Paper 8

PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC

Answer three questions only.

Write the number of the question at the beginning of each answer. If you are answering an either/or question, indicate the letter as well.

STATIONERY REQUIREMENTS

20 Page Answer book x 1
Rough Work Pad

You may not start to read the questions printed on the subsequent pages of this question paper until instructed that you may do so by the Invigilator.
What, if anything, is wrong with a 'modest' theory of meaning?

'Human minds did not create the stars or the mountains, but this remark is hardly enough to settle the philosophical question of realism versus anti-realism.' Isn't it?

Is it possible to refer to objects in a language without identity?

Is Kripke's sceptical solution a satisfactory riposte to scepticism about meaning?

Either (a) What role, if any, should conditional probability have in an account of indicative conditionals?

Or (b) Does the sentence 'If Nixon had pressed the button, there would have been a nuclear holocaust' pose a serious problem for Lewis' account of counterfactuals?

Either (a) 'Although plural terms occur in English, there is no need to introduce them into formal logic.' Discuss.

Or (b) Is \(\sqrt{4} = \pm 2\) nonsense?

'The quantifiers on the right-hand side of Hume's Principle range over a domain that includes the natural numbers referred to on the left-hand side. So it cannot deliver a grasp of the natural numbers to someone previously ignorant of them.' Is this a good objection against the neo-Fregean?

What implication, if any, does the possibility (or otherwise) of supertasks have for the intuitionist philosophy of mathematics?

'Mathematics is not the science of structures, but the science of possible structures.' Discuss.

'Only knowledge of contingent matters requires causal acquaintance. Hence there is no access problem for mathematical platonism.' Discuss.

END OF PAPER