

PHT2/5  
Philosophy Tripos Part II

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Friday, 31 May 2024

13.30 to 16.30

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**Paper 5**

**PHILOSOPHY IN THE LONG MIDDLE AGES**

Answer **three** questions, including at least **one** from each section. You are permitted to write on an author in section B even if you have discussed that author in section A, but you must not repeat material.

Type the number of the question at the beginning of each answer. If you are answering an either/or question, indicate the letter as well.

Type your candidate number, **not** your name, on the top of **each** document submitted.

**STATIONERY REQUIREMENTS**

20-Page Answer Book  
x 1 Rough Work Pad

**You may not start to read the questions printed on the subsequent pages of this question paper until instructed to do so.**

## SECTION A

1. Identify each of the passages (a) and (b), explain the part it plays in the argument of the text from which it is taken and supply whatever background material and interpretative comments a reader now would need in order to understand its full significance. You may also compare the two passages.
  - (a) It is because of this that the exacting among them have agreed that these accidents and events that occur when the contact between bodies takes place—and, in general, when the relationships between them change—emanate from the bestower of forms, who is one of the angels, so that they have said: “The imprinting of the form of color in the eye comes from the bestower of forms, the sun's appearance, the healthy pupil and the colored body being only 'readiers' and preparers for the receptacle's acceptance of these forms.” They have made this the case with all temporal events. With this, the claim of those who proclaim that it is fire that enacts the burning, that it is bread that enacts satiety, that it is medicine that produces health, and so on, becomes false.
  - (b) In accordance with these statements, I have laid down elsewhere, among others, this thesis: ‘From the fact that some thing is known to be, it cannot be inferred evidently, by evidentness reduced to the first principle, or to the certitude of the first principle, that there is some other thing.’ Among other arguments (which were quite numerous) I brought forward this argument: ‘In such an inference in which from one thing another thing would be inferred, the consequent would not be factually identical with the antecedent, nor with part of what is signified by the antecedent. It therefore follows that such an inference would not be evidently known with the aforesaid evidentness of the first principle. The antecedent is conceded and posited by the opponent. The implication is plain from the definition of ‘contradiction’, which runs ‘an affirmation and a negation of one and the same <attribute> ...etc.’ Since, then, in this case the consequent is not factually identical with the antecedent, or with part of the antecedent, it is manifest that, assuming the opposite of the consequent, and the antecedent to be simultaneously true, there still would not be an ‘affirmation and negation of one and the same <attribute> . . . etc.’
2. Identify each of the passages (a) and (b), explain the part it plays in the argument of the text from which it is taken and supply whatever background material and interpretative comments a reader now would need in order to understand its full significance. You may also compare the two passages.
  - (a) From this we clearly understand wherein our salvation, or blessedness, or freedom, consists, namely, in a constant and eternal love of God, or in God's love for men. And this love, or blessedness, is called glory in the Sacred Scriptures—not without reason. For whether this love is related to God or to the mind, it can rightly be called satisfaction of mind, which is really not distinguished from glory (by Defs. Aff. XXV and XXX). For insofar as it is related to God (by P35), it is joy (if I may still be permitted to use this term), accompanied by the idea of himself [as its cause]. And similarly insofar as it is related to the mind (by P27).

Again, because the essence of our mind consists only in knowledge, of which God is the beginning and foundation (by IP15 and IIP47S), it is clear to us how our mind, with respect both to essence and existence, follows from the divine nature, and continually depends on God.

I thought this worth the trouble of noting here, in order to show by this example how much the knowledge of singular things I have called intuitive, or knowledge of the third kind (see IIP40S2), can accomplish, and how much more powerful it is than the universal knowledge I have called knowledge of the second kind. For although I have shown generally in Part I that all things (and consequently the human mind also) depend on God both for their essence and their existence, nevertheless, that demonstration, though legitimate and put beyond all chance of doubt, still does not affect our mind as much as when this is inferred from the very essence of any singular thing which we say depends on God.

- (b) Thus, in this question the good theologian ought not to be of a different opinion from the true philosopher or vice versa. The same goes with regard to what is false and contrary to right reason. In the present instance, someone with hope of another life ought to judge, according to right reason, that it is preferable to die for the well-being of the commonwealth not so much because he hopes that the penalty of death will be restored, and compensated for, by the reward of a future life but rather because whoever did not make this choice and risk his temporal life for the commonwealth would sin and offend against God. Therefore, someone without hope of a future life ought to make the same judgment, namely, that according to right reason one should choose death for the sake of the commonwealth and should do so because one would sin in not making this choice. This is the case even if he is not afraid of giving offense to God for fear of a future punishment in which he does not believe.

## SECTION B

3. 'Al-Ghazali does not argue that we should really doubt whether cotton will be burned by a flame.' Discuss.
4. What role does the notion of *evidentness* play in Buridan's reply to scepticism?
5. Explain the role the Principle of Non-Contradiction plays in Nicholas of Autrecourt's scepticism.
6. Crathorn holds that from 'this complex known per se, *God or the first cause does nothing groundlessly and supernaturally so as to lead human beings into error*, one can evidently conclude that [...] sensed things exist.' Explain why Crathorn thinks that the above conclusion follows and whether it really does follow given the preceding sceptical presuppositions.
7. 'Christine de Pizan's epistemology, based on the idea of opinion, leaves no room for general sceptical doubts.' Discuss.
8. Is Sanchez's central point that we know nothing, or that we should suspend judgement, or something else altogether?
9. Does Boethius propose a monolithic view of happiness, as identified with the Good, which is God?
10. 'For Ibn Tufayl, true happiness is attainable only by a few intellectuals.' **Discuss.**
11. Analyse the relationship between unselfish love and virtue in Maimonides's account of human well-being.

**TURN OVER**

12. 'The good man...does many acts for the sake of his friends and his country, and if necessary dies for them; for he will throw away both wealth and honours and in general the goods that are objects of competition, gaining for himself nobility.' (Aristotle) Does Henry of Ghent justify Aristotle's position, or does he change it, and does he succeed in making his case?
13. Analyse the role Marguerite Porete gives to will in her discussion of love.
14. 'What Spinoza says about the intellectual love of God is only a sop to the masses, since there is nothing capable of being loved in a God who necessarily produces all good indiscriminately. True love is grounded not in necessity, but in goodness.' Is this criticism justified?
15. **EITHER:** (a) Are there features of sceptical arguments from the period 1000 to 1400 that distinguish them from sceptical arguments made by earlier or later writers? In your answer you should focus mainly on ONE or TWO of the set texts.  
  
**OR:** (b) 'Medieval ethics was fundamentally egotistical.' Discuss with regard to ONE or TWO of the set texts.

**PASSAGES****Passage for question 1(a):**

It is because of this that the exacting among them have agreed that these accidents and events that occur when the contact between bodies takes place--and, in general, when the relationships between them change--emanate from the bestower of forms, who is one of the angels, so that they have said: "The imprinting of the form of color in the eye comes from the bestower of forms, the sun's appearance, the healthy pupil and the colored body being only 'readiers' and preparers for the receptacle's acceptance of these forms." They have made this the case with all temporal events. With this, the claim of those who proclaim that it is fire that enacts the burning, that it is bread that enacts satiety, that it is medicine that produces health, and so on, becomes false.

**Passage for question 2(b):**

Schol. From this we clearly understand wherein our salvation, *or* blessedness, *or* freedom, consists, namely, in a constant and eternal love of God, *or* in God's love for men. And this love, *or* blessedness, is called glory in the Sacred Scriptures—not without reason. For whether this love is related to God or to the mind, it can rightly be called satisfaction of mind, which is really not distinguished from glory (by Defs. Aff. XXV and XXX). For insofar as it is related to God (by P35), it is joy (if I may still be permitted to use this term), accompanied by the idea of himself [as its cause]. And similarly insofar as it is related to the mind (by P27).

Again, because the essence of our mind consists only in knowledge, of which God is the beginning and foundation (by IP15 and IIP47S), it is clear to us how our mind, with respect both to essence and existence, follows from the divine nature, and continually depends on God.

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**END OF PAPER**