

PHILOSOPHY TRIPOS Part II

Monday 28 May 2012

09.00 to 12.00

Paper 8

PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC

*Answer **three** questions only.*

Write the number of the question at the beginning of each answer. If you are answering an either/or question, indicate the letter as well.

STATIONERY REQUIREMENTS

20 Page Answer book x 1

Rough Work Pad

**You may not start to read the questions
printed on the subsequent pages of this
question paper until instructed that you
may do so by the Invigilator**

- 1 What, if anything, is wrong with a 'modest' theory of meaning?
- 2 'Human minds did not create the stars or the mountains, but this remark is hardly enough to settle the philosophical question of realism versus anti-realism.' Isn't it?
- 3 Is it possible to refer to objects in a language without identity?
- 4 Is Kripke's sceptical solution a satisfactory riposte to scepticism about meaning?
- 5 **Either** (a) What role, if any, should conditional probability have in an account of indicative conditionals?

Or (b) Does the sentence 'If Nixon had pressed the button, there would have been a nuclear holocaust' pose a serious problem for Lewis' account of counterfactuals?
- 6 **Either** (a) 'Although plural terms occur in English, there is no need to introduce them into formal logic.' Discuss.

Or (b) Is ' $\sqrt{4} = \pm 2$ ' nonsense?
- 7 'The quantifiers on the right-hand side of Hume's Principle range over a domain that includes the natural numbers referred to on the left-hand side. So it cannot deliver a grasp of the natural numbers to someone previously ignorant of them.' Is this a good objection against the neo-Fregean?
- 8 What implication, if any, does the possibility (or otherwise) of supertasks have for the intuitionist philosophy of mathematics?
- 9 'Mathematics is not the science of structures, but the science of *possible* structures.' Discuss.
- 10 'Only knowledge of contingent matters requires causal acquaintance. Hence there is no access problem for mathematical platonism.' Discuss.

END OF PAPER