

PHILOSOPHY TRIPOS Part II

Monday 30 May 2016

13.30 – 16.30

Paper 3

ETHICS

*Answer **three** questions only.*

Write the number of the question at the beginning of each answer. If you are answering an either/or question, indicate the letter as well.

STATIONERY REQUIREMENTS

20 Page Answer book x 1

Rough Work Pad

**You may not start to read the questions
printed on the subsequent pages of this
question paper until instructed that you
may do so by the Invigilator**

1. Do objections to hedonist theories of well-being rest on mistaken intuitions?
2. 'Being desire-satisfying is not a good-making property. Therefore, well-being cannot consist in the satisfaction of desires.' Is this a good argument?
3. What, if anything, do fitting-attitude accounts of value explain?
4. Does Sidgwick provide a convincing argument against the view that virtue is the ultimate good?
5. EITHER (a) Can moral naturalists satisfactorily explain moral disagreement?

OR (b) Does the supervenience of moral properties on non-moral properties provide a decisive argument against moral non-naturalism?
6. 'It is no more challenging to provide a theory of moral properties than it is to provide a theory of epistemological properties.' Discuss.
7. 'A good will is not good...because of its fitness to attain some proposed end, but only because of its volition, that is, it is good in itself.' (KANT). Does it follow from this claim that there is no such thing as moral luck?
8. EITHER (a) 'Kant's formula of humanity is too open-ended to be useful in everyday life.' Discuss.

OR (b) Does sex necessarily involve some degree of objectification? Would it be a problem if it did?
9. 'Someone is to blame just in case the reasons for which they act reveal them to have attitudes that impair their relations with others.' Discuss.
10. Does implicit bias tell us anything interesting about the nature of justice?

END OF PAPER