

Abstract: Heavy Ontology, Light Ideology

I think that there is a serious ontological question as to whether the world hosts things such as protons, plums, and planets, but that there is no serious ideological question as to whether the world prefers us to talk about such things using ' \wedge ' and ' \neg ', or ' \forall ' and ' \neg ', or ' \uparrow '. I thus uphold heavy ontology plus light ideology. So I take issue with Hirsch, who argues that heavy ontology falls to quantifier variance, and with Sider, who replies to Hirsch that heavy ontology can be saved but only via heavy ideology (in particular, a worldly preference for a distinguished quantifier). My argument runs (1) quantifier variance is best understood as a thesis about variance in the domain over which the quantifier ranges, (2) heavy ontology can be saved (pace Hirsch) by positing that the world provides a distinguished domain, and (3) saving heavy ontology puts no pressure on ideology (pace Sider) since the domain is not part of the language at all, but rather an object positing by the interpreter in modeling the language. In short: heavy ontology needs a distinguished domain not heavy ideology.