PHILOSOPHY TRIPOS   Part II

Friday 26 May 2006   9 to 12

Paper 1

METAPHYSICS

Answer **three** *questions only.*

Write the number of the question at the beginning of each answer. If you are answering an either/or question, indicate the letter as well.
The questions marked with an asterisk may not be answered by candidates also offering Paper 9: Wittgenstein.

STATIONERY REQUIREMENTS
20 Page Answer book x 1
Rough Work Pad

You may not start to read the questions printed on the subsequent pages of this question paper until instructed that you may do so by the Invigilator

1   **Either**   *(a)*   Are minimalists about truth automatically realists?

     Or   *(b)*   Do truths require facts to make them true?

2   Is there a gap between believing a theory to be empirically adequate and believing it outright?

3   What, if anything, would commit you to the existence of universals?

4   **Either**   *(a)*   Does 'the problem of late pre-emption' undermine any counterfactual theory of causation?

     Or   *(b)*   Are singular causal facts dependent upon the laws of nature?

5   Why should anyone believe that what we perceive continues to exist unperceived?

6   Do transcendental arguments depend on idealist assumptions?

7   **Either**   *(a)*   Does continuing to be the same person require continuing to be the same animal?

     Or   *(b)*   'According to the psychological theory of personal identity, I shouldn't worry about getting a pension.' Discuss.

8   **Either**   *(a)*   How do the past and future differ from the present?

     Or   *(b)*   Is time travel possible?

9   In what sense, if any, does the ability to think about other people's thoughts require grasp of a theory of mind?

10   **Either**   *(a)*   Must I know my own mental states better than those of others?

     Or   *(b)*   Can functionalism give an adequate account of sensation?

*11 'If the world has no substance, then whether a proposition had sense would depend on whether another proposition was true.' (TLP, 2.0211). Discuss.

*12 Discuss Wittgenstein's claim in the *Tractatus* that '*A* believes that *p*' is to be analysed as having the same form as ' "p"says that *p*'.

END OF PAPER