

PHILOSOPHY TRIPOS Part II

Monday 26th May 2014

09.00 – 12.00

Paper 2

PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

*Answer **three** questions only.*

Write the number of the question at the beginning of each answer. If you are answering the either/or question, indicate the letter as well.

STATIONERY REQUIREMENTS

20 Page Answer Book x 1

Rough Work Pad

You may not start to read the questions printed on the subsequent pages of this question paper until instructed that you may do so by the Invigilator

1. If we can think about things that do not exist, does this mean that the externalist view of intentionality is incorrect?
2. Are all intentional states of mind propositional attitudes?
3. EITHER (a) To what extent is the simulation theory an improvement on the view that we acquire knowledge of other minds by drawing analogies with our own case?

OR (b) Can someone consistently doubt whether any of their judgments about other minds constitute knowledge, whilst remaining confident that their judgments about the rest of the external world do?
4. 'Perceptual experiences have no introspectible features over and above those implicated in their intentional contents. So the phenomenal character of such experiences is identical with, or determined by, their intentional content.' Discuss.
5. Does phenomenal consciousness require thoughts about one's own mental states?
6. Suppose a scientist omniscient about all the scientific facts sees red for the first time. Does she learn something new? If so, is it a new fact, or does she simply acquire a new concept to represent a fact she already knew, or neither?
7. Ed thinks that he believes World War II ended in 1945. Could Jane know that he doesn't believe this?
8. Is first-person knowledge knowledge of first-person facts?
9. Can the functionalist theory of the mind give an adequate account of mental causation?
10. 'Intending to do something is really a kind of desire.' Discuss.
11. For whom is the problem of akrasia a problem?

END OF PAPER