## PHILOSOPHY TRIPOS Part II

Monday 2 June 2003

1.30 to 4.30

Paper 8

PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC

Answer three questions only.

Write the number of the question at the beginning of each answer. If you are answering an either/or question, indicate the letter as well.

You may not start to read the questions printed on the subsequent pages of this question paper until instructed that you may do so by the Invigilator

- 1 Does knowledge of a Davidsonian theory for a language suffice for understanding utterances in that language?
- 2 Discuss Dummett's view that theories of meaning whose central notion is verification are preferable to those whose central notion is truth.
- 3 What, if anything, makes it true that I mean addition by 'plus'? How, if at all, do I know I mean addition by 'plus'?
- 4 **Either** (*a*) Is an indicative conditional equivalent to the corresponding material implication?
  - **Or** (*b*) 'If Nixon had pressed the button, a nuclear holocaust would have ensued.' Does this sentence present a serious problem for Lewis's analysis of counterfactuals?
- 5 **Either** (*a*) Does the liar paradox show that the concept of truth is incoherent?
  - **Or** (b) How many kinds of paradox can the theory of types solve?
- 6 Is logic universal?
- 7 Does the possibility of non-Euclidean geometry contradict Kant's claim that we can know the structure of space a priori?
- 8 Should we expect our account of arithmetic to settle whether or not Julius Caesar was a natural number?
- 9 Do numbers have only structural properties?
- 10 Does the applicability of a piece of mathematics to natural science imply its truth?

## END OF PAPER