## PHT1/1

## PHILOSOPHY TRIPOS Part IB

Monday 30 May 2005 9 to 12

Paper 1

## METAPHYSICS AND PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

Answer three questions only.

Write the number of the question at the beginning of each answer. If you are answering an either/or question, indicate the letter as well.

STATIONERY REQUIREMENTS 20 Page Answer Book x 1 Rough Work Pad

You may not start to read the questions

printed on the subsequent pages of this

question paper until instructed that you

may do so by the Invigilator

- 1 'The trouble with functionalist theories of the mental is that they say nothing about the nature of the mental.' To what extent is this criticism justified?
- 2 Does the 'knowledge argument' make a cogent case for dualism?
- 3 Is perception ever direct?
- 4 **Either** (*a*) To what kinds of scepticism, if any, can an externalist account of knowledge provide an answer?
  - **Or** (b) Should we deny that knowledge is closed under known logical implication?
- 5 Could what is called *a priori* knowledge really be a matter of linguistic convention?
- 6 **Either** (a) What could coherence theorists of truth plausibly mean by 'coherence'?
  - **Or** (*b*) What could correspondence theorists of truth plausibly mean by 'correspondence'?
- 7 **Either** (*a*) 'Just as my perceptual state can tell me that a flood has occurred, so my emotional reaction can tell me that something tragic has occurred.' Do you agree?
  - **Or** (*b*) Are emotions feelings?
- 8 'Though it could turn out that mental states are states of the brain, it cannot turn out that mental states are patterns of behaviour.' Discuss.
- 9 Is it possible for something to *seem* pleasant without really being pleasant?
- 10 Are colours real?

## END OF PAPER