

PHILOSOPHY TRIPOS Part II

Monday 1 June 2015

09.00 – 12.00

Paper 2

PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

*Answer **three** questions only.*

Write the number of the question at the beginning of each answer. If you are answering an either/or question put the letter as well.

STATIONERY REQUIREMENTS

20 Page Answer Book x 1

Rough Work Pad

You may not start to read the questions printed on the subsequent pages of this question paper until instructed that you may do so by the Invigilator

1. Does the conceivability of zombies entail the falsity of physicalist theories of phenomenal consciousness?
2. Are there any plausible non-physicalist theories of phenomenal consciousness?
3. 'No physical state is essentially painful, so no physical state can be pain.' How plausible is this?
4. If mental states aren't identified with physical ones, how can they have any causal effects?
5. EITHER (a) 'I believe I want a drink.' Could the speaker be wrong?

OR (b) 'I discover whether I believe that p by asking myself whether p.' Is this a plausible account of how we know our own beliefs? Does it generalize to other mental states?
6. Can you know on the basis of perception that someone else is angry?
7. 'Putnam thought the example of XYZ showed that reference is a causal relation. But we are not in a causal relation to XYZ. So Putnam's premises are meaningful only if his conclusion is false.' Discuss.
8. What are thoughts about Pegasus about?
9. Are beliefs and desires the only mental states one needs to explain action?
10. EITHER (a) 'All that's the matter with addicts is that they don't want to stop badly enough.' Discuss.

OR (b) 'You show what you really think by what you do.' How effective is this as a response to the problem of akrasia?

END OF PAPER