

SAMPLE PAPER

Part II

Paper 2, Philosophy of mind (*reintroduced for Tripos 2010*)

Candidates are asked to answer three questions.

Candidates also taking Paper 9 may not answer questions in this paper on Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*, which will be marked with an asterisk (*). The paper will be set in such a way that there are at least ten questions not marked with an asterisk.

1. 'Physicalism has as much difficulty in explaining mental causation as dualism does.' Discuss.
2. How could we know whether or not pain is a brain state?
3. 'No-one can deny that we sometimes theorise about the minds of others; and no-one can deny that the occasionally "simulate" the minds of others by imagining or "replicating" their thoughts. Therefore the Theory Theory and the Simulation Theory of knowledge of other minds are not incompatible, but just describe different aspects of our thinking about other minds.' Discuss.
4. Are thoughts conscious in a different way from the way in which sensations and other experiences are conscious? If so, do these different forms of consciousness have anything in common?
5. How might one argue for the thesis that indexical thinking (thinking expressible in terms of expressions like 'I', 'here' and 'now') is irreducible to any other kind of thinking?
6. Does the inverted spectrum hypothesis describe a genuine possibility? If it does, what are the consequences for functionalist theories of mind?
7. 'All mental states exhibit intentionality'. What does this mean? Is it true?
8. Critically evaluate the hypothesis that I can know what I am thinking in a way that no-one else can.
9. Are there any good reasons for thinking that the nature of certain thoughts is essentially dependent on the environment of the thinker?
10. Can there be thought without language?
11. *'Wittgenstein's private language argument shows that the Cartesian conception of the mind is deeply flawed.' What is the Cartesian conception of the mind? Did Wittgenstein show this?

