PHILOSOPHY TRIPOS     Part II

Date, Date, Month 2014          Time

Paper 5

PHILOSOPHY IN THE LONG MIDDLE AGES

*Answer three questions only, at least one from each section.*

STATIONERY REQUIREMENTS

20 Page Answer book x 1
Rough Work Pad

You may not start to read the questions printed on the subsequent pages of this question paper until instructed that you may do so by the Invigilator.
PASSAGE A
Thus when I hear 'man', a kind of model rises up in my mind that is related to single men in such a way that it is common to all of them and proper to none. But when I hear 'Socrates', a certain form rises up in my mind that expresses the likeness of a certain person. Hence by the 'Word 'Socrates', which produces in the mind the proper form of one person, a certain thing is picked out and determined. But with the word 'man' the understanding of which depends on the common form of all men, that very community produces a "confusion" so that we do not understand any one form from among them all.

PASSAGE B
Moreover sixth: if every real unity is numerical unity, therefore every real diversity is numerical diversity. The consequent is false. For every numerical diversity, insofar as it is numerical, is equal. And so all things would be equally distinct. In that case, it follows that the intellect could not abstract something common from Socrates and Plato any more that it can from Socrates and a line. Every universal would be a pure figment of the intellect.

PASSAGE C
Further, it seems ridiculous to say that the intellective soul, which is a power single in number, has two ways of understanding, one dependent on and one independent of the body. For thus it would seem to possess two kinds of being. For an Intelligence, even though it be intellect and soul, and in its understanding does not need the body, still might need the body in causing motion. But causing motion in place and understanding are very different functions. In the soul, moreover, are placed intellections, of which one depends on the body, while the other is unqualifiedly absolute. This does not seem in harmony with reason, since of a single function, with respect to one and the same thing, there does not seem to be but a single manner of functioning.

PASSAGE D
P20: There is also in God an idea, or knowledge, of the human mind, which follows in God in the same way and is related to God in the same way as the idea, or knowledge, of the human body.
Dem: Thought is an attribute of God (by P1), and so (by P3) there must necessarily be in God an idea both of [NS: thought] and of all of its affections, and consequently (by P11), of the human mind also. Next, this idea or knowledge, of the mind does not follow in God insofar as he is infinite, but insofar as he is affected by another idea of a singular thing (by P9). But the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of causes (by P7). Therefore, this idea, or knowledge, of the mind follows in God and is related to God in the same way as the idea, or knowledge, of the body, q.e.d.
Answer Three Questions, including at least one from Section A. You may answer Section B questions on texts, extracts from which you have commented on in a Section A question, so long as you avoid any substantial repetition of material.

Section A

1. With regard to both Passages A and B write a commentary analysing the argument of each, explaining any presuppositions or concepts which are not familiar to readers today, placing it within the wider argument the author is developing and saying how it relates more generally to the problem of universals in the long Middle Ages. You may write separately about each of the passages, or treat them comparatively in a single discussion.

2. With regard to both Passages C and D, write a commentary analysing the argument of each, explaining any presuppositions or concepts which are not familiar to readers today, placing it within the wider argument the author is developing and saying how it relates more generally to the problem of mind and body in the long Middle Ages. You may write separately about each of the passages, or treat them comparatively in a single discussion.

Section B

3. Explain Boethius’s notion of abstraction and the role it plays in his discussion of universals.

4. Why does Abelard insist that we must posit a common cause as well as a common concept in order to explain the semantics of universals?

5. What does Avicenna mean by a common nature? How does he use this concept in his discussion of universals?

6. Why does Scotus think that species do, and genera do not, have less than numerical unity?

7. EITHER (a) ‘Ockham’s criticisms of Scotus’s theory of universals beg the question’. Discuss.

    OR (b) What role does Ockham’s theory of mental language play in proposing his nominalistic view of universals?

8. In what sense can Locke be called a nominalist?

9. ‘Avicenna presents the operation of the Agent Intellect in such a way as to leave little room for individual human effort in intellectual cognition.’ Discuss.
10. What did Aquinas find most objectionable about Averroes’s view of intellectual cognition, and why?

11. Does Gersonides deny the immortality of the human soul?

12. What are the most powerful arguments Pomponazzi puts against the immortality of the human soul? Did he accept them?

13. Since almost all his interlocutors accepted that soul and body are actually separable, what is new or important about Descartes’s real distinction?

14. How does Spinoza individuate human minds?

15. EITHER (a) ‘The Problem of Universals’ is fundamentally the same, from Boethius to Locke’. Discuss with relation to two or more of the set authors.

   OR (b) Discuss, in relation to two or more of the set authors, how they use their conception of substance in discussing the relation of mind and body.

END OF PAPER