The 88th Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association

University of Cambridge

Fitzwilliam College, 11–13 July 2014

Contents

Timetable	2
Symposia	5
Postgraduate sessions	10
Open sessions: Saturday	14
Open sessions: Sunday early	26
Open sessions and SWIP: Sunday late	38

Dear Delegate,

It is a great pleasure to welcome you to the 88th Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association.

The first Joint Session was held in 1918, and Cambridge hosted it for the first time in 1926, at Trinity College, under the title 'Methods of Analysis'. The tenth Joint Session in 1931 was also held at Trinity, with the slightly more recondite title 'Indeterminism, Formalism and Value'. In 1947 Cambridge hosted the 21st Session, called 'Explanation in History and Philosophy'. These general titles had been eliminated by the time the 35th Joint Session came here in 1961, and the 61st in 1987.

It has been 27 years since the Joint Session was last held in Cambridge, and we are delighted to be its host this year for the sixth time in the history of the UK's most significant national philosophy conference.

We hope that the conference and accommodation facilities here at Fitzwilliam College will meet all your needs. If you have any questions, please contact the registration desk in the Upper Hall 2, or speak to a helper (identifiable by their yellow lanyards).

We are very grateful to the Mind Association and the Aristotelian Society for all their support, to Oxford University Press for sponsoring the reception, and to Cambridge University Press for its sponsorship of essential conference materials.

As chair of the Faculty of Philosophy I would like to thank our invaluable administrators in the Faculty Office for their assistance, and to extend a special thanks to Suzanne Donovan for all her excellent work. But most of all, on behalf of the Faculty, I would like to express my deep gratitude to Tim Button for taking on the demanding job of local organiser and carrying it out with such good will and efficiency.

I wish you a most enjoyable and stimulating conference.

Tim Crane Knightbridge Professor of Philosophy Chair, Faculty of Philosophy University of Cambridge

Timetable

Map references appear in square-brackets (see back of programme).

Publishers' stands are in the Upper Hall 2 and Auditorium throughout the conference.

The Upper Hall used to be known as the 'Old Library'; both names may be in use on signs within the College.

Friday 11 July

14.30–14.45	Aristotelian Society AGM	Trust Room	[2A]
14.45-15.00	Mind AGM	Trust Room	[2A]
15.00-17.00	Registration, Tea and Coffee	Upper Hall 2	[3A]
16.30-17.00	Tea and Coffee	Auditorium	[1A]
17.15–19.00	The Inaugural Address: <i>Reasons for Belief,</i> <i>Perception and Reflective Knowledge</i> Alan Millar	Auditorium	[1A]
19.00–19.45	Drinks Reception, sponsored by OUP	Upper Hall 2	[3A]
20.00-21.30	Conference dinner	Hall	[2D]
19.00-00.00	Bar open	Café / Bar	[2E]

Saturday 12 July

07.30-08.45	Breakfast	Hall*	[2D]
09.00–10.45	Symposium I: <i>Truth and Meaning</i> Ian Rumfitt & Gary Kemp	Auditorium	[1A]
10.45-11.15	Tea and Coffee	Auditorium Upper Hall 2	[1A] [3A]
11.15–13.00	Symposium II: <i>Moral Testimony</i> Hallvard Lillehammer & Roger Crisp	Auditorium	[1A]
13.00-14.00	Lunch	Hall	[2D]
14.00–16.00	Postgraduate sessions: Theoretical	Auditorium	[1A]
14.00–15.30	Postgraduate sessions: Normative	Reddaway	[3B]
16.00–16.30	Tea and Coffee	Auditorium Upper Hall 2	[1A] [3A]
16.30–18.30	Open sessions	see p.14	
18.45–19.45	Dinner	Hall	[2D]
20.00-21.45	Symposium III: <i>Culpability, Duress and Excuses</i> Gideon Rosen & Marcia Baron	Auditorium	[1A]
19.00-00.00	Bar open	Café / Bar	[2E]

*Accommodation includes breakfast at, and only at, the institution where accommodation is provided. So: those with accommodation at Murray Edwards must eat breakfast at Murray Edwards; those with accommodation at Fitzwilliam must eat breakfast at Fitzwilliam.

Sunday 13 July

07.30-08.45	Breakfast	Hall*	[2D]
09.00-10.45	Symposium IV: <i>The Ethical Significance of</i> <i>Persistence</i> Amber Carpenter & Stephen Makin	Auditorium	[1A]
10.45-11.15	Tea and Coffee	Auditorium Upper Hall 2	[1A] [3A]
11.15-13.15	Open sessions	see p.26	
13.15-14.15	Lunch	Hall	[2D]
14.15–16.15	Open sessions & SWIP	see p.38	
16.15–17.00	Tea and Coffee	Auditorium Upper Hall 2	[1A] [3A]
17.00–18.45	Symposium V: <i>Self-Regulation</i> Tamar Szabó Gendler & Jennifer Nagel	Auditorium	[1A]
19.00-20.00	Dinner	Hall	[2D]
19.00-22.30	Bar open	Café / Bar	[2E]

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Symposia

Inaugural Address

Friday 11 July, 17.15–19.00, chaired by David Papineau (KCL)

ALAN MILLAR (Stirling)

Reasons for Belief, Perception and Reflective Knowledge

A conception of the relation between reasons for belief, justified belief, and knowledge is outlined on which (1) a belief is justified, in the sense of well founded, only if there is an adequate (normative) reason to believe it, (2) (normative) reasons to believe something are constituted by truths, and (3) a reason to believe something justifies one in believing it only if it is constituted by a truth or truths that one knows. It is argued that, contrary to initial appearances, perceptual justification does not pose a problem for this view. The discussion touches upon the relation between believing for reasons and reflective knowledge

Symposium I: Truth and Meaning

Saturday 12 July 2013, 09.00–10.45, chaired by Tim Button (Cambridge)

IAN RUMFITT (Birmingham)

Truth and Meaning

Should we explicate truth in terms of meaning, or meaning in terms of truth? F.P. Ramsey, A.N. Prior and P.F. Strawson all favoured the former approach: a statement is true if and only if things are as the speaker, in making the statement, states things to be; similarly, a belief is true if and only if things are as a thinker with that belief thereby believes them to be. I defend this explication of truth against a range of objections. Ramsey formalised this account of truth (as it applies to beliefs) as follows: B is true $=_{df} (\exists P)(B \text{ is a belief that } P \land P)$; in §1, I defend this formula against the late Peter Geach's objection that its right-hand side is ill-formed. Donald Davidson held that Ramsey and co. had the whole matter back to front: on his view, we should explicate meaning in terms of truth, not vice versa. In §2, I argue that Ramsey's approach opens the way to a more promising approach to semantic theorizing than Davidson's. Ramsey presents his formula as a definition of truth, apparently contradicting Alfred Tarski's theorem that truth is indefinable. In §3, I show that the contradiction is only apparent: Tarski assumes that the Liar-like inscription he uses to prove his theorem has a content, but Ramsey can and should reject that assumption. As I explain in §4, versions of the Liar Paradox may be generated without making any assumptions about truth: paradox arises when the impredicativity that is found when a statement's content depends on the contents of a collection of statements to which it belongs turns pathological. Since they do not succeed in saying anything, such pathological utterances or inscriptions pose no threat to the laws of logic, when these are understood as universal principles about the ways things may be said or thought to be. There is, though, a call for rules by following which we can be sure that any conclusion deduced from true premisses is true, and hence says something. Such rules cannot be purely formal, but in §5 I propose a system of them: this opens the way to the construction of deductive theories even in circumstances where producing a well-formed formula is no guarantee of saying anything.

GARY KEMP (Glasgow)

Hyperintensional Truth-Conditions

A response to certain parts of Rumfitt's paper: I defend Davidson's project in semantics, suggest that Rumfitt's use of sentential quantification renders his definition of truth needlessly elaborate, and pose a question for Rumfitt's handling of the strengthened Liar.

Symposium II: Moral Testimony

Saturday 12 July, 11.15–13.00, chaired by Alison Hills (Oxford)

HALLVARD LILLEHAMMER (Birkbeck)

Moral Testimony, Moral Virtue, and the Value of Autonomy

According to some, taking moral testimony is a potentially decent way to exercise one's moral agency. According to others, it amounts to a failure to live up to minimal standards of moral worth. What's the issue? Is it conceptual or empirical? Is it epistemological or moral? Is there a 'puzzle' of moral testimony; or are there many, or none? I argue that there is no distinctive puzzle of moral testimony. The question of its legitimacy is as much a moral or political as an epistemological question. Its answer is as much a matter of contingent empirical fact as a matter of *a priori* necessity. In the background is a mixture of normative and descriptive issues, including the value of autonomy, the nature of legitimate authority, and who to trust.

ROGER CRISP (Oxford)

Moral Testimony Pessimism: A Defence

This paper defends moral testimony pessimism, the view that there is something morally or epistemically regrettable about relying on the moral testimony of others, against several arguments in Lillehammer (2013). One central such argument is that reliance on testimony is inconsistent with the exercise of true practical wisdom. Lillehammer doubts whether such reliance is always objectionable, but it is important to note that moral testimony pessimism is best understood as a view about the pro tanto, rather than the overall, badness of relying on testimony. One must also be clear about what counts as genuine moral testimony: there will be morally charged occasions when a virtuous person will properly rely on the views of others. It can also plausibly be argued that relying on moral testimony may constitute a lack of full autonomy. After discussing some remaining issues concerning the definition of moral testimony, a possible analogy between lying and relying on testimony, and the implications of untrust-worthiness for the truth of moral testimony pessimism, the paper ends with a return to the case against relying on moral testimony, grounded on a conception of the role of knowledge and understanding in virtue.

Symposium III: Culpability, Duress and Excuses

Saturday 12 July, 20.00–21.45, chaired by Richard Holton (Cambridge)

GIDEON ROSEN (Princeton) *Culpability And Duress: A Case Study* The paper examines the conditions under which we are responsible for actions performed under duress, focussing on a real case in which a soldier was compelled at gunpoint to participate in the massacre of civilian prisoners. The case stands for a class of cases in which the compelled act is neither clearly justified nor clearly excused on grounds of temporary incapacity, but in which it is nonetheless plausible that the agent is not morally blameworthy. The theoretical challenge is to identify the excuse in such cases and to explain its basis. The paper argues that when mortal duress excuses in cases of this sort, it does so because the compelled act, though impermissible and freely chosen, nonetheless fails to manifest 'an insufficiently good will'. The argument depends on a potentially controversial thesis in the ethics of concern, namely, that a thoroughly decent moral agent—someone who cares enough about morality and the values that underlie it—will not always be moved to do what he knows he ought to do.

MARCIA BARON (St Andrews)

Culpability, Excuse, And The Ill Will Condition

Gideon Rosen has drawn our attention to cases of duress of a particularly interesting sort: the person's 'mind is not flooded with pain or fear', she knows exactly what she is doing, and she makes a clear-headed choice to act in, as Rosen says, 'awful ways'. The explanation of why we excuse such actions cannot be that the action was not voluntary. In addition, although some duress cases could also be viewed as necessity cases and thus as justified, Rosen wisely sets aside that complicating factor by zeroing in on those cases where the action clearly is not justified. So why do we—or more to the point, why is it appropriate to—excuse in these cases, where the action clearly is not justified and the agent acted voluntarily?

Rosen thinks the key lies in the ill will condition, 'the idea that an act is blameworthy only if it manifests insufficient concern or regard for those affected'. Rosen says this is relatively uncontroversial; much of my paper is taken up with calling the ill will into question. I also take issue with Rosen on just how justifications and excuses differ. I argue in favour of understanding justifications (in a context where we are asking how justifications and excuses differ) as not requiring truth, but only reasonable belief.

Symposium IV: The Ethical Significance of Persistence

Sunday 13 July, 09.00–10.45, chaired by James Warren (Cambridge)

Amber Carpenter (York)

Ethics of Substance

Aristotle bequeathed to us a powerful metaphysical picture, of substances in which properties inhere. The picture has turned out to be highly problematic in many ways; but it is nevertheless a picture not easy to dislodge. Less obvious are the normative tones implicit in the picture and the way these permeate our system of values, especially when thinking of ourselves and our ambitions, hopes and fears. These have proved, if anything, even harder to dislodge than the metaphysical picture which supports them. This paper first draws out the ethics suggested by a conception of being as individual substances, and finds both inner tensions among these values – expressed in divergent characteristics in the history of philosophy – and a neglect of a significant set of values. Substance metaphysics prefers freedom, independence and autonomy over relational and reciprocal values, which can even be regarded as existentially threatening. A prominent attempt to accommodate both sorts of values without eschewing substantialist metaphysics is briefly considered, before turning to examine an alternative metaphysics and the values it implies. A metaphysics which takes being as becoming, it is argued, supports an ethics centred on relational values, and their associated virtues of care.

STEPHEN MAKIN (Sheffield)

Ethics, Fixity and Flux

This paper engages with the idea at the core of my co-symposiast's paper 'Ethics of Substance': that the Aristotelian concept of substantial being has ethical implications, and an alternative understanding of existence in terms of affecting and being-affected will help us more easily to accommodate relational values, which are thought to sit uneasily within the Aristotelian framework.

I focus on two questions. First, is there really is a tension between an Aristotelian metaphysics of substance and concern-for-others? The answer depends on how we understand the relation between my valuing something indeterminate but determinable (e.g. my having a child, or my living a life) and my valuing the particular way in which that determinable is contingently determined (e.g. my having a daughter or my living this life). I agree that Carpenter is correct in identifying the tension she does.

Second, does the alternative Buddhist-influenced view of what it is to exist shift our attention from ethical values such as independence and autonomy onto interpersonal and relational values? I consider an example which reflects another aspect of Aristotle's outlook: his account of the ontological status of the simple material elements. I suggest that once we abandon the idea that such elements exist in virtue of specific intrinsic structures, then questions about the their persistence through the changes by reference to which they are identified at the very least admit of no determinate answer. This suggestion also supports the line taken in Carpenter's paper.

Symposium V: Self-Regulation

Sunday 13 July, 17.00–18.45, chaired by Tim Crane (Cambridge)

TAMAR SZABÓ GENDLER (Yale)

The Third Horse: On Unendorsed Association and Human Behavior

On one standard reading, Plato's works contain at least two distinct views about the structure of the human soul. According to the first, there is a crucial unity to human psychology: there is a dominant faculty that is capable of controlling attention and behavior in a way that not only produces right action, but also 'silences' inclinations to the contrary – at least in idealized circumstances. According to the second, the human soul contains multiple autonomous parts, and although one of them – reason – normatively dominates the others, it may fail to do so descriptively: even in the face of full, explicit, well-reasoned, conscious awareness of the truth of a claim, a person may continue to feel residual inclinations towards disavowed, in-appropriate and misguided experiences and courses of action. In this paper, I will argue that even the second of these views does not fully capture the ways in which reflective commitment fails to guide human action. Whereas the traditional multi-part soul view is well-suited to explaining phenomena that involve a cognitive conflict between our reflective attitudes and our non-reflective endorsements (such as weakness of the will), it falls short when we turn to the full array of human patterns of response, because it neglects a further source of challenge to reason's rule, namely, the mediation of associative and heuristic processes. These processes introduce complications for which the simple faculty psychology view cannot adequately account. Because they produce challenges to reason's rule that are phenomenologically invisible, traditional strategies for self-regulation cannot be straightforwardly applied to their management.

JENNIFER NAGEL (Toronto)

Intuition, Reflection, and the Command of Knowledge

Action is not always guided by conscious deliberation; in many circumstances, we act intuitively rather than reflectively. Tamar Gendler contends that because intuitively guided action can lead us away from our reflective commitments, it limits the power of knowledge to guide action. While I agree that intuition can diverge from reflection, I argue that this is not always a bad thing, and that it does not constitute a restriction on the power of knowledge. After explaining my view of the contrast between intuitive and reflective thinking, this paper argues against the conclusions Gendler draws from empirical work on implicit bias.

Postgraduate sessions

The two postgraduate sessions will run in parallel on Saturday 12 July from 14.00. However, Ron Aboodi's will be delivered on Sunday at 12.45 in the Reddaway Room.

Theoretical: Auditorium

Saturday 12 July, chaired by Matt Soteriou (Warwick)

14.00–14.30	A problem for Stanley's Intellectualism about Knowledge-How Georgi Gardiner
14.30-15.00	Kant, the Paradox of Knowability, and the Meaning of 'Experience' Andrew Stephenson
15.00-15.30	Source Representationalism Maarten Steenhagen
15.30-16.00	Quantifying without Carving Kyle Mitchell

Normative: Reddaway Room

Saturday 12 July, chaired by Rory Madden (University College London)

14.00–14.30	A social reason to be rational Carl Mildenberger
14.30–15.00	Correct Instrumental Reasoning Benedikt Kahmen
15.00-15.30	Reasons of Love: A Case Against Universalism about Practical Reason Oded Na'aman
Sunday 12.45–13.15	What makes <i>de-re</i> moral motivation more virtuous than <i>de-dicto</i> moral motivation? Ron Aboodi

Theoretical: Auditorium

14.00. GEORGI GARDINER (Rutgers)

A problem for Stanley's Intellectualism about Knowledge-How

Anti-intellectualism about knowledge-how claims knowledge-how is different in kind from knowledge-that. Intellectualism, by contrast, argues that knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that. One version of intellectualism, advanced by Jason Stanley holds that to know how to do something is to (propositionally) know the answer to the question 'how could you do it?' In this paper I suggest a problem for this view: I argue that knowledge-how and propositional knowledge have different epistemic profiles, and I suggest a case that illustrates and motivates this claim. If correct, this paper provides support for anti-intellectualism about knowledge-how.

14.30. Andrew Stephenson (Oxford)

Kant, the Paradox of Knowability, and the Meaning of 'Experience'

It is often claimed that anti-realism is a form of transcendental idealism or that Kant was an anti-realist. It is also often claimed that anti-realists are committed to some form of knowability principle to the effect that all truths (or at least all truths of a certain class) are knowable and that such principles have problematic consequences. It is therefore natural to ask whether Kant was committed to any such principle, and if he was, whether this leads him into similar difficulties. Both transcendental idealism and anti-realism aim to provide a middle way between realism and idealism. A well-known logical result appears to show that anti-realism fails in its aim because it collapses into idealism. Can a related proof show that transcendental idealism collapses in the same way? First I show that an apparently Kantian knowability principle is indeed susceptible to a Fitch–Church style proof. Then, however, I suggest that it is in fact not at all clear whether Kant himself was committed to such a principle. By 'experience' Kant did not always mean our everyday notion of a basic perceptual or epistemic encounter with the world. Often he had a highly technical notion in mind, something more like the ideal of final scientific knowledge. And because experience so understood is an ideal, it expresses no anti-realist knowability principle to define truth in terms of accord with experience.

15.00. MAARTEN STEENHAGEN (University College London)

Source Representationalism

Source representationalism is the view that the sources of the sounds we hear, whenever they are heard, are represented in experience. Source representationalists may accept that auditory experience consists in a perceptual relation to particular sounds. What they deny is that hearing a sound source consists in a perceptual relation to such a source. Starting from arguments about listening to recordings, I develop a defence of the source representationalist's thesis. I show that listening to recordings enables us to hear sound sources representationally. I then demonstrate that, given the structure and character of auditory perception, hearing a source when it is actually producing the sounds one hears is equally representational. This establishes source representationalism as a global thesis about auditory perception. This conclusion has important implications for our understanding of perceptual representation more generally.

15.30. Kyle Mitchell (Cambridge)

Quantifying without Carving

In his 2011 book, *Writing the Book of the World*, Ted Sider employs an indispensability argument for the thesis that quantificational structure is an objective part of the structure of the world. I argue that, not only may we reject the crucial premises of Sider's argument, but that we can also explain all the facts that the indispensability argument purports to explain with an ideologically simpler theory: existential deflationism. I conclude that the indispensability argument gives us no compelling reasons endorse the idea that the world contains quantificational structure.

Normative: Reddaway Room

14.00. CARL MILDENBERGER (St Andrews)

A social reason to be rational

The purpose of this essay is to contribute to the debate whether rationality is normative. I shall argue that in spite of the powerful arguments proposed by Kolodny (2005) and Broome (2007) there is a reason to be rational. It is a social reason to be rational. It only reveals itself once we consider individuals who interact with each other, i.e. who are in some way in a social condition. The social reason to be rational is that an agent's being rational enables other people to explain and predict the agent's beliefs and intentions. Put differently: rationality leads to traceability as regards the attitudes of an agent. This is valuable in the social condition, as traceability seems to be a necessary prerequisite for coordination and cooperation. Thus, I argue that there is an instrumental reason to be rational.

14.30. BENEDIKT KAHMEN (Bielefeld)

Correct Instrumental Reasoning

What distinguishes correct from incorrect instrumental reasoning? In *Rationality through Reasoning*, John Broome suggests that correct instrumental reasoning follows what he calls the Instrumental Rule. Broome's formulation of the Instrumental Rule is meant to yield the correct result in Frances Kamm's triple effect example. I argue that his rule does not yield the correct result. My argument is based on suppositions about the relation between intention and belief. I go through each supposition, and argue for each that Broome's version of the Instrumental Rule cannot distinguish correct from incorrect instrumental reasoning. Then I suggest how to improve the Instrumental Rule.

15.00. Oded Na'aman (Harvard)

Reasons of Love: A Case Against Universalism about Practical Reason

The paper presents an argument from love against universalism about practical reason, i.e., the view that an agent's practical reasons normatively supervene on the agent's circumstance. Universalism explains the different reasons you and I have by citing differences in our properties, circumstances, relationships, etc. It thus rejects the possibility that the normative differences between us are basic. But love seems to make such basic distinctions, for it gives us special reasons with regard to specific individuals. Niko Kolodny has developed the 'relationship theory' in order to account for reasons of love in universal terms. I criticize Kolodny's theory for not doing justice to love's resistance to substitutions. Then I argue that any universal account will fail in the same way, for it would allow that the universal value instantiated in the beloved

Sunday 12.45. RON ABOODI (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)

What makes de-re moral motivation more virtuous than de-dicto moral motivation? Is doing the right thing in order to behave in accordance with the moral truth as such less virtuous than doing the same right thing merely for the sake of some more concrete moral value (such as benevolence)? The former type of motivation has been called de-dicto moral motivation, whereas the latter, (non-derivative) de-re moral motivation. I argue that in cases where an effective de-re moral motivation is more virtuous than an effective de-dicto moral motivation (assuming that both would lead to the same right action), this is due to (1) certain applicable practical advantages of this de-re moral motivation (such as leading directly to action without wasting precious time on unnecessary reflection about the right de-dicto), or (2) certain virtuous non-deliberative dispositions the presence of which this de-re moral motivation indicates (such as an emotional attachment to a spouse). In cases where an effective de-dicto moral motivation neither indicates a lack of such virtuous non-deliberative dispositions, nor has practical disadvantages that are important enough, it is in no way less virtuous.

Open sessions: Saturday

	16.30–17.00	17.00–17.30	17.30-18.00	18.00-18.30
Logic & Math 1 Auditorium	LUCA INCURVATI & JULIEN MURZI. Maximally consistent sets of instances of Naïve Comprehension	ALEXANDER PASEAU. A measure of good formalisation	Тномаs Locкнаrt. Caesar's role in The Basic Laws of Arithmetic	STEPHEN MCLEOD. Frege on saturation
Metaethics Gordon Cameron Room	PIOTR SZALEK. Expressivism, minimalism and pragmatism	CHRISTINE TIEFENSEE. How to be an anti-Archimedean	RAVI THAKRAI. Semantic competence and normative terms	MATTHEW SIMPSON. Reply to Asay on truthmaking and creeping minimalism
Normativity William Thatcher Room	Тімотну Снарреll. Recognising reasons	N SHACKEL. A problem for the unity of normativity	ESA DIAZ-LEON. Norms of judgement, naturalism, and normativism about content	ADAM STEWART-WALLACE. Taste and the state of nature
Metaphysics 1 Trust Room	BILLY DUNAWAY. Perfectly natural relative naturalness	DAVID MARK KOVACS. Metaphysical explanation without grounding	ELANOR TAYLOR. Three problems for grounding	RINA TZINMAN. Against the brainstem view of human persistence
Science Old SCR	RUNE NYRUP. Perspectival pluralism: Where's the perspective in that?	Еміly Тномаs. Henry More and the development of absolute time	ARNOLD KOSLOW. Laws, accidental generalizations and the Lotze Uniformity Condition	ROBERT KNOWLES. Ensuring up the indispensability argument
Mind 1 Walter Grave Room	ROBERTA LOCATELLI. Hallucinations and the motivations for naive realism	WILL MCNEILL. The visual role of objects' facing surfaces	ALFREDO VERNAZZANI. Vividness and the levels of consciousness	Assaf Weksler. Phenomenal concepts and massive modularity
Epistemology 1 Upper Hall 1	ALEXANDER JACKSON. Formulating the problem of easy knowledge	LOGAN PAUL GAGE. Phenomenal conservatism and the subject's perspective objection	BERNHARD SALOW. Epistemology, evidence, iteration and manipulation	JOSHUA HABGOOD-COOTE. Knowledge-how and safety. Or: Why it matters that knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge
Epistemology 2 Reddaway Room	Fernando Broncano-Berrocal. Five views on aptness	EMA SULLIVAN-BISSETT. Epistemic innocence: A friend to the one-stage account of delusion formation	ED NETTEL. Transmitting knowledge	Амвеr Riaz. Open-minded, not vacuous
Law Gaskoin Room	MARCELLO GUARINI. Reflections on analogical arguments in the law	VERONICA RODRIGUEZ-BLANCO. Legal rule-compliance phenomenon under the lens of Anscombe's intentions	LINDSEY PORTER. Too many diblings: Limiting offspring numbers in sperm donation	
Kantian Ethics 1 Music Room	Gudrun von Tevenar. Kant's duty of love	SORIN BAIASU. On a supposed non-epistemic practical epistemology in Kant	SASHA MUDD. The good will and the priority of the right in <i>Groundwork I</i>	CHRISTOPHER JAY. How to read the Formulae of Law in <i>Groundwork II</i>

Logic & Math 1: Auditorium

16.30. LUCA INCURVATI & JULIEN MURZI (Amsterdam & Kent)

Maximally consistent sets of instances of Naïve Comprehension

In this note, we examine the view that naïve principles such as the T-Scheme and Naïve Comprehension should be restricted according to consistency maxims. A proposal along these lines was once made by Paul Horwich (1998) for truth, and has recently been defended by Laurence Goldstein for both truth and set theory (Goldstein 2006; 2013). We argue that the prospects of such a strategy are not good: restrictions of the kind Goldstein advocates fail for essentially the same reasons why, as Vann McGee (1992) first noticed, Horwich's proposed restriction of the T-Schema also fails. We focus on set theory; a similar argument can be run, mutatis mutandis, for truth.

17.00. Alexander Paseau (Oxford)

A measure of good formalisation

Formalisations of a given natural-language sentence are routinely compared with one another. '*Fa* & *Gb*' is thought a better first-order formalisation of 'Fido is a dog but Bruin is a bear' than '*Fa* \vee *Gb*'; we usually regard the formalisation of 'It is possible that it rains' in propositional modal logic as superior to its formalisation(s) in a non-modal logic; and so on. Although commonplace, such comparative judgments have so far been overlooked by logical theory. This short talk explores a model of how well a formal sentence formalises a given natural-language sentence.

17.30. THOMAS LOCKHART (Auburn)

Caesar's role in The Basic Laws of Arithmetic

In *The Foundations of Arithmetic*, Frege presents the Caesar Problem (CP) as an insuperable obstacle to the possibility of using Hume's Principle as a contextual definition of number. Instead, he adopts an explicit definition of number in terms of value-ranges. In *The Basic Laws of Arithmetic*, Frege argues that his fundamental law concerning value-ranges—Basic Law V—it itself subject to CP. But Frege thinks that he can resolve CP as it concerns value ranges. I argue that this shows that Basic Law V was not, for Frege, a contextual definition of 'Value-Range,' but a basic truth of logic.

18.00. STEPHEN MCLEOD (Liverpool)

Frege on saturation

Frege's saturated/unsaturated distinction is basically at the level of reference. The saturatedness of proper names and that of their senses are special cases of the saturatedness of objects. The senses of function names are unsaturated: their unsaturatedness depends upon the unsaturatedness of the functions they present. The unsaturatedness of function names, which are themselves functions, ultimately depends upon that of their referents. Two objections receive responses: that for Frege the saturated/unsaturated distinction is primarily at the level of sense; that he regards function names as objects.

Metaethics: Gordon Cameron Room

16.30. PIOTR SZALEK (Catholic University of Lublin; Cambridge)

Expressivism, minimalism and pragmatism

The paper argues against the charge that quasi-realism is a kind of unnecessarily complicated fictionalism. The question is approached in the following way: Firstly, I will reconstruct the Lewisian argument for the identification of quasi-realism with fictionalism. Secondly, I will propose two arguments for the differentiation of quasi-realism from fictionalism. The core of the arguments will consist in the claim that quasi-realism is distinctively different from fictionalism by its expressivist, minimalistic and pragmatic character. In fact, the combination of these three elements is what makes quasi-realism a distinctive stance in a broad spectrum of both anti-realist and non-cognitivist camps in meta-ethics.

17.00. CHRISTINE TIEFENSEE (Bamberg)

How to be an anti-Archimedean

Metaethical theses are substantive, moral claims—or so anti-Archimedeans argue. This bold thesis has received considerable attention in recent years. It is noticeable, though, that the debate about anti-Archimedeanism is characterised by a significant amount of fragmentation: Firstly, instead of making a general case for the moral or non-moral nature of metaethics, metaethical theses and their respective status are often discussed one at a time. Secondly, several distinct arguments swirl about in this debate without any clear order. In this talk, I consider if, and if so how, anti-Archimedeanism can be put on a more systematic footing and which specific structure of anti-Archimedeanism this systematic approach would suggest.

17.30. RAVI THAKRAI (St Andrews)

Semantic competence and normative terms

Eklund (2012) provides a deflationary argument for normative terms which is a variant of Horgan and Timmons' Moral Twin Earth case in their (1992). In particular, it is an argument against normative semantic theories which do not share the Moral Twin Earth intuition. However, there are two key problems with Eklund's deflationary argument. The first is that the normative semantic realists can reject (3), for this premise has unpalatable consequences pertaining to semantic competence. The second is that such realists can add pressure from the outset and admit that (1) is possible, yet unintelligible.

18.00. MATTHEW SIMPSON (Cambridge)

Reply to Asay on truthmaking and creeping minimalism

This is a brief reply to Jamin Asay's (2013) argument that metaethical quasi-realism can escape the problem of creeping minimalism by turning to truthmaker theory. Asay argues that quasirealists can distinguish themselves from their rivals, despite the threatof minimalism. They can achieve this by turning to truthmaker theory, and arguing that naturalistic facts are the ethical truthmakers. This is compatible with their minimalist stance on truth and other notions, and distinguishes them from non-naturalistrealists, as well as subjectivists, constructivists, and relativists, who all choose other kinds of facts as ethical truthmakers. Then, to distinguish themselves from naturalistrealists, Asay argues that quasi-realists should take the ethical truthmaking relation to be mind-dependent. I argue that quasi-realists cannot pull off this last move. This is because due to minimalism about truth, truthmaking claims become first-order ethical claims, and in particular the mind-dependence of the ethical truthmaking relation becomes an unacceptably subjectivist commitment which quasi-realists will want to reject. So the appeal to truthmaking does not solve the problem of creeping minimalism.

Normativity: William Thatcher Room

16.30. TIMOTHY CHAPPELL (Open University)

Recognising reasons

A recognitional approach to ethical reasons, in the spirit of McDowell, shows us how to draw the sting from Williams' Internal Reasons Thesis (IRT). It also shows what is wrong with Le Bar's Virtue Eudaimonism, insofar as this is an instance both of constructivism and also of systematic moral theory. It leaves us with a picture of our own ethical agency as messily unsystematic, and radically vulnerable to contingency. Such is life.

17.00. N SHACKEL (Cardiff)

A problem for the unity of normativity

A prevalent assumption is that normativity is a unity. In this paper I argue against this assumption by demonstrating the problems it poses to a well known answer to a well known problem for taking rationality to be normative. John Broome's normative requirement relation does indeed avoid that problem, but insofar as the relation is supposed to offer a general characterisation of the normativity of rationality, it fails. It fails because it cannot capture an important aspect of the normativity of rationality, that it is available to guide us. I show that if we distinguish two kinds of normativity it need not fail in this way.

17.30. ESA DIAZ-LEON (Manitoba)

Norms of judgement, naturalism, and normativism about content

David Papineau (1999) argues that norms of judgement pose no special problem for naturalism, because all such norms of judgement are derived from moral or personal values. Papineau claims that this account of the normativity of judgement presupposes an account of content that places normativity outside the analysis of content, because in his view any accounts of content that place normativity inside the analysis of content cannot explain the normativity of judgement in the derivative way he proposes. Furthermore, he argues that normative accounts of content along those lines are independently problematic. In this paper I aim to respond to both objections, by arguing that normative accounts of content; and that normative accounts, even if they place normativity inside the analysis of content; and that normative accounts of content are compatible with a derivative account of norms of judgement of the sort Papineau advocates.

18.00. Adam Stewart-Wallace (Heythrop)

Taste and the state of nature

This paper attempts to elucidate concepts of taste in a way that takes inspiration from the model set out for knowledge by Edward Craig (1990). It offers a prototype form that differs in some regards from our actual taste concepts, but which aims to shed light by comparison on how they function. The prototype is modelled using certain features of inferentialist semantics, though it uses them in a non-standard way. The prototype is used to throw light on a puzzle regarding

faultless disagreement. Some reasons are then given as to why the prototype differs from our actual concept, which in turn vindicates the methodology.

Metaphysics 1: Trust Room

16.30. BILLY DUNAWAY (Oxford)

Perfectly natural relative naturalness

This paper is about 'naturalness' in Lewis's sense. It motivates the idea that a notion of relative naturalness should be among the perfectly natural properties, and defends the proposal from a style of objection found in Sider (2012), according to which perfectly natural relative naturalness would violate his 'purity' constraint.

17.00. David Mark Kovacs (Cornell)

Metaphysical explanation without grounding

In recent years, there has been a surging interest in grounding, a supposedly primitive and explanatory notion of metaphysical determination. One commonly cited argument for the indispensability of grounding is that statements cast in ground-theoretic terms are explanatory, while their more familiar (modal, mereological or set-theoretic) surrogates are not. For example, the explanatory asymmetry between the fact that Socrates exists and the fact that its singleton set {Socrates} exists, cannot be represented without a primitive notion of ground. In this paper, I offer what I take to be a charitable reconstruction of this argument and then criticise it. I argue that there is a perfectly acceptable type-specific approach to metaphysical explanation, on which facts with different underlying relations do the explanatory work in different cases but the obtaining of no relation is either necessary or sufficient for metaphysical explanation.

17.30. Elanor Taylor (Iowa State)

Three problems for grounding

Recently a number of philosophers have argued for the existence of a form of metaphysical determination known as grounding. In this paper I discuss three problems for Paul Audi's theory of grounding, each of which is generated by the connection between grounding and explanation. I will not argue for general skepticism about grounding, but will argue that a viable theory of grounding must avoid these three problems.

18.00. RINA TZINMAN (Miami)

Against the brainstem view of human persistence

On animalist views of personal identity, we are identical to our organisms. Some leading animalist accounts, mainly defended by Eric Olson and Peter van Inwagen, have it that sameness of a living working brainstem is necessary and sufficient for human animal persistence and thus for our persistence. I will argue that the sameness of the brainstem is neither necessary nor sufficient for sameness of a human animal over time. I will do so by pointing to a conceptual ambiguity in their argument and by constructing a thought experiment to show why their view is wrong.

Science: Old SCR

16.30. RUNE NYRUP (Durham)

Perspectival pluralism: Where's the perspective in that?

This paper examines whether perspectival realism can be developed as an interesting alternative to selective realism in accounting for cases of multiple inconsistent scientific models. Perspectivism promises to (1) avoid making metaphysical assumptions about the objective nature of the phenomena studied by science while (2) retaining a sense of realism. I argue, first, that the analogy Giere draws between colour vision and his account of scientific theorising cannot on its own carry the day for perspectivism. It fails to provide a convincing reason why models cannot capture objective features of the world, even if models are always constructed within and dependent on some theoretical perspective. I then propose an alternative route to perspectivism, drawing on a different strand in Giere's work, namely his agent-based view of scientific representation. I sketch a way to develop this view along the of deflationary anti-representationalism, arguing that this keeps metaphysics out of scientific representation while being more than mere 'rebranded instrumentalism'. However, on this account the sharp distinctions between representational models and instrumentally justified theoretical perspectives, which forms the touch-stone for the analogy to colour vision, is blurred. In conclusion this analogy is not helpful as a guiding metaphor for perspectivism.

17.00. EMILY THOMAS (Groningen)

Henry More and the development of absolute time

Absolutism about time holds that time is a real entity that exists independently of motion and material bodies. The theory arguably emerged in the seventeenth century, and it took on a uniquely theological aspect in the work of several English philosophers, who associated time with God. Although this kind of absolute time came to prominence in the work of Newton, it can also be found in Henry More, Isaac Barrow, and Samuel Clarke. This paper explores the first English account of absolute time, in the 'Cambridge Platonist' More, and asks what led More to develop it. Although a few scholars have suggested reasons underlying the development of absolute time in other contexts, More's views have not been examined, and I argue that two kinds of previously unrecognised reasons motivated More's absolutism: Descartes' physics, and a theological proscription.

17.30. ARNOLD KOSLOW (Graduate Center, CUNY)

Laws, accidental generalizations and the Lotze Uniformity Condition

There has been a great deal of discussion of what laws are, but very little about accidental generalizations. We develop a mini-theory of the difference between these generalizations that relies on explanation, and which has several immediate consequences one of which is that the explanation of any contingent generalization is not accidental.

18.00. ROBERT KNOWLES (Manchester)

Ensuring up the indispensability argument

Aidan Lyon (2012) defends the Indispensability Argument by providing examples of scientific explanations and arguing that in them mathematics plays an explanatory role that can be understood in terms of Jackson and Pettit's (1990) program explanation.

In response, Juha Saatsi (2012) makes three objections: first, the examples are not program

explanations because there is no underlying causal explanation (aka process explanation); second, the dialectical use of the examples begs the question; third, the prospects for providing a suitable metaphysical account of mathematics' programming role are slim.

In this note, I show that Lyon can avoid all three objections: the first in section 2 by providing a process explanation for one of Lyon's examples; the second and third in section 3 by providing two metaphysical accounts of mathematics' programming role. I conclude by arguing that my insights can support indispensability arguments in areas other than the philosophy of mathematics.

Mind 1: Walter Grave Room

16.30. ROBERTA LOCATELLI (Warwick)

Hallucinations and the motivations for naive realism

This paper will present an argument against Naive Realism (NR): the Parity Argument. The argument hinges on the assumption that the main motivation for NR is phenomenological: it better accounts for certain aspects of our experience. Nonetheless, the indistinguishability between perception and hallucination provides a phenomenological motivation for the common kind assumption, CKA. Since CKA and NR are equally motivated, but incompatible, there is no real phenomenological motivation for NR. Or so the argument goes. I will argue that the argument trades on two different interpretations of 'indistinguishable'. On a strong reading, it is false that hallucinations and perceptions are indistinguishable: there is only a mere hypothetical possibility for them to be indistinguishable. On the weak reading, the indistinguishability of hallucination from perception is not enough to support CKA. Either way, there is no phenomenological datum in support of CKA, hence the parity argument fails.

17.00. WILL MCNEILL (Cardiff)

The visual role of objects' facing surfaces

In normal lighting, you see an apple. There is something intuitive about the claim that you see the apple by seeing its facing surface. However a common philosophical interpretation of that claim leads to difficulties. In this paper I aim to bring out the nature of these difficulties and suggest how our intuitions might nonetheless be salvaged.

17.30. Alfredo Vernazzani (Bonn)

Vividness and the levels of consciousness

In the scientific literature, consciousness is often described as a gradual phenomenon structured in different levels. In this study, I sketch out an account of the phenomenal character that distinguishes the different levels of consciousness. In the first section, I outline the framework of our question and introduce the distinction between state and content consciousness. In the second section, I review different features that can account for the phenomenal character of the different levels: content richness, qualia, and vividness. I argue that vividness, in particular, is the aspect altered in different levels of consciousness. I then proceed to consider what vividness might be and distinguish two options: vividness can be an internal or an external feature of the contents of consciousness. I will put forward the idea that the degree of vividness is explained by the overall modulation of the bindings between the elements of the content of consciousness

18.00. ASSAF WEKSLER (Open University of Israel)

Phenomenal concepts and massive modularity

Intuitively, phenomenal concepts are transparent, that is, they reveal the nature of their referents. On this basis, some philosophers have argued against a posteriori physicalism, on the grounds that, if phenomenal concepts reveal the physical nature of their referents, then, apparently, it is possible to a priori derive phenomenal truths from physical truths, contrary to a posteriori physicalism. In this talk, after highlighting the significance of this argument, I argue that even if we grant that phenomenal concepts are transparent, the argument can be resisted by utilizing resources from the massive modularity of mind framework. Specifically, I claim that (a) phenomenal concepts are transparent to us in virtue of being transparent to certain modules I call 'phenomenal modules', and yet (b) phenomenal-physical identities are a posteriori to us because we do not have a module capable of a priori pairing phenomenal and physical concepts.

Epistemology 1: Upper Hall 1

16.30. Alexander Jackson (Boise State)

Formulating the problem of easy knowledge

The Problem of Easy Knowledge is meant to refute a class of epistemological views, including foundationalism about perceptual knowledge. I present the best version of the argument, and explain faults in the formulations of Stewart Cohen and Roger White.

17.00. LOGAN PAUL GAGE (Baylor)

Phenomenal conservatism and the subject's perspective objection

Michael Bergmann (2006) has advanced a destructive dilemma against all internalist theories of epistemic justification. While some have thought phenomenal conservatism (PC)—the view that 'If it seems to S that p, then, in the absence of defeaters, S thereby has at least some degree of justification for believing that p' (Huemer 2007: 30)—might escape this dilemma, Bergmann (2013) has recently argued that PC is only one more of its victims. In this paper I argue that PC survives.

17.30. BERNHARD SALOW (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

Epistemology, evidence, iteration and manipulation

Williamson influentially argues that the principle 'if *p* is part of my evidence, it is also part of my evidence that it is' is false. I examine the kinds of cases he uses in his argument, and show that his description of them has absurd consequences for the possibility of a certain kind of rational self-manipulation. I conclude that we shouldn't find his criticism of the principle compelling.

18.00. JOSHUA HABGOOD-COOTE (St Andrews)

Knowledge-how and safety. Or: Why it matters that knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge

In their Forthcoming paper 'Knowledge How and Epistemic Luck', J. Adam Carter and Duncan Pritchard attempt to move the knowledge-how debate back into epistemology. They claim that knowledge-that is undermined by a kind of luck to which knowledge-how is invulnerable; meaning that while knowledge-that requires safety, knowledge-how does not. They use this difference to drive a wedge between knowledge-how and knowledge-that, which they argue is incompatible with the Intellectualist view that knowledge-how just is a species of knowledgethat. In this paper I consider two problems for this argument. First, it has no persuasive force against an intellectualist who is prepared to allow unsafe knowledge-that. Second, their appeal to anti-luck epistemology to support the safety condition on knowledge-that in conjunction with their use of a case of unsafe knowledge-how makes it mysterious why knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge at all. This issue opens up a novel problem for Anti-Intellectualists: how to explain why knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge. I contend that an explanation of this intuitive claim is a central part of any anti-intellectualist account of knowledge-how, and explore how some modified versions of the safety condition might be a part of such a story.

Epistemology 2: Reddaway Room

16.30. FERNANDO BRONCANO-BERROCAL (LOGOS, Barcelona)

Five views on aptness

Virtue epistemology says that in order to know that p one's cognitive success must be adequately related to one's cognitive abilities. The term 'aptness', originally introduced by Sosa (1991), aims to capture that link. The rough idea is that one knows that p only if one's belief that p is apt (aptness condition for knowledge) and one's belief is apt iff it is true because of the exercise of one's cognitive abilities (definition of apt belief). Some virtue epistemologists interpret the 'because of' relation in terms of manifestation of epistemic competence; some in terms of explanatory salience or creditability. In this paper, I will: 1) explain why several versions of aptness in terms of explanatory salience or creditability are inadequate; 2) argue that the common way of understanding 'because of' in terms of manifestation of competence is mistaken; 3) sketch an alternative version of the manifestation reading.

17.00. EMA SULLIVAN-BISSETT (Birmingham)

Epistemic innocence: A friend to the one-stage account of delusion formation

I introduce two conditions on a delusion being epistemically innocent and suggest that if delusions meet them, this is something that theories of delusion formation had better be able to account for. I then look broadly at three accounts: the one-stage and two-stage versions of the bottom-up approach, and the top-down approach. I suggest that epistemic innocence sits very well with the one-stage account, less well with the two-stage account, and even less well with the top-down account. I will conclude with the claim that if delusions are epistemically innocent, this lends support to the one-stage account of delusion formation.

17.30. ED NETTEL (University College London)

Transmitting knowledge

The term 'testifying' picks out those acts that make available testimonial knowledge. 'Testimonial knowledge' is the kind of knowledge that can be acquired by an audience via transmission from a knowledgeable speaker. I present a counterexample to Richard Moran's account of testifying in his 'Getting Told and Being Believed', and locate its source in the distinction between kinds of epistemic support, that transmission necessitates: the kind one has for accepting a putative act of testifying, and for what one acquires on the basis of such acceptance.

18.00. AMBER RIAZ (Lahore University of Management Sciences)

Open-minded, not vacuous

This paper is about religious, moral, political, and historical disagreement and defeat. There is an implicit assumption (NEUTRAL) in the relevant literature on disagreement that the disagreeing parties share the same evidence, where that is something to be characterised in neutral terms acceptable to all parties. However, sometimes two people have the same evidence in a coarse-grained sense but for example one of them notices a pattern in it which the other doesn't, and that can be crucial in deciding what conclusions to draw from the evidence. In a more fine-grained sense, noticing the pattern provides new evidence. If this is correct, then NEUTRAL is false for many kinds of cases of disagreement.

Law: Gaskoin Room

16.30. MARCELLO GUARINI (Windsor)

Reflections on analogical arguments in the law

There has been much disagreement over how to understand, interpret, or reconstruct analogical arguments in the law. Some have argued that we need to understand them as involving a deduction (Brewer, 1996; Shecaira, 2013) while others have suggested that they need not be understood in that way (Guarini, 2004; Postema, 2002 & 2007; Sunstein 1993, 1996, 1999, & 2000). The purpose of this paper is to argue that not all analogical arguments in the law require a deduction. This will be done by reflecting on the conditions that make such arguments possible in the first place.

17.00. VERONICA RODRIGUEZ-BLANCO (Birmingham)

Legal rule-compliance phenomenon under the lens of Anscombe's intentions

I begin by examining the 'anarchist' view as formulated by Wolff who aims to show that there can never be legitimate authority since this inevitably undermines our autonomy. In the paper, I show that the view of authoritative commands as advanced by Wolff is implausible, but the details of this argument depend on the account of intentional action and practical reason that I defend.

17.30. LINDSEY PORTER (Lancaster)

Too many diblings: Limiting offspring numbers in sperm donation

One of the issues in assisted reproduction under periodic review by the HFEA is whether the number of offspring created with a single donor's sperm ought to be legally limited. Doing so artificially—and dramatically—limits the number of offspring that can be created using one man's sperm. On the assumption that we ought to respect and facilitate the reproductive autonomy of potential recipients of donated gametes, all other things equal, limits to offspring numbers ought to have a justification if they are in place.

Various reasons are often cited for the need of limits. Chief among them are concerns over incest, genetic defects, and donor family distress. In this paper, I argue that these reasons cannot motivate a limit, and that greater clarity is needed on the moral import of genetic relationships in order to say whether numbers should be limited.

Kantian Ethics 1: Music Room

16.30. Gudrun von Tevenar (Birkbeck)

Kant's duty of love

This paper examines Kant's notion of *Menschenliebe* (love of human beings) to see whether it is not rather *Menschheitsliebe* (love of humanity). While this distinction is indeed subtle, I hope to persuade you that it is not a futile exercise of hair splitting. Kant's essay 'On the Supposed Right to Lie out of *Menschenliebe*' as well as his views on friendship both display a certain tension between respect and love also found in the distinction between *Menschenliebe* and *Menschheitsliebe*. The paper concludes with the suggestion that the peculiar shortcomings of Kant's notions of love are due, in part, to this tension as well as to Kant's general normative pressure of respect over love. This normative pressure often results in forced either/or choices and thus neglects the familiar everyday possibility of combining love and respect.

17.00. Sorin Baiasu (Keele)

On a supposed non-epistemic practical epistemology in Kant

Commentators often talk about Kant's knowledge claims or about his belief claims. Yet, discussions of his theoretical and practical epistemologies are rarely presented from the perspective of his distinction between knowledge, belief/faith and opinion and from the perspective of his account of how such forms of propositional attitudes can be justified. This paper focuses on one exception: I argue that Andrew Chignell's project of bridging the gap between contemporary epistemologists and contemporary Kantian scholars is a welcome and impressive effort; I point however to a potential problem and I suggest a solution. Unaddressed, the problem can lead to the paradoxical result that Kant's practical epistemology is an epistemology without a notion of justification or, alternatively, that it represents a non-epistemic form of epistemology.

17.30. SASHA MUDD (Southampton)

The good will and the priority of the right in Groundwork I

In *Groundwork I* Kant seems to derive his conception of the moral law from a prior claim about the value of the good will, contrary to the argument he puts forward elsewhere to the effect that any conception of moral must be derived from an antecedent recognition of the law. This suggests to many interpreters that a moral conception of worth in fact underlies the Categorical Imperative, securing its validity and providing its content. In this paper I argue that, despite appearances to the contrary, Kant's conception of the good will is not derived from an assumed moral value in *Groundwork I*, but rather follows analytically from the concept of a categorical imperative. According to this proposal, Kant arrives at his conception of the good will and its ultimate value without relying on any prior assumption about the nature of moral worth.

18.00. Christopher Jay (York)

How to read the Formulae of Law in Groundwork II

A way of understanding the first formulations of the Categorical Imperative which has become popular – the 'what if everyone did that?' reading – notoriously generates obvious putative counterexamples. In this paper, I remind us that another reading is available, one which universalizes maxims and not actions, on which those counterexamples do not arise, but which can still account for Kant's own workings out of his examples. Moreover, an only maxim universalizing reading does better justice to much of what Kant says, even in those passages which have often been taken to support the 'what if everyone did that?' reading.

Open sessions: Sunday early

	11.15–11.45	11.45-12.15	12.15–12.45	12.45-13.15
Metaphysics 2 Auditorium	NATHAN WILDMAN. Motivating minimalist essentialism	LUKAS SKIBA. Modal fictionalism and incompleteneess	BRIAN BALL. On existence and quantification (or, can we count what does not exist?)	JEREMY GOODMAN. Matter and mereology
Metaphysics 3 Gordon Cameron Room	GRAEME A FORBES. Dunbar's challenge to dynamic metaphysics	MICHAEL TRAYNOR. Beyond the limits of the senses: Possible experience and possibility in Shoemaker's 'Time without change'	Alberto Tassoni. Presentism and temporal parts	CARLO ROSSI. Intensionalism, special relativity, and temporary intrinsic predicates
Logic & Math 2 William Thatcher Room	MARK PINDER. Should we abandon traditional approaches to the liar paradox?	MATTHEW W PARKER. A new argument for Cantor's theory of cardinality	LENA ZUCHOWSKI & KATHARINA KRAUS. Kant and Poincaré: Mathematical intuitions vs. a mathematician's intuition	
Epistemology 3 Trust Room	JULIEN DUTANT. Are the Not-so-Evil Demon's victims Gettiered?	LISA BORTOLOTTI & KENGO MIYAZONO. Do delusions have any epistemic value?	Stephen Wright. Infallibilism	KENNETH BOYD. Counterexamples and the asymmetry problem
Action 1 Old SCR	ALISON FERNANDES. An epistemic model of practical deliberation	JOSHUA SHEPHERD. A problem for intentional deciding	EDGAR HAYDON PHILLIPS. Is there any reason to accept the 'Humean theory of motivation'?	JOEL WALMSLEY. Emergence, group judgment and the discursive dilemma
Mind 2 Walter Grave Room	EUGEN FISCHER. Experiments for Austin	HICHEM NAAR. Introducing sentiments	CRISTINA BORGONI. Epistemic akrasia and mental agency	
Politics Upper Hall 1	ALAN COFFEE. Republican freedom from a slave's perspective	KATHERINE JENKINS. Trans-inclusivity and Haslanger's gender concepts	FIONA JENKINS. 'Feminist theory': Coding women in philosophy?	NICOLA MCMILLAN. Exploring Young's use of identity in her deliberative democratic theory
Ethics Reddaway Room	ROBERT SIMPSON. Valuing intrinsically	DAMIAN COX. Why virtue ethics really is self-effacing	CHRISTOPHER COWIE. Humeanism as a revisionary view	RON ABOODI. What makes <i>de-re</i> moral motivation more virtuous than <i>de-dicto</i> moral motivation?
Kantian Ethics 2 Gaskoin Room	NEIL SINHABABU. Hume's theory of motivation in Kant's house of lust	Ретек Hulme. Ethical theory between Kant and Hume: A Sartrean approach	JENNIFER LOCKHART. Reevaluating Kant on moral luck	
Aristotle Music Room	Mаттнеw Duncombe. Aristotle on relatives in <i>Categories</i> 7	ROBERT GALLAGHER. Change and contradiction in Aristotle's <i>Metaphysics</i> and <i>Physics</i>	JOSEPH KARBOWSKI. Syllogisms of existence in Aristotle's <i>Posterior Analytics</i>	ELENA FIECCONI. Undermining the authority of reason in Aristotle's philosophy of action

Metaphysics 2: Auditorium

11.15. NATHAN WILDMAN (Hamburg)

Motivating minimalist essentialism

In the penultimate chapter of her 2006, Penelope Mackie argues that, since there may be some essential kinds, we ought to abandon extreme haecceitism (the view according to which objects have no non-trivial qualitative restrictions on how different they might have been) in favour of her own minimalist essentialism. Here, I contend that this argument fails – no matter what sense of 'may' we take Mackie to be invoking, we never get an argument that in fact motivates minimalist essentialism.

11.45. LUKAS SKIBA (Cambridge)

Modal fictionalism and incompleteness

Modal fictionalists reinterpret ontologically controversial statements as ontologically innocent claims about the content of what they consider to be a useful fiction, e.g. Lewis' modal realism. They are often said to face a problem due to the seeming incompleteness of this fiction: certain relevant claims are neither true nor false according to the fiction. The problem is that this incompleteness, in tandem with the fictionalist's paraphrase schema, appears to give rise to contradictions. The standard responses to this problem involve a rejection of bivalence. I argue that the problem can be avoided without having to abandon classical logic.

12.15. BRIAN BALL (Oxford)

On existence and quantification (or, can we count what does not exist?)

Frege (1884/1980) held that 'Affirmation of existence is in fact nothing but denial of the number zero'. In this paper I consider grounds for doubting this claim. I begin with a consideration of Quine's (1948) influential view of the relationship between quantification and existence, suggesting that it is mistaken; for we can count pluralities (considered as many) without committing to the existence of any plural entities (i.e. pluralities considered as one). If there is time, I will also consider the counting of possible individuals: this will lead me to discuss the views of Bacon (2013) and Williamson (2012).

12.45. JEREMY GOODMAN (Oxford)

Matter and mereology

I will sketch theory of the part-whole relation as it applies to material things. I hope to show that much more of the structure of the material world than is often supposed can be understood in term of mereology. My view is conservative, in the sense that it is non-revisionary regarding the existence and structure of the material objects recognized by common sense and neutral regarding the existence of further material objects not recognized by common sense. But it is offered in an exploratory spirit, and its constituent doctrines should be treated as working hypotheses partially confirmed by our present knowledge.

Metaphysics 3: Gordon Cameron Room

11.15. GRAEME A FORBES (Kent) Dunbar's challenge to dynamic metaphysics What is it to take our phenomenology as a reason for adopting a metaphysical view about the passage of time? Dunbar, the character from Joseph Heller's novel *Catch-22*, tries to extend his life by making it boring, to pose a challenge to those who think our phenomenology gives us reason to defend time's passage as a metaphysical view. I argue that the reason phenomenology gives for us to defend time's passage cannot be that our brains detect time's passage, unless we take Dunbar's metaphysics more seriously than it deserves.

11.45. MICHAEL TRAYNOR (St Andrews)

Beyond the limits of the senses: Possible experience and possibility in Shoemaker's 'Time without change'

This paper explores what Shoemaker's (1969) thought experiment says about the reach of induction. Inductive inferences essentially involve projecting beyond what is actually experienced, and their part in this thought experiment is crucial, given that *direct awareness* of time without change is impossible. After a brief introduction, I suggest an analogy between Shoemaker's imagined inductions and a more mundane case, with the aim of strengthening the claim to legitimacy of the former. I then show how Shoemaker effectively presupposes, first, an imagistic guide to possibility, and, second, that no mental imagery can be conjured of time passing in the absence of change. I make sense of this by invoking a suggestion of Gallois (1974) that ties imaging to possible experience. This helps to make sense of the end given the means: though imaginary, Shoemaker's inductions take us beyond what we find ourselves able to imagine.

12.15. Alberto Tassoni (University College London)

Presentism and temporal parts

Numerous attempts have been made in the literature to argue for the compatibility of presentism—the view that only present objects exist—and perduring entities (be they material objects, non-point sized events, tropes and so on)—entities that have proper temporal parts. These attempts have simply overlooked the blatant yet crucial fact that what they were trying to reconcile was a presentist ontology with the predicate of temporal parthood: given that proper parthood is an axiomatised relation, compatibilists still have to show that its axioms are not violated under the presentist framework. This is, indeed, my central concern. More precisely, I argue that, under presentism and the Weak Supplementation principle, there are no perduring entities. I then dismiss various objections, including tensing manoeuvres and conceiving of non-present temporal parts as ersatz entities. I also hope to say a few constructive things about proper parthood and location along the way.

12.45. CARLO ROSSI (Cambridge)

Intensionalism, special relativity, and temporary intrinsic predicates

A substantial part of the contemporary debate on the metaphysics of change and persistence has dealt on the impact that the Special Theory of Relativity has in the way we explain the conditions of persistence of material objects, by translating our most plausible accounts of endurance and perdurance from a non-relativistic to a relativistic context. However, little attention has been paid to a similar task that should be pursued in the domain of temporary intrinsic properties. Such neglect is a considerably serious one, especially in light of the criticism raised by Sattig (2006) to the standard accounts of temporary intrinsics available to endurance theorists. In particular, Sattig charges these accounts of not being able to meet the Temporal Supervenience task, which consists in specifying the spacetime facts on which certain types of ordinary temporal facts supervene. This paper aims to defend an intensional account of temporary intrinsic predication from Sattig's criticism. Intensionalist accounts receive such name because they postulate as the intension of temporary intrinsic predicates a function from times to classes of ordinary objects. Against Sattig, I argue that intensional accounts are a viable alternative for the non-presentist endurantist in order to deal with the Problem of Change and the Temporal Supervenience Task.

Logic & Math 2: William Thatcher Room

11.15. MARK PINDER (Bristol)

Should we abandon traditional approaches to the liar paradox?

A number of theorists have become frustrated with what we might call 'traditional' approaches to the liar paradox. They suggest that we postulate that the meaning of (say) the truth predicate encodes, in one way or another, a contradiction. While I share some of these theorists' frustrations, I am not convinced that we must abandon traditional approaches to the paradox. In the present paper, I aim to undercut the key motivation for inconsistency theories, by sketching a frustration-free, traditional approach to the liar paradox.

11.45. MATTHEW W PARKER (London School of Economics)

A new argument for Cantor's theory of cardinality

Gödel's 1947 argument that Cantor's concept of cardinality is the only acceptable one is multiply flawed, and recent authors have introduced alternatives to Cantor's theory. But any theory in which a bijection does not imply equal number for certain sets suffers from arbitrariness. For many sets, a bijection implies that the sets are related by a uniform deformation. If such sets differ in size, the sizes of the sets must change at an arbitrary point in the deformation. This does not show that Cantor's theory is the only acceptable one, but that alternatives are in some ways uninformative and potentially misleading.

12.15. LENA ZUCHOWSKI & KATHARINA KRAUS (Cambridge & Hebrew University of Jerusalem)

Kant and Poincaré: Mathematical intuitions vs. a mathematician's intuition

Poincaré's philosophy of mathematics has often been called Kantian. We wish to draw attention to a previously neglected point: while Poincaré is concerned with the (professional) mathematician's intuition, Kant is trying to formalize the role intuitions, understood as nonconceptual representations, play in mathematics in the most general sense. Hence, we assert that Kant's writing on mathematical genius, which has received little attention in the debate to date, should be given a more prominent role in tracing Poincaré's Kantian roots.

Epistemology 3: Trust Room

11.15. Julien Dutant (Geneva)

Are the Not-so-Evil Demon's victims Gettiered?

Goldberg's (2012) novel and surprising argument against Justification Internalism crucially rests on the claim that the Not-so-Evil Demon case he devises involves an 'unGettiered' belief. I argue that Goldberg's argument for that claim fails and that no revision is likely to succeed.

The broader lesson is that 'Gettiered' is an ambiguous and slippery phrase that should only be used with great care.

11.45. LISA BORTOLOTTI & KENGO MIYAZONO (Birmingham)

Do delusions have any epistemic value?

In the paper I ask whether delusions have any epistemic value. The idea may seem counterintuitive, given that delusions are primarily characterised by their epistemic faults. But from the perspective of the epistemic consequentialist, even beliefs that are false and irrational can have epistemic value if they contribute to the pursuit of epistemic goals, such as the acquisition, retention, and use of true beliefs of importance (as in Alston's veritism). On the basis of evidence suggesting that delusions have can have a number of psychological benefits, I shall argue that they can be viewed as epistemically beneficial too. In particular, they are a means to restoring epistemic functionality at a time when the agent is overwhelmed by hypersalient experience or negative emotions.

12.15. STEPHEN WRIGHT (Sheffield)

Infallibilism

Infallibilism is the view that an individual's belief amounts to knowledge if and only if her belief is supported by justification that guarantees the truth of her belief. One thing that it is generally agreed that infallibilist theories have going for them is that they are incompatible with Gettier cases in that one cannot formulate a case of infallibly justified true belief that does not amount to knowledge. In this paper, I argue that this is false—one can generate a case of infallibly justified true belief that fails to amount to knowledge in the same way that traditional Gettier cases do. More specifically, I argue that cases of pre-emption can yield a Gettier case featuring infallible justification.

12.45. Kenneth Boyd (Toronto)

Counterexamples and the asymmetry problem

In epistemology, many theories of knowledge have been rejected on the basis of counterexamples. On the other hand, while counterexamples have certainly had a place in ethical discourse, theories of right action have not historically been rejected wholesale solely on the basis of counterexamples. What accounts for the difference between epistemologists' and ethicists' treatment of counterexamples in their respective domains of discourse? Call this the asymmetry problem. I argue here that the asymmetry problem is a product of a difference in evaluative structure in ethics and epistemology, namely that while ethicists can appeal to a notion of being responsible for one's moral mistakes, an analogous evaluation is generally considered not to be available to the epistemologist. As a result, intuitions about whether one possesses knowledge can only be explained in terms of a theory of knowledge itself. This difference also explains the proliferation of theories of knowledge in post-Gettier epistemology.

Action 1: Old SCR

11.15. ALISON FERNANDES (Columbia)An epistemic model of practical deliberationAn epistemic model of deliberation explains features of deliberation by appealing to what be-

liefs an agent must and must not have while deliberating. In this paper, I will argue for a set of necessary epistemic conditions on deliberation and consider how they can be used to account for our sense of freedom in deliberation: one of the characteristic features of agency. These conditions all concern beliefs of the agent, and have as a consequence that an agent cannot be certain of her decision (or its result) while deliberating on that decision. The beliefs of an agent instead delimit an available decision space within which deliberation takes place—a decision space comprised of options that are taken to be compatible with the agent's beliefs. It is the impossibility of an agent to predict her decision while deliberating, combined with the condition that she take her decisions to be good evidence for the states of the world they are about, that explains how the world appears open to choice in deliberation.

11.45. Joshua Shepherd (Oxford)

A problem for intentional deciding

Commonsense folk psychology and mainstream philosophy of action agree about decisions: decisions are under an agent's direct control, and are thus intentional actions. Here I offer a challenge to this view. In short, since the content of the motivational attitudes that drive deliberation and decision remains open-ended until the moment of decision, it is unclear how agents can be thought to exercise direct control over their decisions.

12.15. EDGAR HAYDON PHILLIPS (University College London)

Is there any reason to accept the 'Humean theory of motivation'?

The 'Humean theory of motivation' claims that the reasons for which we act are mental states of belief and desire. Arguments for the theory focus on the explanation of action, taking the reasons cited in a certain kind of explanation to be the reasons for which the agent acted. I examine some arguments for the Humean view and suggest that they are not convincing. I consider ways in which the Humean might try to respond, and argue that they too are unsuccessful. I conclude by suggesting that the most natural account of reasons is that they are facts, and that in the absence of a good argument for the Humean theory, this ought to be the view we adopt.

12.45. JOEL WALMSLEY (University College Cork)

Emergence, group judgment and the discursive dilemma

In this paper, I argue that on one plausible interpretation of the famous 'discursive dilemma,' a group's judgment is supervenient on, but not reducible to the individual judgments of the group's members. This formulation—supervenience without reducibility—very closely resembles the analysis of the concept of emergence advanced by C.D. Broad (1925). Thus, contrary to some recent discussion (e.g., that of List and Pettit 2011), I conclude that realism about group agency is a form of emergentism.

Mind 2: Walter Grave Room

11.15. EUGEN FISCHER (East Anglia)

Experiments for Austin

This paper will provide a fresh rationale for the kind of ordinary language analysis J.L. Austin practises in key parts of *Sense and Sensibilia* (Austin 1962). This fresh rationale will render such

analysis immune to the historically most influential objection. The paper will, first, develop the rationale and, second, show that it requires that armchair analysis be complemented by well-established experimental methods from psycholinguistics (McRae et al. 1997, Ferretti et al. 2001, Harmon-Vukic et al. 2009). It will demonstrate one such method in outlining how the approach, once reoriented and experimentally grounded, can contribute to resolving 'the problem of perception' (Smith 2002).

11.45. HICHEM NAAR (Geneva)

Introducing sentiments

In this paper, I motivate the introduction of a distinctive kind of psychological category: the category of *sentiments*. Sentiments, I argue, play certain theoretical roles which, on the face of it, cannot be adequately played by any other kind of mental entity. Although they seem intimately related to them, sentiments cannot be reduced to, or in any interesting way grounded in, emotions. A stronger thesis would be that sentiments are not reducible to, or grounded in, *any* other kind of mental entity – that they are psychologically basic. After motivating the introduction of the notion of sentiment, my task will be to argue for the modest claim that sentiments and emotions are distinct kinds of thing. I will do this by first examining the apparent differences between sentiments and emotions do not belong to the same ontological category, and as a result none of them can be reduced to the other: whereas emotions are event or process-like, sentiments appear to be state-like. Their connection, however, is more than merely contingent. I will argue that such a connection can be understood along dispositional lines: sentiments are dispositions or powers that are essentially manifested in emotions

12.15. CRISTINA BORGONI (Karl-Franzens University, Graz)

Epistemic akrasia and mental agency

In this work, I examine the phenomenon of Epistemic Akrasia. An individual is epistemically akratic if two conditions hold: 1. He/she believes that *P* and judges that his/her belief is epistemically defective and 2. Being in the mental state (1) displays a failure of rationality that is analogous to ordinary akrasia. I examine three objections to the possibility of epistemic akrasia. I suggest that the real challenge regarding epistemic akrasia is to explain condition (2). I finally argue that epistemic akrasia is possible, and that it represents a specific failure of mental agency in critical reasoning.

Politics: Upper Hall 1

11.15. ALAN COFFEE (King's College London)

Republican freedom from a slave's perspective

Republicans define slavery as subjection to arbitrary power. This description is used widely and meant literally. Groups as diverse as the subjects of absolute monarchs, women without citizenship rights and workers without adequate protection under employment law, on this account are all 'slaves' in the same sense as the bondsmen of the American plantations. This has struck many critics as unworkable if not to say obscene. However, while republicans are preoccupied by the issue of slavery, it is notable that their theory has been written almost exclusively by freemen. Frederick Douglass, therefore, offers a unique insight in responding to these critics. He wrote as a republican but from the perspective of one who knew what it was to be the legal property of another. In so doing, he upholds the classical republican ideal but offers an innovative model of his own that, I argue, presents a viable alternative to the now dominant neo-republicanism that follows the work of Philip Pettit and others. Rather than as a negative ideal of individual freedom that reflects the choices one makes, Douglass defines freedom in overtly moralised terms that reflect both the agency of the individual and full membership within a particular community.

11.45. KATHERINE JENKINS (Sheffield)

Trans-inclusivity and Haslanger's gender concepts

Sally Haslanger defines gender as a hierarchical social class system based on presumed sex. I argue that this definition is not trans-inclusive. Since I take trans-inclusivity to be an essential desideratum of a feminist account of gender concepts, this is reason to reject the account as it stands.

Focussing on trans women, I show that some trans women would not count as women according to Haslanger's concept of woman. This is because the concept is defined so as to require the subject to be regularly and for the most part perceived as having bodily features that are presumed to be evidence of a female's biological role in reproduction. Although some trans women meet this condition consistently, many trans women meet it only at certain times, and others do not meet it at all. Moreover, Haslanger's account states that gender as a social class is the central or core notion of gender, enjoying theoretical priority over other senses of gender. This means that even if another sense of gender were defined that was trans-inclusive, trans women would only be women in a secondary or peripheral sense, which is insufficient for overall inclusivity.

I conclude with a proposal for how the account could be rendered trans inclusive. I suggest that the account acknowledge multiple senses of gender that are equally central. If one of these senses of gender entailed that trans people were members of their identified genders, then the overall account would arguably be trans-inclusive.

12.15. FIONA JENKINS (Australian National University)

'Feminist theory': Coding women in philosophy?

This paper explores some tensions between the aims of improving the representation and status of women in academic philosophy and the existence of a sub-field of research in the discipline labelled 'feminist philosophy' or 'feminist theory'. If scholarship that is often critical of prevailing disciplinary norms is assigned to its own (marginal) field, does this limit its capacity to intervene in and transform the wider discipline? How does assuming a feminist identity in philosophy, pursuing feminist research or categorising one's work as feminist, translate into the project of advancing women? My discussion draws upon Nancy Fraser's controversial claims about the tensions that exist between redistributive projects that aim to transform institutions and cultural projects that seek recognition and accommodation for an identity. What would it mean for 'feminist' to function as an identity category rather than as a call for fundamental transformations in the discipline of philosophy?

12.45. NICOLA MCMILLAN (Lancaster)

Exploring Young's use of identity in her deliberative democratic theory

This paper critically discusses Iris Marion Young's treatment of identity in her theory of delib-

erative democracy. Young sees social identity as a potential resource for democracy in that she believes that identity groups can foster narratives which bring injustices to the political fore. However, she simultaneously asserts that identity groups which seek to revalue and actively create new performativities for their group are not acting politically. I argue that this is predicated on a false view of identity and fails to see how positive acts of identity formation might feed into the political arena and provide political solutions to injustices.

Ethics: Reddaway

11.15. ROBERT SIMPSON (Monash)

Valuing intrinsically

In this paper I examine the relationships between the judgements (1) that x is intrinsically valuable, and (2) that it is fitting to value x intrinsically. The customary way of understanding this relationship, so I want to suggest, treats judgement (1) as conceptually prior to judgement (2) – that is to say, the fittingness of intrinsic valuation is understood as being a consequence of something's having intrinsic value. My aim, in short, will be to present an account of this relationship which denies that priority claim. I will argue that it is sometimes fitting for us to intrinsically value things which lack intrinsic value.

11.45. DAMIAN COX (Bond)

Why virtue ethics really is self-effacing

The paper argues that virtue ethics is self-effacing. This means that virtue ethicists should draw up a clear distinction between action-assessment and action guidance. Virtue ethicists advance a theory of right action, which is a standard of action-assessment. The ways in which virtue ethicists should seek to guide the actions of moral agents are not always consistent with this standard. The standard is often too uncompromising for the guidance of morally imperfect people. In this respect virtue ethics is much like utilitarianism and other forms of maximizing consequentialism.

12.15. CHRISTOPHER COWIE (Cambridge)

Humeanism as a revisionary view

Humeans claim that one's reasons for action are a function of one's existing 'motivational set'. This view is often criticised on grounds of extensional inadequacy: it fails to capture 'ordinary' intuitions about the universality of moral reasons. I argue that this criticism rests on a mistaken view of what at least some Humeans are trying to do. At least some Humeans – notably Williams – regard their view as part of a politically motivated, revisionist view of ordinary morality. The criticism of extensional inadequacy is dialectically ineffective against these views.

12.45. RON ABOODI (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)

What makes de-re *moral motivation more virtuous than* de-dicto *moral motivation? Rescheduled talk from the postgraduate sessions.*

Is doing the right thing in order to behave in accordance with the moral truth as such less virtuous than doing the same right thing merely for the sake of some more concrete moral value (such as benevolence)? The former type of motivation has been called de-dicto moral motivation, whereas the latter, (non-derivative) de-re moral motivation. I argue that in cases where an effective de-re moral motivation is more virtuous than an effective de-dicto moral motivation (assuming that both would lead to the same right action), this is due to (1) certain applicable practical advantages of this de-re moral motivation (such as leading directly to action without wasting precious time on unnecessary reflection about the right de-dicto), or (2) certain virtuous non-deliberative dispositions the presence of which this de-re moral motivation indicates (such as an emotional attachment to a spouse). In cases where an effective de-dicto moral motivation neither indicates a lack of such virtuous non-deliberative dispositions, nor has practical disadvantages that are important enough, it is in no way less virtuous.

Kantian Ethics 2: Gaskoin Room

11.15. NEIL SINHABABU (National University of Singapore)

Hume's theory of motivation in Kant's house of lust

First I'll lay out a strong version of the Humean theory of motivation, according to which desire motivates all action and drives all practical reasoning. Then I'll show how the Humean theory can respond to an objection from Immanuel Kant, concerning how options look to us as we consider them in deliberation. Kant notes that one might see it as impossible to give up one's life for sexual satisfaction, but possible to give up one's life instead of joining in the judicial execution of a good person. He takes this to be a sign of freedom and the moral law within us. In fact, our beliefs about the strengths of our own motivations can explain when things look possible.

11.45. Peter Hulme (Birkbeck)

Ethical theory between Kant and Hume: A Sartrean approach

Humeans hold that our moral commitments can be identified with motivations. Christine Korsgaard, as a Kantian, denies this. She argues that motivations can only explain and cannot justify our actions. Motivations lack normativity. However, Korsgaard's identification of the source of normativity with self-legislation has been criticised because it seems implausible that there is a single answer to the question: 'why must I act morally?' which is applicable to all rational agents. This paper will outline an alternative Sartrean theory which could explain how our moral commitments are normative while preserving a degree of plurality in the sources of normativity. I argue that this approach could be a plausible third alternative, combining advantages from neo-Humean and neo-Kantian approaches to ethical theory.

12.15. Jennifer Lockhart (Auburn)

Reevaluating Kant on moral luck

Kant is widely viewed as the 'most rigorous exponent' of a conception of morality that is free from luck. This paper identifies three theses that are typically attributed to Kant with respect to moral luck and makes the case that all three theses are incorrectly ascribed to Kant. The traditional narrative surrounding Kant on moral luck fails to take into account his views regarding the complete good and the necessary relationship between happiness and virtue.

Aristotle: Music Room

11.15. Matthew Duncombe (Groningen)

Aristotle on relatives in Categories 7

In his discussion of 'relatives', e.g. large, double, and knowledge, Aristotle gives two different definitions of 'relative', D1 and D2. Traditionally, scholars have thought that D2 is strictly narrower than D1: that is, at least one relative, that falls under D1, does not fall under D2. However, in this paper I will argue, using a distinction formulated by Quine, that D1 and D2 give us two different ways to view relatives. The D1 relatives are relatives viewed opaquely, while the D2 relatives are relatives viewed transparently.

11.45. ROBERT GALLAGHER (American University of Beirut)

Change and contradiction in Aristotle's Metaphysics and Physics

Contradiction (*antiphasis*) characterizes the relation of the extremes of processes of comingto-be or perishing, in Aristotle's theory of change. 'The change not from a subject to a subject is coming-to-be through an antiphasis' (*Phys.* E.1: 225a12–14; *Met.* K.11.1068a1–5 agrees). Contradiction also governs perishing (cf. 225a17–18). I call such contradiction 'ontological,' in distinction from the propositional signification. An objection to Aristotle's treatment of change argues one opposing extreme of contradiction is lacking, the negative one, for 'not a subject' does not exist, and has no referent. Aristotle's theory of 'false objects' (cf. *Met.* Δ .29) and his determination of priority between pragmata and propositions (cf. *Cat.* 12) are discussed in formulating responses to the objections. The Law of Non-Contradiction, and contradictions between propositions, and the processes of coming-to-be and perishing all require the kind of contradiction that Aristotle discusses in *Phys.* E.1.

12.15. JOSEPH KARBOWSKI (Notre Dame)

Syllogisms of existence in Aristotle's Posterior Analytics

This paper examines the question of how, according to Aristotle, syllogistic reasoning establishes the existence of scientific kinds in the *Posterior Analytics*. I reject the standard account, which maintains that syllogisms establish existence by drawing attention to particular (actually existing) instances of a phenomenon. I show that Aristotle has a different 'causal' conception of existence in the treatise which holds that for something to exist it must not only have instances but also, and more importantly, have a unified causal essence. I then proceed to develop a novel interpretation of the existential force of syllogistic reasoning, which explains how they reveal that certain phenomena have causal essences. My account exploits Aristotle's tendency to use coextensive relations as evidence of underlying essential, per se relations, a strategy found in the *Posterior Analytics* and elsewhere in the Aristotelian corpus.

12.45. Elena Fiecconi (Oxford)

Undermining the authority of reason in Aristotle's philosophy of action

In this paper, I undermine the view that, according to Aristotle, reason governs human action. I argue that his treatise *On the Soul* doesn't present conclusive evidence for this view and that his work *On Dreams* implies that perception, rather than reason, is what governs our actions. I suggest that undermining the authority of reason and defending the authority of perception is a philosophically plausible move which also gestures towards a deeper understanding of some of Aristotle's most controversial views, such as his account of weakness of the will.

Open sessions and SWIP: Sunday late

	14.15–14.45	14.45–15.15	15.15–15.45	15.45–16.15
Society for Women in Philosophy Auditorium	STEPHANIE KAPUSTA. Transfeminist philosophy: An attempt at characterisation	MOLLIE GERVER. Whose benefit matters in wrongful exploitation?	ESA DIAZ-LEON. 'Women' as a politically significant term: A solution to the puzzle	HALLIE LIBERTO & ERIC WILAND. Reasons, advice and slut-shaming
Politics & Ethics Gordon Cameron Room	BART STREUMER. Irresponsible equality	SEBASTIAN NYE. A platform for No Platform	RICHARD ROWLAND. Wrongness and reasons to apologise	MATTHEW RENDALL. Mere addition and the separateness of persons
History William Thatcher Room	MATTHEW DENNIS. Nietzsche's fatalism: Puzzling over Leiter's 'causal essentialist' thesis	Тімотну C Lord. The weight of Wollheim on Collingwood's aesthetics	CHARLOTTE KNOWLES. Authentic discourse in <i>Being and Time</i>	ROXANA BAIASU. Wittgenstein and Taylor on mental life
Content Trust Room	BENCE NANAY. The underspecification of desires and the context of assessment	SANNA HIRVONEN. Relativism and the contents of thoughts	IOANNIS CHRISTODOULOU. Phantasia in Aristotle's De Anima	JAMES MILLER. On the source of metaphysical distinctions
Action 2 Old SCR	SIMON GOLDSTEIN. A preface paradox for intentions	GLORIA AYOB. Self-control, autonomous actions, and mind-blindness	Nora Heinzelmann. Akrasia in dilemmas	
Mind 3 Walter Grave Room	NICOLA SPINELLI. What it is to be an intentional object	MATTHEW RELLIHAN. Content, consciousness, and Cambridge change	SEBASTIÁN SANHUEZA RODRÍGUEZ. Change and process in perceptual experience	ISTVAN ARANYOSI. Explanatory role functionalism
Epistemology 4 Upper Hall 1	JOHN T ROBERTS. Fuzzy credence as vague credence: A reply to Elga's argument	SERGI OMS. The incoherence of probabilistic measures of coherence	ALEX WORSNIP. Belief, credence, and the preface paradox	IAN WELLS. A new solution to the paradox of the surprise examination
Logic & Math 3 Reddaway Room	Owen GRIFFITHS. Permutation invariance defended	ANDY YU. Models and logical consequence	ROBERT TRUEMAN. Neutralism within the semantic tradition	KASIA JASZCZOLT & CHI-HE ELDER. Towards a pragmatic category of conditionals
Metaphysics 4 Gaskoin Room	ALEX KAISERMAN. Causes and counterparts	SHYANE SIRIWARDENA. The suppositional account and Morgenbesser counterfactuals	CHRIS MEYNS. The distinction of powers	JAN WESTERHOFF. Why there is nothing rather than something: An argument for ontological nihilism

Society for Women in Philosophy: Auditorium

14.15. Stephanie Kapusta (Western Ontario)

Transfeminist philosophy: An attempt at characterisation

Feminist philosophy has raised critical awareness of women's issues and of the oppression of women, as well as of the complexities of gender identity, not just within philosophy, but also beyond. I take it as a premise of the present paper that a specifically transfeminist philosophy could, similarly, increase critical awareness of trans issues and oppression suffered by trans people, as well as of further complexities of gender identity. But how might one characterise a transfeminist philosophy? In this paper I propose a 'rule of thumb' characterisation, focussing on what might count as being a transfeminist work of philosophy. First, I distinguish between gender scripting and legitimate processes of gender ascription, and argue that trans people resist, and hence problematize, not only gender scripting (gender-linked expectations) but also processes of gender ascription. Second, I maintain that a philosophical work that is transfeminst seeks to incorporate this general approach, while manifesting solidarity with, and critical responsiveness to, the trans community. This leads to a generalization of these basic features into an initial formulation of what features a work of philosophy should possess in order to be considered transfeminist. Third, I apply this general characterisation to a particular work of philosophy – Charlotte Witt's *The Metaphysics of Gender* – to determine whether it is transfeminist in the specified sense.

14.45. MOLLIE GERVER (London School of Economics)

Whose benefit matters in wrongful exploitation?

A necessary condition of exploitation is that one party extracts a benefit from another party. Yet, it is unclear whether one or both of the following conditions are necessary for wrongful exploitation to take place:

- 1. An exploited party receives less of a benefit than he ought to receive, were the exploiter to fulfil her moral obligations.
- 2. The exploiter receives a benefit in excess of what she ought to receive, were she to fulfil her moral obligations.

I will first show that an excessive benefit is not a necessary condition for exploitation. I will then show that a deficient benefit compared to the moral baseline (what the exploiter ought to do) is a necessary condition for both exploitation and negligence. Thirdly, I will show that an additional necessary condition for exploitation, and not negligence, is that the benefit for the exploiter moves the moral baseline such that the exploiter now must provide a greater benefit for the exploited and, because of this, the benefit for the exploited is deficient compared to what the exploiter ought to now provide. When this moral baseline moves, the benefit for the exploited is the same, but it is now relatively lower compared to the baseline moral obligation of the exploiter. In other words, what makes exploitation wrong and distinct from other wrongs, including negligence, is the way in which the benefit for one party increases the deficiency in the benefit that an exploite receives relative to the moral baseline.

15.15. Esa Diaz-Leon (Manitoba)

'Women' as a politically significant term: A solution to the puzzle

What does 'woman' mean? According to two competing views, it can be seen as a sex term or as a gender term. Recently, Saul (2012) has put forward a contextualist view, according to which 'woman' can have different meanings in different contexts. The main motivation for this view seems to involve moral and political considerations, namely, that this view seems to do justice to the claims of trans women. Unfortunately, Saul argues, on further reflection the contextualist view fails to do justice to those moral and political claims that motivated the view in the first place. In this paper I argue that there is a version of the contextualist view which can indeed capture those moral and political aims, and in addition, I use this case to illustrate an important and more general claim, namely, that moral and political considerations can be relevant to the descriptive project of finding out what certain politically significant terms actually mean.

15.45. HALLIE LIBERTO & ERIC WILAND (Connecticut & Missouri–St. Louis)

Reasons, advice, and slut-shaming

The expression 'slut-shaming' is most commonly used to refer to derogatory comments and behavior aimed at women's sexual experiences, and at their choices that are perceived of as sexual in nature (e.g. how they dress). Such comments and behavior suggest that a woman's sexual behavior is immoral, or that the character of the woman herself is lacking in virtue. Notoriously, slut-shaming promotes a double-standard for men and women's sexual mores. In this paper we are going to explore a different type of slut-shaming. Just as we feel shame about our immoral acts or for our vices, we tend to feel shame when we act imprudently or are perceived as acting imprudently. Hence, one way of slut-shaming is to make a woman feel as if her sexual choices, or how she dresses, are stupid. Consider 3 different pieces of advice:

- 1) If you sleep with too many boys at school, you'll get a bad reputation. You don't want to get a reputation!
- 2) If you wear knee-high boots and make-up to your job talk, no one will take you seriously as a philosopher.
- 3) If you walk home alone after midnight, you might get raped. So, don't walk home alone.

In one sense, these are all good pieces of advice. Depending on the neighborhood or department, 1, 2, and 3 warn someone of highly or moderately probable bad consequences of their choices. However, these forms of advice, when they are widespread, also exacerbate, and sometimes even create, bad consequences to the chosen behavior of the advisees. They create a culture in which victims of these sorts of bad (or criminal) forms of behavior are considered stupid. 1, 2, and 3 also fail to take into account the moral reasons advisees might have to resist gendered oppression.

Politics & Ethics: Gordon Cameron Room

14.15. BART STREUMER (Groningen)

Irresponsible equality

Rawlsian egalitarians defend the difference principle, according to which social and economic inequalities are permitted if and only if they benefit the worst off members of society. Luck egalitarians reject the difference principle. They think that people should be compensated for

being worse off than others if and only if these people are not themselves responsible for being worse off. In this talk, I will first argue that if we accept the correct view about moral responsibility, luck egalitarianism supports Rawlsian egalitarianism. I will then argue that this defence of Rawlsian egalitarianism enables us to give new answers to objections to both luck egalitarianism and Rawlsian egalitarianism

14.45. SEBASTIAN NYE (Cambridge)

A platform for No Platform

No platform policies deny platforms to speakers with politically objectionable views (such as racist, fascist or misogynistic views). It is commonly argued that no platform policies should be rejected because they constitute an unacceptable violation of freedom of speech. I argue that, although there may be particular cases where specific no platform policies violate freedom of speech, there is no general tension between freedom of speech and no platform policies. Any conception of freedom of speech which could be used to oppose no platform policies, I argue, either fails to do so on closer inspection, or is implausible. Determining whether no platform policies are in tension with freedom of speech is a complex case-by-case matter, not something which can be lazily assumed.

15.15. RICHARD ROWLAND (Warwick)

Wrongness and reasons to apologise

Analysing moral wrongness in terms of reasons for action is very attractive. But there are problems with extant accounts of wrongness in terms of reasons. I defend a new account in terms of reasons for action and reasons to apologise that avoids these problems and is more illuminating than competing accounts.

15.45. MATTHEW RENDALL (Nottingham)

Mere addition and the separateness of persons

How can we resist the repugnant conclusion? James Griffin has suggested that part way through the sequence we may reach a world—let us call it 'J'— in which the lives are lexically superior. If it would be better to live a single life in J than through any number of lives in the next one ('K'), we may judge the smaller world preferable, as if aggregating the lives in the larger world intrapersonally. I argue that the mere addition paradox arises because adding new people with separate preference functions renders such lexical rankings untenable. Whereas in comparing J and K we could legitimately infer that the former was lexically preferable, we cannot 'suspend addition' when comparing J⁺ and K. Instead, for half of these worlds' populations, it will be preferable to move to K. The result is an intransitive value judgement: $J < J^+ < K < J$, producing the mere addition paradox.

History: William Thatcher Room

14.15. MATTHEW DENNIS (Warwick)

Nietzsche's fatalism: Puzzling over Leiter's 'causal essentialist' thesis

Most commentators, including Brian Leiter, interpret Nietzsche's injunction to 'become what you are' as a straightforward commitment to fatalism. But even a cursory glance of the formulation's historical appearance shows that Nietzsche most often renders it as an imperative that presupposes at least a limited capacity to determine our lives. Leiter ignores this, backing the fatalist reading of the imperative, despite claiming elsewhere that Nietzsche should be read as a Casual Essentialist. This paper will suggest that if Nietzsche is indeed a Causal Essentialist, then he has the philosophical resources to escape the charge of fatalism and that this should inform our reading of his imperative to 'become what you are'.

14.45. TIMOTHY C LORD (Heartland College)

The weight of Wollheim on Collingwood's aesthetics

In this paper I defend R.G. Collingwood's so-called 'Ideal theory' in the philosophy of art from one of the criticisms of Richard Wollheim. I demonstrate that Collingwood did accept the theory, but maintain that Wollheim's interpretation and criticism have been given too much weight. I concentrate my defense of the Ideal theory on the most influential of Wollheim's criticisms, the Argument from Art Media. I argue that an artist's engagement with art media is not inconsistent with the Ideal theory

15.15. CHARLOTTE KNOWLES (Birkbeck)

Authentic discourse in Being and Time

In *Being and Time*, Martin Heidegger uses the term 'discourse' to describe the human being's meaningful engagement with the world. This paper is a contribution to an ongoing debate about the relation between discourse and language. Leading commentators have argued that, for Heidegger, linguistic discourse is inauthentic. They infer that what he calls authentic discourse must be non-linguistic. I argue that this stance threatens the coherence of Heidegger's ontology and should be rejected. The deficiency of inauthentic discourse does not lie in the fact that it is linguistic. Moreover, some authentic discourse is linguistic. I outline a better way of distinguishing authentic from inauthentic discourse.

15.45. ROXANA BAIASU (Vienna; Oxford)

Wittgenstein and Taylor on mental life

In *Sources of the Self*, in the context of a discussion concerning mental phenomena, Charles Taylor quotes Wittgenstein in support of his expressivist view according to which we learn what emotions are within a public, common space which is shaped by language. I argue that Taylor misreads Wittgenstein on this issue. Moreover, I point out a certain aspect of Wittgenstein's approach to mental life which Taylor seems to have more or less neglected, and which he could have used to endorse and develop his conception of mental life; more specifically, what I want to draw attention to here is the Wittgensteinian view that there is an element of bodily life related to our experience and expression of emotions, which is irreducible to language. Wittgensteinian view that there is the Wittgensteinian view that there is an element of bodily life related to our experience and expression of emotions, which is irreducible to language. Wittgensteinian view that there is an element of bodily life related to our experience and expression of emotions, which is irreducible to language. Wittgensteinian view that there is an element of bodily life related to our experience and expression of emotions, which is irreducible to our experience and expression of bodily life related to our experience and expression of bodily life related to our experience and expression of bodily life related to our experience and expression of bodily life related to our experience and expression of bodily life related to our experience and expression of bodily life related to our experience and expression of bodily life related to our experience and expression of bodily life related to our experience and expression of emotions, which is irreducible to language.

Content: Trust Room

14.15. BENCE NANAY (Antwerp; Cambridge) *The underspecification of desires and the context of assessment* Here is the problem of the underspecification of desires: the embedded proposition of desires does not specify the satisfaction conditions of desires. The embedded proposition of a desire may be true, but the desire may still remain unsatisfied. I consider two ways of addressing this problem (i) by treating desires as conditional desires and (ii) by taking the embedded proposition to be relative to the context of the tokening of the desire and point out that neither works. I then propose a new way of addressing this problem, where the embedded proposition is relative to the desire's context of assessment.

14.45. SANNA HIRVONEN (University College London)

Relativism and the contents of thoughts

The recent semantic relativist accounts build on the distinction between the content and the circumstance of evaluation or context of assessment that determines the truth. Whether the distinction has any relevance to the contents of thoughts is unclear. This paper considers Mac-Farlane's (2009) claim that Perry's (1986) distinction between concerning and being about can be used by the relativists to provide an account of relativized and non-relativised thoughts. I show that the distinction as defined by Perry is in conflict with other commitments by the contemporary relativists. I then show that Perry's (1979) earlier criticism of relativism as a solution to the problem of the essential indexical applies equally to the contemporary forms of relativism. The upshot of the criticism is that at the level of thought people think in terms of complete, truth-evaluable propositions. Since thoughts are what matter for linguistic predictions I conclude that relativism cannot explain disagreements or retractions any better than their rival contextualists.

15.15. IOANNIS CHRISTODOULOU (Cyprus)

Phantasia in Aristotle's De Anima

In the present paper, I follow Aristotle's endeavor in *De Anima* to define imagination. The complicated nature of Aristotle's account of $\varphi a \nu \tau a \sigma i a$ is due to the fact that it is some kind of a futile enterprise to philosophically locate imagination as a distinct mind function. In my analysis, I take into account the connection between imagination and desire, and I come to the conclusion that both are presented as intellectual functions, thanks to the unexplained appearance of some ideas, which could be ideas of both desire and imagination.

15.45. JAMES MILLER (Durham)

On the source of metaphysical distinctions

Distinctions in language are expressed through grammatical encoding, or semantics (including the lexicon). Cinque (2013) has produced evidence that only a subset of the distinctions that language expresses are grammatically encoded, forcing speakers to value those distinctions in sentences. I argue that this subset maps onto (some) topics of metaphysical debate. This mapping requires that positions arguing for the non-substantivity of metaphysics through appealing to variability in language must locate this variation in the grammar. This would mean that such positions are in disagreement with the empirical and theoretical claims of many linguists, most notably those who support Universal Grammar.

Action 2: Old SCR

14.15. SIMON GOLDSTEIN (Rutgers)

A preface paradox for intentions

In this paper, I will argue that there is a preface paradox for intentions. The solution to the paradox is to recognize a new mental state of partial intention, which stands to intention as credence does to belief. This new mental state is understood in terms of the degree to which an agent holds the dispositions characteristic of full intention. Finally, I argue that the real coherence norms for intention govern partial intentions

14.45. GLORIA AYOB (Central Lancashire)

Self-control, autonomous actions, and mind-blindness

This paper explores the relation between self-control and autonomous agency. Examining the case of actions that do not seem autonomous in spite of the fact that their agents exercise self-control, I suggest that the capacity for bringing one's own mind into view in a particular way is an essential condition for autonomous agency. This condition explains how self-control and autonomous agency can come apart. In doing so, the condition captures the intuition elicited by the cases of action noted above, namely that self-control isn't sufficient for autonomous agency.

15.15. NORA HEINZELMANN (Cambridge)

Akrasia in dilemmas

Akrasia is commonly described as a failure to intend in accordance with one's better judgement. More precisely, an agent is akratic iff he does not intend to do what he judges he ought to do. Such an account of akrasia is challenged the by existence of certain dilemmas. In such dilemmas, the agent judges that he ought to do something and that he ought not to do it. Then, regardless of what he intends to do, he will intend to do what he judges he ought not to do. But it seems implausible that an agent in a dilemma should necessarily be akratic. This paper discusses possible reactions to this problem and implications for action theory and moral philosophy.

Mind 3: Walter Grave Room

14.15. NICOLA SPINELLI (Warwick)

What it is to be an intentional object

One view about intentionality—call it View 1—has it that all intentional states have an intentional object, that is, they are directed at something. On the face of it, such a view is at odds with the fact that some intentional states are about non-existents. In what sense would these states have an intentional object—be directed at something? It seems that, short of an answer to this question, View 1 should go. In his 2001 article 'Intentional Objects', T. Crane attempts to give such an answer. I shall reject his argument and conclude that, if there is a way of making View 1 good, it is not Crane's way.

14.45. MATTHEW RELLIHAN (Seattle) Content, consciousness, and Cambridge change Representationalism is widely thought to grease the skids of ontological reduction. If phenomenal character is just a certain sort of intentional content, representationalists argue, the hard problem of accommodating consciousness within a broadly naturalistic view of the world reduces to the much easier problem of accommodating intentionality. I argue, however, that there's a fatal flaw in this reasoning, for whatever ground representationalism gains by explaining the phenomenal in terms of the intentional it loses again by undermining our best naturalistic accounts of intentionality. These theories make intentional content a mere Cambridge property of intentional states, a property that can be gained or lost through changes to causally disconnected objects, and phenomenal properties are manifestly not like this. Thus, if phenomenal character really is just a certain sort of intentional content, it's not anything like the sort of intentional content described by our best naturalistic theories.

15.15. SEBASTIÁN SANHUEZA RODRÍGUEZ (University College London) Experience and change in perceptual experience

The goal of this piece is to put some pressure on the thought that a processive conception of perceptual experiences follows from the fact that perceptual phenomena are, at a fundamental level of description, changes in perceivers – in short, from the fact that perceptual phenomena have a necessary dynamic character. More specifically, I argue that the dynamic character of perceptual experience does not necessarily entail a processive conception of that psychological category. In a nutshell, the thought is that the dynamic character of perceptual experiences seems to be silent on the question how perceptual experiences, insofar as mental (not physiological) phenomena, should be ontologically classified. To focus the discussion, I critically assess the line of thought explicitly developed by Brian O'Shaughnessy.

15.45. Istvan Aranyosi (Bilkent)

Explanatory role functionalism

I put forward a new version of analytic functionalism, based on an apparently minor change regarding what the commonsense component of the view is supposed to ascribe. In particular, I will call this new version 'explanatory role functionalism' instead of 'causal role functionalism', thus indicating that it is the explanatory role mental state types play between stimulus and behaviour that serves as the meaning of mental terms. I will first formulate the details of the view, after which I will argue that it can be turned into an argument for physicalism in the guise of the type identity. I then show how explanatory role functionalism addresses the problem of metaphysically necessary effects.

Epistemology 4: Upper Hall 1

14.15. JOHN T ROBERTS (North Carolina at Chapel Hill)

Fuzzy credence as vague credence: A reply to Elga's argument

Many philosophers hold that a rational person can have imprecise credences. A famous argument due to Adam Elga, however, purports to show that rationality requires that credences have precise values. I show that Elga's argument can be evaded if we understand imprecise credences to be a case of vagueness.

14.45. SERGI OMS (LOGOS, Barcelona)

The incoherence of probabilistic measures of coherence

In the last decades some authors have offered a formal and quantitative explication of the notion of coherence. This has been achieved by using Probabilistic Measures of Coherence (PMC): functions which take as arguments probabilities concerning the Boolean combinations of the propositions conforming the set whose coherence is to be established. Then, after the application of certain a priori procedures, they yield as value some number that represents the degree of coherence of the aforementioned set. I want to show that no coherent PMC theories of this kind can be coherent if they meet the following principle: no set of propositions changes its degree of coherence unless we add essentially new information to the set or we drop essentially old information from it.

15.15. ALEX WORSNIP (Yale)

Belief, credence, and the preface paradox

Many discussions of the 'preface paradox' assume that how troubling it is for the deductive closure constraint on rational belief will depend on whether outright belief is reducible to credence. I show that this is an error: we can generate the problem without assuming such reducibility. All we need are some very weak normative assumptions about rational relationships between belief and credence. This version of the preface paradox also renders powerless solutions that appeal to epistemic probability 1 for knowledge. So the deductive closure constraint is in more serious trouble than some have thought.

15.45. IAN WELLS (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

A new solution to the paradox of the surprise examination

This paper defends a new solution to the paradox of the surprise examination. Central to the solution is a distinction between two methods for calculating the probability of an indicative conditional: a local method and a global method. Appreciation of this distinction reveals what is wrong with the student's argument in the paradox. The argument relies on a conditional the probability of which is low, according to the global method, but high according to the local method. Examples independent of the paradox suggest that, when faced with such 'local-global divergence', the intuitions of English speakers generally agree with the probability assigned by the local method (McGee (2000), Kaufmann (2004), Rothschild (2013)). This explains our temptation to accept the student's conditional and acquiesce with his paradoxical argument. Nonetheless, we must resist the temptation. For the local method finds no support in the probability calculus. Moreover, it can be used to assign inconsistent probabilities to the same conditional in contexts which make salient more than one way of partitioning the space of possibilities (Douven (2008)). Once we reject the local method, as we have independent reason to do, we can help ourselves to a solution to the surprise exam paradox at no extra cost.

Logic & Math 3: Reddaway Room

14.15. Owen GRIFFITHS (Cambridge)

Permutation invariance defended

The permutation invariance account of the logical constants has much to recommend it: it is philosophically motivated by the thought that logic is topic neutral, capable of precise formu-

lation and finds all the usual constants to be logical. Nevertheless, it has come under recent attack for implausibly finding many mathematical notions to be logical. We defend permutation invariance against all such charges and argue that it remains an attractive account of logical nature.

14.45. ANDY YU (Oxford)

Models and logical consequence

I argue that on Shapiro's (1998) representational-interpretational semantics, a version of model-theoretic semantics, model-theoretic consequence fails to model logical consequence as intended. The semantics is forced to take a side in metaphysical disputes, and so makes substantive metaphysical assumptions. Such assumptions exert extralogical influence on the generation of logical consequences, which conflicts with the intuitive characterization of logical consequence as general and topic-neutral. Thus, the semantics fails to provide an adequate analysis of logical consequence.

15.15. ROBERT TRUEMAN (Stirling)

Neutralism within the semantic tradition

A neutralist framework is an account of the second-order quantifiers which does not by itself tell us what the ontological commitments of second-order quantification are, but which does tell us that those commitments cannot exceed those of predication. Recently, Wright has suggested that an inferentialist account of the second-order quantifiers is an adequate neutralist framework. I show that we do not have to become inferentialists in the pursuit of a neutralist framework: such a framework can be established within the semantic tradition.

15.45. KASIA JASZCZOLT & CHI-HE ELDER (Cambridge)

Towards a pragmatic category of conditionals

The paper offers an argument for a unified pragmatic category of conditionals that is not based on the syntactic form of the expression, the presence of a relevant connective ('if'), or even a conditional meaning as it is understood in minimalist semantics. Instead, using a radical contextualist approach, we show how one can bring together (i) various uses of a conditional form and (ii) various (overt and covert) means of expressing conditional thought, giving them a uniform semantic representation. The principles for a formal pragmatic account are founded on corpus research employing the notion of pragmatic compositionality.

Metaphysics 4: Gaskoin Room

14.15. Alex Kaiserman (Oxford)

Causes and counterparts

I point out a previously unnoticed tension between Lewis' counterpart-theoretic analysis of *de re* modality and his metaphysics of causation. Rather than distinguish, on modal grounds, the statue and the lump, Lewis accounts for the intensionality of *de re* modality by exploiting the inconstancy of the counterpart relation. Yet he does distinguish, on causal grounds, John's saying 'hello' and John's saying 'hello' *loudly*. Given the intimate connection, on Lewis' counterfactual account of causation, between an event's causal properties and its modal properties, this tension is dialectically untenable. I lay out what Lewis' metaphysics of causation *should*

have been, and explore its consequences.

14.45. SHYANE SIRIWARDENA (Cambridge)

The suppositional account and Morgenbesser counterfactuals

Dorothy Edgington (2003) argues that her suppositional theory of counterfactuals successfully accommodates Morgenbesser cases. In this paper, I present a new counterexample to the suppositional theory. The example puts pressure on the Edgingtonian requirement that, in evaluating counterfactuals, we hold fixed all and only those events between the antecedent and consequent that are causally independent of the antecedent and causally relevant to the consequent. I conclude by proposing a modification to Edgington's theory.

15.15. CHRIS MEYNS (University College London)

The distinction of powers

It is common for those who appeal to powers in the explanation of a variety of phenomena to accept pluralism about powers. In this paper I demonstrate that such pluralism about powers is problematic, because it conflicts with a plausible baseline principle for the introduction of distinctions. This presents friends of the common view of powers with a dilemma. Either they give up the baseline principle, which forces cracks into the overall explanatory project that motivated their appeal to powers in the first place; or they give up pluralism and accept power monism, the view that there is at most one power.

15.45. JAN WESTERHOFF (Oxford)

Why there is nothing rather than something: An argument for ontological nihilism

This paper discusses an argument for ontological nihilism, i.e. the view that there isn't anything. The argument rests on two premisses, eliminativism ('non-fundamental levels don't exist') and non-foundationalism ('it's dependence all the way down'). After assessing the argument we will consider some of its metatheoretical implications.



2D. Hall

2E. Café/Bar

3C. Gaskoi 3D. Music