

PHILOSOPHY TRIPOS Part II

---

Friday 24 May 2019

09.00 – 12.00

---

Paper 2

PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

Answer **three** questions only

*Write the number of the question at the beginning of each answer. If you are answering an either/or question, indicate the letter as well.*

**STATIONERY REQUIREMENTS**

*20 page answer book × 1*

*Rough work pad*

**You may not start to read the questions  
printed on the subsequent pages of  
this question paper until instructed that  
you may do so by the Invigilator**

1. Do we have privileged access to our own mental states?
2. We can think about things that don't exist. Does this mean intentionality cannot be reductively explained?
3. Do our ascriptions of mental states to others presuppose acts of mental simulation?
4. If I don't know what water is, can I think about water?
5. EITHER: (a) It seems that there are some things it is impossible to learn from books. What, if anything, does this tell us about the nature of consciousness?  
  
OR: (b) If physicalism were true, would zombies be inconceivable? Are they?
6. Can one intend to do something whilst believing one won't do it?
7. 'When I attend to my experiences, I end up attending to objects and properties outside my head. So, my experiences represent objects and properties outside my head.' Is this a sound argument for representationalism about consciousness?
8. Is there anything to the imagination besides mental images?
9. 'If John could not think first-person thoughts, he could not act for selfish reasons.' Is this true?
10. Under what conditions do two conscious experiences belong to the same mind?

**END OF PAPER**