PHILOSOPHY TRIPOS Part II

Monday 27th May 2013

13.30 - 16.30

Paper 2

PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

Answer three questions only.

Write the number of the question at the beginning of each answer.

* Question 11 may <u>not</u> be answered by candidates also offering Paper 9: Wittgenstein.

STATIONERY REQUIREMENTS

20 Page Answer Book x 1 Rough Work Pad

You may not start to read the questions printed on the subsequent pages of this question paper until instructed that you may do so by the Invigilator

- 1. Do I understand the minds of others by applying a theory of mind?
- 2. Suppose I see someone in the mirror and I suddenly realise that it is me. What kind of truth have I learned, and what are the consequences, if any, of someone's learning such truths?
- 3. Evaluate the claim that I know what I'm thinking in a way that no one else does.
- 4. 'Someone could know all the physical facts about seeing red and yet learn something new when he or she sees red for the first time.' Is this true? If so, what consequences does it have for an account of consciousness?
- 5. What does it mean to say that the phenomenal character of an experience is determined by its intentional content? Is it true?
- 6. EITHER: a) 'The object of a thought is what the thought is about. Since every thought is about something, every thought has an object. But since we can think about things that do not exist, there must therefore be non-existent objects.' Evaluate this argument.
 - OR: b) What are propositional attitudes? Are all intentional states propositional attitudes?
- 7. Are there any thoughts whose existence and nature depend essentially on how things are in the world external to the thinker?
- 8. 'Thoughts must have a structure; but their structure need not be anything like the structure of a language.' Discuss.
- 9. Can mental representation or intentionality be explained in non-mental terms?
- 10. 'Only an identification of mental and physical causes can give an account of mental causation which is acceptable to physicalists.' Discuss.
- *11.Explain the significance, if any, of Wittgenstein's private language argument for theories of consciousness and/or intentionality.

END OF PAPER