This course considers a variety of problems about the nature of mental phenomena and their relationship to the rest of reality.

Two types of mental phenomena which have given rise to philosophical debate are consciousness and intentionality. Consciousness is often said to be the stumbling-block for physicalist or materialist theories of the mind. But consciousness is also of intrinsic interest: what does it mean to say that a creature is or is not conscious? What is the difference between the conscious and the unconscious?

'Intentionality' is a philosophical term for the representational power of mental states (it therefore does not just refer to intentions to do things). Intentional mental states are those that are 'about' things in the world. This is sometimes described as their having representational content. What does it mean to have content? Can this be explained by a naturalistic conception of the world?

Another group of problems is epistemological: how do we acquire knowledge of our own minds and the minds of others? Is our knowledge of other minds based wholly on theoretical reasoning or does it also require empathy and imagination? Do we possess privileged knowledge of our own minds and if so, how is that explained?

The last broad topic of this paper is the philosophical study of mental faculties: the faculties of the will (including decision and intention), emotion, imagination, for example. These phenomena all give rise to their own specific philosophical problems.

**Prerequisites**

This course presupposes some knowledge of basic metaphysics and epistemology, as covered in Part IA paper 1, and Part IB paper 1. Those who are coming into Philosophy Part II after another Tripos would do well to start by looking at some of the reading recommended for the Mind and Matter section of Part IA, Paper 01.

**Objectives**

Students taking this paper will be expected to:

1. Acquire a detailed knowledge of some of the concepts, positions and arguments in the central literature on the topics of the course.
2. Acquire an understanding of how different topics of the syllabus fit together.
3. Engage closely and critically with some of the ideas studied.
4. Develop their ability to think independently about the philosophical problems and arguments studied.

**Preliminary Reading**

On consciousness:


On intentionality and mental content:


On the epistemology of mind:

CASSAM, Quassim, ed., *Self-Knowledge* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). [On knowledge of one's own mind: see the introduction to this collection]

On mental faculties:

There are a number of good anthologies of essays in the philosophy of mind. Here are two:

CHALMERS, David, ed., Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). [This contains many useful readings for a number of areas of the paper. Referred to below as CHALMERS]

GERTLER, Brie, and Larry SHAPIRO, eds., Arguing About the Mind (London: Routledge, 2007). [A more unusual anthology, with some good pieces that are not found in the normal textbooks]

On consciousness, a classic collection of readings is:

BLOCK, Ned, et al., The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997). [Contains many classic papers on consciousness, though now showing its age a bit. Referred to below as BLOCK]

An excellent up-to-date anthology of commissioned pieces is:

MCLAUGHLIN, Brian, Ansgar BECKERMANN, and Sven WALTER, The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). Also available online at: http://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199262618.001.0001. [Intended as state-of-the-art accounts of the main issues in the area. Referred to below as MCLAUGHLIN]

Knowledge of One’s Own Mind: First-Person Authority

Does our knowledge of our own mental states differ in fundamental ways from our knowledge of the external world, either epistemically or psychologically? Do we have privileged access to our own minds? How do we acquire self-knowledge?


SMITHIES, Declan, and Daniel STOLJAR, eds., Introspection and Consciousness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). [The introduction provides a very helpful overview over the philosophical terrain. See also essays by Schwitzgebel, Dretske, Gertler, Sosa, Byrne, Moran]


Knowledge of Other Minds: Theory and Simulation

Do we know about the mental states of others? According to theory theorists, we employ a theory of mind. According to simulation theorists, we imaginatively project ourselves into others' situation.

*CARRUTHERS, Peter, and Peter SMITH, eds., *Theories of Theories of Mind* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Also available online at: [http://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511597985](http://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511597985). [Essays by Gordon, Carruthers and Heal]


CONSCIOUSNESS

Varieties of Consciousness

What is the difference between access and phenomenal consciousness? Do both kinds give rise to the “hard problem” of consciousness?


HILL, Christopher, *Consciousness* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). Also available online at: [http://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511804274].


The Explanatory Gap

What is the “hard” problem of consciousness?


Intentional Theories of Consciousness

Intentionalist theories of consciousness argue that what it is for a mental state to be phenomenally conscious just is for it to have a particular type of content. There are broadly, two types of intentionalist theories: first-order and higher-order.
First order representationalist theories argue that the phenomenal character of an experience is identical with its representational content.


*CRANE, Tim, *Intentionality*, in MCLAUGHLIN, above, pp. 177-203. Also available online at: [http://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139173452.002](http://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139173452.002)


*CARRUTHERS, Peter, *Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). Also available online at: [http://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511487491](http://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511487491)

*LYCAN, William G., *Consciousness and Experience* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000), ch. 2 'Conscious awareness as internal monitoring'.


**INTENTIONALITY AND MENTAL REPRESENTATION**

*The Nature of Intentionality*

What is intentionality?


### Reductive Theories of Content

Can we give a naturalistic account of representational content?

*CUMMINS, Robert, *Meaning and Mental Representation* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988)*. [The whole book is highly recommended, but chapters 6-8 are particularly useful here]


### Externalism and Internalism

Does the content of our mental states depend on our relationship to the external environment?


MENTAL FACULTIES

Intention and the Will

Do we have a distinct faculty of the will? What are intentions and what role do they play in the phenomena of addiction and weakness of will?


*BRONNER, John, 'Are Intentions Reasons?', in C. Morris and A. Ripstein, eds., *Practical Rationality and Preference* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 98-120. Also available online at: [http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511570803.006](http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511570803.006)


Emotion

For an overview over the philosophical terrain, the following are good introductions:


Are emotions feelings? Or are they constituted by judgments? Can we give a unified theory of emotions?


*NUSSEBAUM, Martha C., *Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligences of Emotions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), ch. 1 'Emotions as Judgments of Value'. Also available online at: [http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511840715.002](http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511840715.002)


Imagination

Is there a special faculty of imagination? Does imagination pose a challenge to traditional belief-desire psychology? What is the role of "images" in imagination?

Can we gain knowledge through imagination? Or can we only imagine what we know?
