content. There are broadly, two types of intentionalist theories: first-order and higher-order.

First order representationalist theories argue that the phenomenal character of an experience is identical with its representational content.

- *BLOCK, Ned, 'Inverted Earth', in J.E. Tomberlin, ed., *Philosophical Perspectives*. Vol. 4, Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind (Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview, 1990), pp. 53-79. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2214187>. Reprinted in BLOCK, above.
- *DRETSKE, Fred, *Naturalizing the Mind* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), chs. 3 & 4.
- *HARMAN, Gilbert, 'The Intrinsic Quality of Experience', in J.E. Tomberlin, ed., *Philosophical Perspectives*. Vol. 4, Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind (Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview, 1990), pp. 31-52. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2214186>. Reprinted in his *Reasoning, Meaning and Mind* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1999), pp. 244-61, and in BLOCK, above.
- *KIND, Amy, 'Transparency and Representationalist Theories of Consciousness', *Philosophy Compass*, 5, no. 10 (2010): 902-13.
<http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00328.x>
- *TYE, Michael, *Ten Problems of Consciousness* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), chs. 1-5.
- BYRNE, A., 'Intentionalism Defended', *Philosophical Review*, 110 (2001): 199-240.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/2693675>
- CRANE, Tim, 'Intentionalism', in MCLAUGHLIN, above, pp. 474-93. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199262618.003.0029>
- DENNETT, Daniel, 'Quining Qualia', in A.J. Marcel and E. Bisiach, eds., *Consciousness in Contemporary Science* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 42-77. Reprinted in W.G. Lycan, ed., *Mind and Cognition* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), and in BLOCK, above. Also available on [Moodle](#)

Higher-order internationalist theories argue that phenomenal consciousness requires inner awareness. To be conscious a mental state must be the object of another mental state.

- *DRETSKE, Fred, 'Conscious Experience', *Mind*, 1 (1993): 263-83.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/2253868>. Reprinted in *Philosophy of mind: Classical and contemporary readings* (2002): 422-434.
- *ROSENTHAL, David M., 'The Independence of Consciousness and Sensory Quality', *Philosophical Issues*, 1 (1991): 15-36. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1522921>
- CARRUTHERS, Peter, *Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). Also available online at:
<http://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511487491>
- LYCAN, William G., *Consciousness and Experience* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000), ch. 2 'Conscious awareness as internal monitoring'.
- ROSENTHAL, David M., 'Explaining Consciousness', in D.J. Chalmers, ed., *Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 406-21.

Unity of Consciousness

What characterises the unity of consciousness? What do cases where such unity seems to break down tell us about the mind?

- *HUME, David, *Treatise of Human Nature* Book 1, part iv, sect. 6. Also available online at:
www.davidhume.org/texts/thn
- BAYNE, Tim, and David CHALMERS, 'What Is the Unity of Consciousness?' in A. Cleeremans, ed., *The Unity of Consciousness: Binding, Integration, Dissociation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 23-58. Also available online on Chalmers's website at: <http://consc.net/papers/unity.html>. Reprinted in T. Bayne, *The Unity of Consciousness* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
- BROAD, C.D., *The Mind and Its Place in Nature* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1925), ch. 13 'The Unity of the Mind'. Available in a number of reprints.
- HILL, Christopher S., *Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), ch. 10 'Unity of Consciousness, Other minds, and Phenomenal Space' (pp. 228-44). Also available online at:
<http://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139173827.011>
- NAGEL, Thomas, 'Brain Bisection and the Unity of Consciousness', *Synthese*, 22 (1971): 396-413. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20114764>. Reprinted in his *Mortal Questions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).
- TYE, Michael, 'The Problem of Common Sensibles', *Erkenntnis*, 66 (2007): 287-303.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/27667893>

INTENTIONALITY AND MENTAL REPRESENTATION

The Nature of Intentionality

What is intentionality?

- ANSCOMBE, G.E.M., 'The Intentionality of Sensation: A Grammatical Feature', in R.J. Butler, ed., *Analytical Philosophy. 2nd Series* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1965). Reprinted in her *Philosophical Papers. Vol.2: Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1981), pp. 3-20. Also available on [Moodle](#)
- BRENTANO, Franz, 'The Distinction between Mental and Physical Phenomena', in his *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973), pp. 77-100. Also available on [Moodle](#). [Originally published in 1874 by Duncker and Humblot, Leipzig as *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*]
- CRANE, Tim, *Elements of Mind* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), ch. 1 'Mind'.
- DENNETT, Daniel, *Content and Consciousness* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969), chs. 1 & 2.
- FODOR, Jerry, 'Propositional Attitudes', in his *Representations* (Brighton: Harvester, 1981), pp. 177-203.
- FORBES, Graeme, *Attitude Problems* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), chs. 3 & 4.
- FREGE, Gottlob, 'The Thought: A Logical Inquiry', *Mind*, 65 (1956): 289-311.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/2251513>
- PRIOR, A.N., *Objects of Thought* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), Part 2 'What we think about'.
- SEARLE, John, *Intentionality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), ch. 1 'The nature of intentional states'. Also available online at:
<http://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139173452.002>

Intentional Objects

- *MCGINN, Colin, *Logical Properties* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), ch. 2 'Existence'. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/0199241813.003.0002>
- *QUINE, W.V.O., 'On What There Is', *Review of Metaphysics*, 2 (1948): 21-38.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/20123117>. Reprinted in his *From a Logical Point of View* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1953), pp. 1-19.
- CARTWRIGHT, Richard, 'Negative Existentials', *The Journal of Philosophy*, 57 (1960): 629-39. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2023455>
- CHISHOLM, Roderick, 'Intentional Inexistence', in D. Rosenthal, ed., *The Nature of Mind* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 297-304. Also on [Moodle](#)
- CRANE, Tim, 'What Is the Problem of Non-Existence?' *Philosophia*, 40, no. 3 (2012): 417-34. <http://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-011-9354-1>. Also available online at:
www.timcrane.com
- DONNELLAN, Keith, 'Speaking of Nothing', *Philosophical Review*, 83 (1974): 3-31.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/2183871>
- KRIPKE, Saul, *Reference and Existence* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

- PRIEST, Graham, *Towards Non-Being* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005), chs. 3-5. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/0199262543.001.0001>
- QUINE, W.V.O., 'Existence and Quantification', in his *Ontological Relativity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978), pp. 91-113. Also available on [Moodle](#)
- RUSSELL, Bertrand, 'On Denoting', *Mind*, 14 (1905): 479-93. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3840617>. Reprinted in his *Logic and Knowledge* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1958).
- SAINSBURY, R.M., *Reference without Referents* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/0199241805.001.0001>
- SALMON, Nathan, 'Existence', *Philosophical Perspectives*, 1 (1987): 49-108. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2214143>
- VAN INWAGEN, Peter, 'McGinn on Existence', *Philosophical Quarterly*, 58 (2008): 36-58. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40468236>

Reductive Theories of Content

Can we give a naturalistic account of representational content?

- *CUMMINS, Robert, *Meaning and Mental Representation* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988). [The whole book is highly recommended, but chapters 6-8 are particularly useful here]
- *DENNETT, Daniel, 'Intentional Systems', *The Journal of Philosophy*, 68 (1971): 87-106. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2025382>. Reprinted in his *Brainstorms* (Brighton: Harvester, 1981), pp. 3-22.
- *FIELD, Hartry, 'Mental Representation', *Erkenntnis*, 13 (1978): 9-61. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20010621>. Reprinted in N. Block, ed., *Readings in Philosophy of Psychology*. Vol. 2 (London: Methuen, 1981), pp. 78-114. Also in S. Stich and T. Warfield, eds., *Mental Representation* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994).
- *LOEWER, Barry, and Georges REY, eds., *Meaning in Mind* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988). [Essays by Boghossian and Antony & Levine]
- *MILLIKAN, Ruth Garrett, 'Biosemantics', *The Journal of Philosophy*, 86 (1989): 281-97. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2027123>. Reprinted in S. Stich and T. Warfield, eds., *Mental Representation* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994).
- BLOCK, Ned, 'Advertisement for a Semantics for Psychology', *Studies in the Philosophy of Mind, Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, 10 (1987): 615-78. <http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4975.1987.tb00558.x>. Reprinted in S. Stich and T. Warfield, eds., *Mental Representation* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), pp. 81-141.
- CRANE, Tim, *The Mechanical Mind*. 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2003; 3rd ed. 2016), ch. 5 (ch. 9 in 3rd ed.) 'Explaining mental representation'. Also available online at: <http://lib.myilibrary.com/?id=2275> (2nd ed.) and www.dawsonera.com (3rd ed.).
- DRETSKE, Fred, *Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988), chs. 3-5.
- FODOR, Jerry, *Psychosemantics* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987), ch. 4 'Meaning and the world order'.
- FODOR, Jerry, *A Theory of Content and Other Essays* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990), chs. 3 & 4.

- HARMAN, Gilbert, 'Conceptual Role Semantics', *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic*, 23 (1982): 242-56. <http://projecteuclid.org/euclid.ndjfl/1093883628>
- MILLIKAN, Ruth Garrett, 'Thoughts without Laws: Cognitive Science with Content', *Philosophical Review*, 95 (1986): 47-80. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2185132>. Reprinted in her *White Queen Psychology and Other Essays for Alice* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993), pp. 51-82.
- STALNAKER, Robert, *Inquiry* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984), chs. 1 & 2.
- STAMPE, Dennis, 'Towards a Causal Theory of Linguistic Representation', *Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language, Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, 2 (1989): 42-63. <http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4975.1977.tb00027.x>
- STERELNY, Kim, *The Representational Theory of Mind* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), ch. 6 'Explaining content'.

Externalism and Internalism

Does the content of our mental states depend on our relationship to the external environment?

- *BURGE, Tyler, 'Individualism and the Mental', *Studies in Metaphysics, Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, 4 (1979): 73-121. <http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4975.1979.tb00374.x>. Reprinted in D. Rosenthal, ed., *Nature of Mind* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).
- *FARKAS, Katalin, 'What Is Externalism?' *Philosophical Studies*, 112, no. 3 (2003): 187-208. <http://doi.org/10.1023/A:1023002625641>
- *FODOR, Jerry, 'Methodological Solipsism Considered as a Research Strategy in Cognitive Psychology', in his *Representations* (Brighton: Harvester, 1981), pp. 225-53. Reprinted in D. Rosenthal, ed., *Nature of Mind* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991). Also available on [Moodle](#)
- *FODOR, Jerry, *Psychosemantics* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987), ch. 2 'Individualism and supervenience'. Also available on [Moodle](#)
- *PUTNAM, Hilary, 'The Meaning of "Meaning"', in his *Philosophical Papers*. Vol. 2, *Mind, Language and Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975). Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511625251>. Reprinted in K. Gunderson, (ed.), *Language, Mind and Knowledge* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1975), pp. 131-93.
- BLACKBURN, Simon, *Spreading the Word* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), ch. 9 'Reference'.
- BURGE, Tyler, 'Other Bodies', in A. Woodfield, ed., *Thought and Object* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 97-120.
- BURGE, Tyler, 'Two Thought Experiments Reviewed', *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic*, 23 (1982): 284-93. <http://projecteuclid.org/euclid.ndjfl/1093870087>
- EVANS, Gareth, *The Varieties of Reference* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), ch. 6 'Demonstrative identification'.
- MCDOWELL, John, 'Singular Thought and the Extent of Inner Space', in P. Pettit and J. McDowell, eds., *Subject, Thought and Context* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 137-68.

- MCKINSEY, Michael, 'Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access', *Analysis*, 51 (1991): 9-16. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3328625>
- NOONAN, Harold, 'Russellian Thoughts and Methodological Solipsism', in J. Butterfield, ed., *Language, Mind and Logic* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 67-90.
- SEGAL, Gabriel, *A Slim Book About Narrow Content* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999).
- STERELNY, Kim, *The Representational Theory of Mind* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), ch. 5. 'Individualism'.

MENTAL FACULTIES

Intention and the Will

Do we have a distinct faculty of the will? What are intentions and what role do they play in the phenomena of addiction and weakness of will?

- *BRATMAN, Michael, 'Two Faces of Intention', *Philosophical Review*, 93 (1984): 375-405. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2184542>
- *BROOME, John, 'Are Intentions Reasons', in C. Morris and A. Ripstein, eds., *Practical Rationality and Preference* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 98-120. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511570803.006>
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- *HOLTON, Richard, 'How Is Strength of Will Possible?' in S. Stroud and C. Tappolet, eds., *Weakness of the Will and Practical Irrationality* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 39-67. Also available online at: <https://doi.org/10.1093/0199257361.003.0003>
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Imagination

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Mind-Reading

How do we know about the mental states of others? According to theory theorists, we employ a theory of mind. According to simulation theorists, we imaginatively project ourselves into others' situation.

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We welcome your suggestions for further readings that will improve and diversify our reading lists, to reflect the best recent research, and important work by members of under-represented groups. Please email your suggestions to phillib@hermes.cam.ac.uk including the relevant part and paper number. For information on how we handle your personal data when you submit a suggestion please see <https://www.information-compliance.admin.cam.ac.uk/data-protection/general-data>.