

Philosophy Faculty Reading List and Course Outline 2018-2019

PART II PAPER 03: ETHICS

SYLLABUS

- **Theories of the good:** Sidgwick's *Methods of Ethics*, goodness and axiology, well-being.
- **Metaethics:** realism, metaphysical foundations of ethics, moral epistemology.
- **Kant's ethics and Kantian ethics:** duty and motive, the categorical imperative, morality and freedom, autonomy.
- **Topics in moral psychology:** trust, ethics of knowing, responsibility.

COURSE OUTLINE

This paper covers a wide range of topics in moral philosophy, concerning normative ethics, metaethics, the history of ethics and moral psychology.

The first section, **Theories of the Good**, addresses normative ethical questions about the nature of the good and human well-being. These are approached both through contemporary debates and Henry Sidgwick's classic *The Methods of Ethics*.

The second section, **Metaethics**, addresses questions about the metaphysical foundations of ethics and the epistemology of ethics.

The third section, **Kant's Ethics and Kantian Ethics** offers the opportunity of undertaking an in-depth study of Kant's *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, and to chart its impact on contemporary ethical debates.

The fourth section, **Moral Psychology**, addresses ethical questions concerning our epistemic lives, the nature of trust, and the responsibility that underwrites praise and blame.

There are more detailed guides to the content of each section interspersed with the reading lists below.

Prerequisites

There are no formal prerequisites.

Course Objectives

Students taking this paper will be expected to:

- 1) Acquire a detailed knowledge of central arguments in the texts studied.
- 2) Acquire an understanding of how different topics of the syllabus fit together.
- 3) Engage in close criticism of arguments studied.
- 4) Develop their powers of philosophical analysis and argument, through study of the readings set for the topics chosen.
- 5) Develop their ability to think independently about philosophical problems and arguments studied.

Preliminary Reading

KANT, Immanuel, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*.

SHAFFER-LANDAU, Russ, and Terrence CUNEO, eds., *Foundations of Ethics* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006).

SIDGWICK, Henry, *The Methods of Ethics*. 7th ed. (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1981), Bk. 1, chs. 1 & 9; Bk. 2, chs. 2 & 3; Bk. 3, chs. 11, 13 & 14; Bk. 4, chs. 1-3.

STRAWSON, Peter F., 'Freedom and Resentment', *Proceedings of the British Academy*, 48 (1962): 1-25. Reprinted in his *Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays* (London: Routledge, 2008). Also available online at:

<http://lib.mylibrary.com/ProductDetail.aspx?id=178684>

READING LIST

**Material marked with an asterisk* is important*

THEORIES OF THE GOOD

Sidgwick's Methods of Ethics

Henry Sidgwick's *The Method of Ethics* was the most important single work in the classical utilitarian tradition. It is a long book, and you will need to be selective about which parts you concentrate on, using the secondary literature as your guide. In it, you will find Sidgwick anticipates several issues that feature in the Goodness and Axiology, and Well-Being sections.

*SIDGWICK, Henry, *The Methods of Ethics*. 7th ed. (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1981), Bk. 1, chs. 1 & 9; Bk. 2, chs. 2 & 3; Bk. 3, chs. 11, 13 & 14; Bk. 4, chs. 1-3.

CRISP, Roger, *The Cosmos of Duty Henry Sidgwick's Methods of Ethics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).

DARWALL, Stephen, 'Sidgwick, Concern, and the Good', *Utilitas*, 12 (2000): 291-306.

<http://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820800002909>

DE LAZARI-RADEK, Katarzyna, and Peter SINGER, *The Point of View of the Universe: Sidgwick and Contemporary Ethics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), chs. 3-5.
 HURKA, Thomas, *British Ethical Theorists from Sidgwick to Ewing* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), chs. 5 & 7.
 IRWIN, Terence, *The Development of Ethics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), ch. 82 'Sidgwick the examination of methods'.
 SCHNEEWIND, J.B., *Sidgwick's Ethics and Victorian Moral Philosophy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), chs. 9-11. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/0198249314.001.0001>

Goodness and Axiology

A key issue concerning goodness is what goodness is. Philosophers often distinguish what is intrinsically good and what is instrumentally good. Are they correct to do so? What is intrinsic value?

*KORSGAARD, Christine, 'Two Distinctions in Goodness', *The Philosophical Review*, 92 (1983): 169-95. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2184924>
 LANGTON, Rae, 'Objective and Unconditioned Value', *The Philosophical Review*, 116 (2007): 157-185. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20446954>
 MOORE, G.E., *Ethics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1912), ch. 7 'Intrinsic value'. The Clarendon, 2005 reprint is also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/0199272018.003.0009>

"Fitting attitudes accounts" of value explain goodness as what it would be appropriate for us to have certain attitudes towards:

*SCANLON, T.M., *What We Owe to Each Other* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), ch. 2 'Values'.
 BYKVIST, Krister, 'No Good Fit: Why the Fitting Attitude Analysis of Value Fails', *Mind*, 118, no. 469 (2009): 1-30. <http://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzn151>
 EWING, A.C., *The Definition of Good* (London: Macmillan, 1974), ch. 5 'An analysis of good in terms of ought'.
 FOOT, Philippa, 'Utilitarianism and the Virtues', *Mind*, 94 (1985): 196-209. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2254745>
 RABINOWICZ, Wlodek, and Toni RØNNOW-RASMUSSEN, 'The Strike of the Demon: On Fitting Pro-Attitudes and Value', *Ethics*, 114 (2004): 391-423. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/381694>

Another key issue concerning goodness is how we should rank things as better or worse. Consequentialists say we should bring about the best outcome. But is the relevant ranking of outcomes the same for everyone? Or should we relativise these rankings to each agent?

DREIER, James, 'The Structures of Normative Theories', *Monist*, 76 (1993): 22-40. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27903320>

SCHROEDER, Mark, 'Teleology, Agent-Relative Value, and 'Good'', *Ethics*, 117 (2007): 265-95. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/511662>
 SMITH, Michael, 'Two Kinds of Consequentialism', *Philosophical Issues*, 19 (2009): 257-72. <http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1533-6077.2009.00169.x>

When deciding how to rank outcomes, how should we trade off the number of people in each outcome and the amount of welfare each individual enjoys? Are these impersonal rankings the best way to decide which future people to create?

*PARFIT, Derek, *Reasons and Persons* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), chs. 16, 17 & 19. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/019824908X.003.0016>
 ROBERTS, Melinda, 'The Nonidentity Problem', in E.N. Zalta, ed., *Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2015 Edition) [Online]. Available at: <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nonidentity-problem/> (Accessed: 30 July 2018).

When we rank things as better or worse, are these rankings always determinate? As well as the relation of "equally good" do we need to introduce another relation of "being on a par"?

CHANG, Ruth, 'The Possibility of Parity', *Ethics*, 112, no. 4 (2002): 659-88. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/339673>
 GRIFFIN, James, *Well-Being: Its Meaning Measurement and Moral Importance* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), ch. 5 'Are there incommensurable values?'. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/0198248431.003.0006>
 WASSERMAN, Ryan, 'Indeterminacy, Ignorance and the Possibility of Parity', *Philosophical Perspectives*, 18, no. 1 (2004): 391-403. <http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1520-8583.2004.00034.x>

Well-being

To get a sense of the shape of the overall debate about what welfare is, have a look at some general discussions:

ALEXANDROVA, Anna, *A Philosophy for the Science of Well-Being* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2017), Appendix A. Also available online at: <https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199300518.001.0001>
 GRIFFIN, James, *Well-Being: Its Meaning Measurement and Moral Importance* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), chs. 1-4. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/0198248431.001.0001>
 PARFIT, Derek, 'What Makes Someone's Life Go Best', in *Reasons and Persons* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), Appendix I, pp. 493-502. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/019824908X.001.0001>
 SUMNER, Larry, *Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999). Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198238782.001.0001>

Objective list theories hold that there are some things that are objectively good and bad for us, independently of our attitudes towards them and the pleasure that we derive from them.

- ARISTOTLE, *Nicomachean Ethics*, edited by R. Crisp (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), Bk. 1.
- KRAUT, Richard, 'Two Conceptions of Happiness', *The Philosophical Review*, 138 (1979): 167-97. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2184505>
- NUSSBAUM, Martha, 'Who Is the Happy Warrior? Philosophy Poses Questions to Psychology', *The Journal of Legal Studies*, 37, no. 2 (2008): 81-113. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/587438>
- SEN, Amartya, 'Capability and Well-Being', in M. Nussbaum and A. Sen, eds., *The Quality of Life* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 30-66. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/0198287976.001.0001>

Hedonist theories explain welfare as pleasure: either understood in terms of a feeling or an attitude.

- CRISP, Roger, 'Hedonism Reconsidered', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 73, no. 3 (2006): 619-45. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40041013>
- FELDMAN, Fred, *Pleasure and the Good Life* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), pp. 38-78; 108-123. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/019926516X.001.0001>
- HAYBRON, Daniel M., 'Happiness and Pleasure', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 62, no. 3 (2001): 501-28. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2653534>

Desire-satisfaction theories explain welfare as the object of certain idealised attitudes that we should have.

- DARWALL, Stephen, *Welfare and Rational Care* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), ch. 2 'Welfare and care'. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1515/9781400825325-003>
- HEATHWOOD, Chris, 'The Problem of Defective Desires', *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 83, no. 4 (2005): 487-504. <http://doi.org/10.1080/00048400500338690>
- KELLER, Simon, 'Welfare as Success', *Noûs*, 43, no. 4 (1993): 656-83. <http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2009.00723.x>
- ROSATI, Connie S., 'Persons, Perspectives, and Full Information Accounts of the Good', *Ethics*, 105 (1995): 296-325. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2382347>
- SCANLON, T.M., 'Preference and Urgency', *Journal of Philosophy*, 72 (1975): 655-69. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2024630>
- SOBEL, David, 'Full Information Accounts of Well-Being', *Ethics*, 104, no. 4 (1993): 784-810. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2382218>

METAETHICS

Metaphysical Foundations of Ethics

For two excellent summaries of the 20th-century debate in metaethics, see:

- *DARWALL, Stephen, Allan GIBBARD, and Peter RAILTON, 'Toward Fin De Siècle Ethics: Some Trends', *The Philosophical Review*, 101, no. 1 (1992): 115-89. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2185045>
- *KORSGAARD, Christine, 'Realism and Constructivism in Twentieth Century Moral Philosophy', in *Philosophy in America at the Turn of the Century, APA Centennial Supplement to the Journal of Philosophical Research*, V. 28 (Charlottesville, VA: The Philosophy Documentation Center, 2003), pp. 99-122. Reprinted in her *The Constitution of Agency* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 302-26. Also available online at: <https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199552733.003.0011>

Helpful summaries of contemporary themes can be found in the following introductory texts:

- MILLER, Alexander, *An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics* (Cambridge: Polity, 2008).
- KIRCHIN, Simon, *Metaethics* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).

Many of the classic readings are in the following anthology:

- SHAFFER-LANDAU, Russ, and Terence CUNEO, eds., *Foundations of Ethics: An Anthology* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007).

Naturalistic versions of realism hold that there are normative facts, and that these are identical to, reducible to, or constituted by natural facts.

- BRINK, David, *Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), ch. 7 'A posteriori objections to moral realism'. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511624612.008>
- HORGAN, Terry, and Mark TIMMONS, 'New Wave Moral Realism Meets Moral Twin Earth', *Journal of Philosophical Research*, 16 (1991): 447-65. Reprinted in R. Shafer-Landau and T. Cuneo, eds., *Foundations of Ethics* (above).
- JACKSON, Frank, *From Metaphysics to Ethics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), ch. 5 'The location problem for ethics'. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/0198250614.003.0005>
- SCHROEDER, Mark, *Slaves of the Passions* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), ch. 4 'Reduction of the normative'. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199299508.003.0004>

Non-naturalistic versions of realism hold that there are normative facts but these are different in kind from, and irreducible to, natural facts.

- CUNEO, Terence, *The Normative Web* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 3-28, ch. 3 'The parity premise'. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218837.003.0004>
- ENOCH, David, *Taking Morality Seriously* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), ch. 3 'The argument from the deliberative indispensability of irreducibly normative truths'. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579969.003.0003>
- PARFIT, Derek, *On What Matters*. Vol. 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), ch. 31 'Metaphysics'. Also available online at: <http://lib.myilibrary.com/?id=316017>
- SCANLON, T.M., *Being Realistic About Reasons* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), ch. 2 'Metaphysical objections'. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199678488.003.0002>
- SHAFFER-LANDAU, Russ, *Moral Realism: A Defence* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003), chs. 1-3. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/0199259755.001.0001>
- WEDGWOOD, Ralph, *The Nature of Normativity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), chs. 3 & 7.

Constructivists and response-dependence theorists hold that normative facts are stance-dependent in the sense that these facts are the result of a certain form of rational deliberation or are the objects of our idealised evaluative attitudes.

- ENOCH, David, 'Can There Be a Global, Interesting, Coherent Constructivism About Practical Reason?', *Philosophical Explorations*, 12 (2009): 319-39. <http://doi.org/10.1080/13869790903067683>
- KORSGAARD, Christine, *The Sources of Normativity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), ch. 3 'The authority of reflection'. Also available online at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511554476>
- LEWIS, David, 'Dispositional Theories of Value', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes*, 63 (1989): 113-37. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4106918>
- MARKOVITS, Julia, *Moral Reason* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), ch. 5 'Kantian internalism'.
- RAWLS, John, 'Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory', *Journal of Philosophy*, 77 (1980): 515-72. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2025790>
- STREET, Sharon, 'Coming to Terms with Contingency: Humean Constructivism about Practical Reason', in J. Lenman and Y. Shemmer, eds., *Constructivism in Practical Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 40-59. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199609833.003.0003>
- WALLACE, R. Jay, 'Constructivism About Normativity: Some Pitfalls', in J. Lenman and Y. Shemmer, eds., *Constructivism in Practical Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 18-39. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199609833.003.0002>

Contemporary theories of expressivists retain emotivists' central idea that normative judgments express conative or evaluative attitudes. However, they often also wish to allow there to be a sense in which normative judgments can be true or false, and often adopt a "quasi-realist" of moral metaphysics. As expressivists converge on the traditional claims of cognitivists about normative judgments, and of realists about normative facts, is it possible to still distinguish these positions in the debate?

- *DREIER, James, 'Metaethics and the Problem of Creeping Minimalism', *Philosophical Perspectives*, 18 (2004): 23-44. <http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1520-8583.2004.00019.x>
- *GIBBARD, Allan, 'Wise Choices, Apt Feelings', in S. Darwall, A. Gibbard and P. Railton, eds., *Moral Discourse and Practice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 179-98.
- *SCHROEDER, Mark, *Noncognitivism in Ethics* (London: Routledge, 2010), chs. 6-8.
- BLACKBURN, Simon, 'How to Be an Ethical Antirealist', *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, 12 (1988): 361-375. <http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4975.1988.tb00173.x>. Reprinted in his *Essays in Quasi-Realism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 166-80, and in R. Shafer-Landau and T. Cuneo, eds., *Foundations of Ethics* (above).
- GIBBARD, Allan, *Thinking How to Live* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), chs. 3 & 4.
- PRICE, Huw, *Naturalism without Mirrors* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), ch. 11.
- RIDGE, Michael, *Impassioned Belief* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), chs. 4 & 7.

Error theorists hold that there are no moral facts and that moral claims would only be true if there were such facts. How should we think about morality if we accepted the error theory? Could we continue to embrace morality as a form of fiction?

- *JOYCE, Richard, *The Myth of Morality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), chs. 1 & 8. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511487101>. An abridged version is reprinted in R. Shafer-Landau and T. Cuneo, eds., *Foundations of Ethics* (above), pp.23-34.
- *OLSON, Jonas, *Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), ch. 9 'Moral error theory, and then what?'
- FINLAY, Stephen, 'The Error in the Error Theory', *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 86, no. 3 (2008): 347-69. <http://doi.org/10.1080/00048400802001921>

Moral Epistemology

A central issue in moral epistemology is whether there can be such a thing as moral knowledge, and whether it is like or unlike scientific knowledge. An important theme in this debate is the role of 'thick' – simultaneously descriptive and evaluative – concepts in moral cognition.

- *WILLIAMS, Bernard, *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy* (London: Fontana, 1985), ch. 8 'Knowledge, science, convergence'. Also available online at: <http://lib.myilibrary.com/?id=62206>

- *PUTNAM, Hilary, 'Objectivity and the Science–Ethics Distinction', in M. Nussbaum and A. Sen, eds., *The Quality of Life* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), pp. 143-57. Also available online at: <https://doi.org/10.1093/0198287976.003.0011>
- BLACKBURN, Simon, 'The Absolute Conception: Putnam Vs. Williams', in his *Practical Tortoise Raising* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 245-60. Also available online at: <https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199548057.003.0014>
- HEAL, Jane, 'Ethics and the Absolute Conception', *Philosophy*, 64, no. 247 (1989): 49-65. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3750906>
- ROBERTS, Debbie, 'Thick Concepts', *Philosophy Compass*, 8 (2013): 677-88. <https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12055>
- Evolutionary theory, psychology theory and neuroscience have provided us with greater understanding of where our moral beliefs come from. Should these discoveries lead us to revise some or all of our moral beliefs?
- *STREET, Sharon, 'A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value', *Philosophical Studies*, 127 (2006): 109-66. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4321684>
- BERKER, Selim, 'The Normative Insignificance of Neuroscience', *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 37 (2009): 293-329. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40468459>
- CLARKE-DOANE, Justin, 'Moral Epistemology: The Mathematics Analogy', *Noûs*, 48 (2014): 238-55. <http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2012.00875.x>
- GREENE, Joshua, 'The Secret Joke of Kant's Soul', in W. Sinnott-Armstrong, ed., *Moral Psychology*. Vol. 3 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008), pp. 35-79.
- HAIDT, Jonathan, 'The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment', *Psychological Review*, 108 (2001): 813-34. http://discover.lib.cam.ac.uk/primo-explore/fulldisplay?docid=TN_apa_articles10.1037/0033-295X.108.4.814&context=PC&vid=44CAM_PROD&search_scope=SCOP_ONLINE&ab=online_res&lang=en_US
- HANSON, Louise, 'The Real Problem with Evolutionary Debunking Arguments', *The Philosophical Quarterly*, 67, no. 268 (2017): 508-33. <https://academic.oup.com/pq/article/67/268/508/2631329>
- JOYCE, Richard, *The Evolution of Morality* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), chs. 5 & 6.
- RAILTON, Peter, 'The Affective Dog and Its Rational Tale', *Ethics*, 124 (2014): 813-59. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/675876>
- VAVOVA, Katia, 'Evolutionary Debunking of Moral Realism', *Philosophy Compass*, 10 (2015): 104-16. <http://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12194>
- WIELENBERG, Erik J., 'On the Evolutionary Debunking of Morality', *Ethics*, 120 (2010): 441-64. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/652292>

Why do people disagree about morality? Does moral disagreement show that there are no moral experts? Is there anything wrong with following someone else's moral testimony?

- ENOCH, David, 'How Is Moral Disagreement a Problem for Realism?' *Journal of Ethics*, 13 (2009): 15-50. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40345390>
- HILLS, Alison, 'Moral Testimony and Moral Epistemology', *Ethics*, 120 (2009): 94-127. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/648610>
- HOPKINS, Robert, 'What Is Wrong with Moral Testimony?' *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 74 (2007): 611-34. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40041071>
- JONES, Karen, 'Second-Hand Moral Knowledge', *Journal of Ethics*, 96 (1999): 55-78. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2564672>
- MCGRATH, Sarah, 'Moral Disagreement and Moral Expertise', in R. Shafer-Landau, ed., *Oxford Studies in Metaethics*. Vol. 4 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 87-108.
- SETIYA, Kieran, *Knowing Right from Wrong* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199657452.001.0001>
- SLIWA, Paulina, 'Moral Understanding as Knowing Right from Wrong', *Ethics*, 127, no. 3 (2017): 521-52. <https://doi.org/10.1086/690011>

KANT'S ETHICS AND KANTIAN ETHICS: GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS

General and Background

- ALLISON, Henry, *Kant's Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals: A Commentary* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199691531.001.0001>
- GUYER, Paul, 'The Strategy of Kant's Groundwork', in *Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 201-31. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139173339.008>
- SCHNEEWIND, J.B., 'Autonomy, Obligation, and Virtue: An Overview of Kant's Moral Philosophy', in P. Guyer, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to Kant* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 309-41. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1017/CCOL0521365872>
- TIMMERMANN, Jens, *Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: A Commentary* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). Also available online at: <http://lib.mylibrary.com/?id=91712>
- VELLEMANN, J. David, 'A Brief Introduction to Kantian Ethics', in P. Guyer, ed., *Self to Self* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 16-44. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511498862.002>

Duty and Motive

Kant begins the Groundwork with an analysis of what morally worthy motivation consists in, concluding that it is the motive to act from duty. Is his argument for this conclusion compelling? Can his view leave space for benevolent action motivated by affection, for example?

- *KANT, Immanuel, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, edited by M.J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), sect. 1. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511809576>
- BARON, Marcia, 'Kant on Acting from Duty', in *Kantian Ethics Almost without Apology* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995), pp. 146-87.
- HERMAN, Barbara, 'On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty Alone', *The Philosophical Review*, 90 (1981): 359-382. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2184978>. Also in her *The Practice of Moral Judgements* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), pp. 1-22.
- KORSGAARD, Christine, 'Kant's Analysis of Obligation: The Argument of Groundwork I', in her *Creating the Kingdom of Ends* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 43-76. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139174503.003>.
- LANGTON, Rae, 'Duty and Desolation', *Philosophy*, 67 (1992): 481-505. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3751703>
- LANGTON, Rae, 'Objective and Unconditioned Value', *The Philosophical Review*, 116 (2007): 157-85. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20446954>
- MARKOVITS, Julia, 'Acting for the Right Reasons', *The Philosophical Review*, 119 (2010): 201-42. <http://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2009-037>
- RAWLS, John, 'Kant Lecture I: Groundwork: Preface and Part I', in his *Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), pp. 143-59.
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The Categorical Imperative

Kant famously held that the categorical imperative was the supreme principle of morality. What makes an imperative a categorical imperative? What is the content of the categorical imperative? How does Kant's formulations of the categorical imperative relate to each other? Are all, or any, of these formulations viable candidates as a general foundation for morality?

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Morality and Freedom and autonomy

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TOPICS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY

Trust

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Ethics of Knowing

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Responsibility

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We welcome your suggestions for further readings that will improve and diversify our reading lists, to reflect the best recent research, and important work by members of under-represented groups. Please email your suggestions to phillib@hermes.cam.ac.uk including the relevant part and paper number. For information on how we handle your personal data when you submit a suggestion please see <https://www.information-compliance.admin.cam.ac.uk/data-protection/general-data>.