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AREAS OF SPECIALISATION

Moral Philosophy; Philosophy of Mind and Action; Political Philosophy

AREAS OF COMPETENCE

Ancient Philosophy; Metaphysics; Epistemology

CURRENT POSITION

Lecturer in Philosophy, University of Kent, SECL (2013 – 2015) and
Affiliated Lecturer, Cambridge University, Faculty of Philosophy (since 2009)

PRIOR ACADEMIC APPOINTMENTS

Senior Research Associate, Cambridge University, Faculty of Philosophy (2010)
Wellcome Trust Research Fellow, Cambridge University, Faculty of Philosophy (2007 – 2010)
Affiliated Lecturer, Cambridge University, Faculty of Philosophy (2006 – 2007)
Research Associate, Cambridge University, Faculty of Philosophy (2005 – 2007)
Director of Studies, Cambridge University, New Hall and Downing College (2004 – 2006)
Research Fellow, Cambridge University, Clare Hall (2003 – 2007)

ACADEMIC QUALIFICATIONS

Ph.D. in Philosophy: “An Aristotelian Project in Moral Philosophy”
Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS), Paris, December 2003.
Supervisor: M. Canto-Sperber. Examiners: J. Barnes, L. Brisson, V. Descombes and R. Ogien

M.Phil. in Philosophy: “The Concept of Nature in Aristotle’s Ethics”
Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS), Paris, September 1999.

M.A. in Philosophy including a *Higher Education Teaching Certificate*
5-year full-time degree with 33 examined courses. First Class Honours (Equivalent)
Faculty of Philosophy, University of Sofia, July 1997.

PGCHE. University of Kent at Canterbury, June 2014.

PUBLICATIONS

Authored Books

Addiction and Weakness of Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, 160pp.

This monograph develops an Aristotelian conception of autonomous agency by focusing on limit cases, such as addiction and weakness of will. It offers a unified view of responsibility for actions and attitudes bringing together insights from volitional and non-volitional accounts.

Aristotle and the Moral Philosophy of Today [L'Actualité d'Aristote en morale]. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2007, 308pp.

This monograph provides a critical examination of autonomy in connection to moral knowledge. Drawing on Aristotle's moral psychology, it is argued that moral judgments aim at knowledge; however, this does not undermine their action-guiding character. Reviewed in *Revue Philosophique* 2008, 133 and *Revue Philosophique de Louvain* 2010, 108.

Edited Book

Autonomy and Mental Disorder. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, 328pp.

By considering instances of mental disorders where autonomy is apparently compromised, this anthology identifies and explores different kinds of emerging scepticism about autonomy and its significance. Contributors: A. Mele, J. Heal, K.W.M. Fulford, D. Bolton, L. Bortolotti, J. Radden, J. Holroyd, H. Lillehammer, G. Gillett, G. Widdershoven, L. Radoilska.

Book Chapters (Peer-Reviewed)

Inverse Akrasia and Autonomy. In C. Rapp and P. Destrée (eds.) *Aristotle's Ethics Today*. Cambridge: CUP. Forthcoming.

The notion of inverse akrasia is shown to be inconsistent, for it ignores a fundamental asymmetry between praise- and blameworthiness: whilst the latter is often appropriate in the absence of autonomy, the former is essentially dependent upon it.

Autonomy in Psychiatric Ethics. In J. Sadler, G.W. van Standen and KWM Fulford (eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of Psychiatric Ethics*. Oxford: OUP. Forthcoming in 2014.

Depression, Decisional Capacity, and Personal Autonomy. In K.W.M. Fulford, M. Davies et al. (eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry*. Oxford: OUP, 2013; 1155–1170.

In this paper, I argue that depression is at odds with autonomous agency to the extent that it involves what I propose to call paradoxical identification.

Autonomy and Ulysses Arrangements. In L. Radoilska (ed.) *Autonomy and Mental Disorder*. Oxford: OUP, 2012; 252–280

By reflecting on Ulysses Arrangements in psychiatry, I argue that mental disorder is compatible with autonomy to the extent that it is also compatible with agential success.

Three Challenges from Delusion for Theories of Autonomy (with K.W.M. Fulford). In L. Radoilska (ed.) *Autonomy and Mental Disorder*. Oxford: OUP, 2012; 44–74

By bringing together psychiatric case studies and action theory, we put the spotlight on an elusive yet inescapable notion of agential success which is implicit in the concepts of autonomy and delusion.

Personal Autonomy, Decisional Capacity, and Mental Disorder. In L. Radoilska (ed.) *Autonomy and Mental Disorder*. Oxford: OUP, 2012; xi–xliii

This paper identifies and explores three implicit assumptions in the current debate, according to which autonomy is: 1) a liberal concept; 2) an agency concept; 3) incompatible with severe mental disorder.

The Intimate, the Private and the Public. In L. Ibrahim (ed.) *Intimité*. Clérmont-Ferrand: Presses Universitaires de Baise Pascal, 2005; 343–355

I consider some forms of public disclosure in the context of vulnerability and argue that more often than not they reinforce the oppressive consequences of the public/ private distinction they are meant to counteract.

Articles in International Peer-Reviewed Journals

Immigration, Interpersonal Trust, and National Culture. *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy* 2014, 17(1): 111–128

I argue that citizenship as equal political membership offers a better ground for trust among fellow citizens than a shared national culture.

Akrasia and Ordinary Weakness of Will. *Topicos* 2012, 43: 25–50.

In this article, I sketch an Aristotelian account of akrasia as a primary failure of intentional agency which I then contrast with ordinary weakness of will as a secondary failure, that to tackle akrasia.

An Aristotelian Approach to Cognitive Enhancement. *Journal of Value Inquiry* 2010, 44: 365–375

I distinguish four categories of actions: caused, attributable, responsible, and creditable. I then argue that, since cognitive enhancement is incompatible with the latter category, it undermines rather than strengthens autonomous agency in the realm of cognition.

Public Health Ethics and Liberalism. *Public Health Ethics* 2009, 2: 135–145

I expand on a liberal conception of freedom as non-interference and show its advantages over a republican alternative (freedom as non-domination) in the context of public health.

Truthfulness and Business. *Journal of Business Ethics* 2008, 79: 21–28

The claim that truthfulness is only valuable if it contributes to building trust is critically examined. It is argued that this claim is mistaken even with respect to practices, for which truth-telling might appear tangential, such as business.

Privacy and Public Expression. *Cités* 2003, 15: 31–4

In this paper, I argue that some privacy waivers, though informed and voluntary, are still unacceptable.

Encyclopaedia Articles (Commissioned and Peer-Reviewed)

Weakness of Will. In D. Pritchard (ed.) *Oxford Bibliographies Online: Philosophy*. 2013.

Need. In M. Marzano (ed.) *Dictionnaire du Corps*. Paris: PUF, 2007; 120–123

Ethics and Medication. In M. Marzano (ed.) *Dictionnaire du Corps*. Paris: PUF, 2007; 573–575

Review Articles (Commissioned)

Hunter, D. (ed.) *Belief and Agency*. CJP 35, 2011. *Philosophical Quarterly*. Forthcoming

Williams, B. *Truth and Truthfulness*. Princeton, 2002. *L'Année sociologique* 2005: 625–629

IN PREPARATION

Akasia and Moral Incapacity (Philosophical Studies)

By contrasting two types of inability to do as intended, the one undermining, the other constitutive of autonomy, I aim to specify the type of control that distinguishes autonomous from non-autonomous agency.

Self-effacement and Autonomy (Noûs)

In this paper, I argue that self-effacing ethical theories, such as consequentialism are self-defeating because they are inconsistent with the notion of autonomous agency that they rely on.

Integrity and Strength of Will (Philosophical Quarterly)

The paper distinguishes integrity from strength of will conceived as ability to act upon one's higher-order desires in the face of temptations or threats.

Is Integrity a Virtue? (Philosophical Review)

Drawing on Aristotle's account of the unity of the virtues, I argue that, although integrity is neither an ethical nor an epistemic virtue, integrity ascriptions imply an acknowledgment of moral worth.

GRANTS, AWARDS AND DISTINCTIONS

Post-Doctoral

Oxford Uehiro Centre Senior Research Associateship (2012 – present)

Honorary position in recognition of philosophical work with direct implications for practical ethics

Wellcome Trust Research Fellowship (2007 – 2010)

Principal investigator of a project on the normative and conceptual grounds of autonomy claims in biomedical ethics, with an emphasis on mental disorder, held at Cambridge University

Grant: £125,000

Wellcome Trust Dissemination Award (2010)

Principal investigator of a 6-month project on the implications of the above research for public policy and practice, carried out at Cambridge University

Grant: £30,000

Wellcome Trust Conference Award (2009)

Convenor of an international multi-disciplinary conference on autonomy and mental disorder at Cambridge University and a follow-up round-table discussion at UWE, Bristol

Grant: £4,500

CRASSH, Cambridge University Conference Award (2009)

Convenor of a second round-table discussion at Cambridge University to follow up on the above

Grant: £2,000

Centre National du Livre, France Academic Publication Grant (2007)

Funding awarded for my research monograph *Aristotle and the Moral Philosophy of Today* (PUF)

Newton Trust, Trinity College, Cambridge University Research Grant (2005 – 2006)

Co-investigator of a 18-month project on trust in institutions as group agents with moral character of their own, including engagement with professional societies, public institutions, and industry.

Clare Hall, Cambridge University Research Fellowship (2003 – 2007)

Principal investigator of a project on the nature of moral judgement bringing together expertise in moral psychology, action theory, and ancient philosophy

Graduate

Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris Scholarship (2003)

Open Society Institute, New York Scholarship (2000, 2002)

Agence Universitaire de Francophonie, Paris Scholarship (2001)

French Government Scholarship (1998, 1999)

RECENT TALKS

Volitional and Non-Volitional Accounts of Responsible Action. Centre for Interdisciplinary Research, University of Bielefeld. 21/11/2013.

Addiction and Weakness of Will. 10th Anniversary Conference of Priority in Practice Network. UCL. 17/09/2013.

Weakness of Will. Audio-recorded interview for the Open University. University of Sheffield. 1/7/2013.

Moral Responsibility and Control. Open University. 7/11/2012.

Shoemaker on Moral Responsibility. Cambridge Forum for Legal and Political Philosophy. Faculty of Law. University of Cambridge. 26/10/2012.

Autonomy and Identification. MANCEPT Workshop in Political Theory, University of Manchester. 6/9/2012.

Self-effacement and Normative Theory. Cambridge Forum for Legal and Political Philosophy. Faculty of Law. University of Cambridge. 7/12/2011.

Inverse Akrasia and Praise. University of Bristol. 7/10/2011.

Fact and Value in Psychiatric Diagnosis (with K.W.M. Fulford). Normative Neutrality and the Theory of Autonomy. University of Essex. 21/5/2011.

Clarifying Hard Paternalism. Cambridge Forum for Legal and Political Philosophy. Faculty of Law. University of Cambridge. 28/04/2011.

Inverse Akrasia, Praise and Personal Autonomy. International Symposium on the Relevance of Aristotelian Practical Philosophy. University of Barcelona. 7/4/2011.

Autonomy and Depression. International Conference on Concepts of Health and Illness. UWE, Bristol. 03/09/2010.

Autonomy and Addiction. Moral Philosophy Seminar, Oxford University. 24/05/2010.

Autonomy and Self-Rule. CRASSH, University of Cambridge. 7/1/2010.

Could Happiness Ever Be Tyrannical? Reflections on Mental Health Promotion. 9th ISoP Congress. University of Reims, France. 9/10/2009.

Akrasia and Aristotle's Theory of Value. Leuven, K.U. Leuven Institute of Philosophy. 19/12/2008.

Aristotelian Group Agency. Trinity College, Dublin. 14/11/2008.

Public Health Ethics and Liberalism. MANCEPT Workshop in Political Theory, University of Manchester. 10/9/2008.

Equality and Health. 8th World Congress on Bioethics, Rijeka, Croatia. 6/9/2008.

An Aristotelian Approach to Cognitive Enhancement. 22nd European Conference on Philosophy and Medicine, University of Tartu, Estonia. 22/08/2008.

Intellectual Property: the Arguments from Utility and Liberty. 4th World Congress on Ethics and Economics. Cape Town, South Africa. 17/07/2008.

Egalitarianism about Health. University of Durham. 1/5/2008.

Collective Responsibility: Insights from Aristotle's Politics. Moral Theory and Ethical Practice 20th Anniversary Conference, VU Amsterdam. 20/03/2008.

CURRENT TEACHING

Undergraduate

Autonomy, Capacity and Consent. Cambridge.

Mental disorder in moral psychology

Philosophy of Religion. Kent.

Nature and significance of religious beliefs in contrast to other kinds of beliefs, e.g. moral, delusional.

Justice, Violence, and the State. Kent.

Limits of authority and political legitimacy in national and international contexts.

Postgraduate

Weakness of Will. Kent.

Different kinds of motivated irrationality and their moral appraisal.

Postgraduate supervision

M.A. essays on practical irrationality, divine motivation theory, weakness of will. Kent.

PRIOR TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Cambridge: Philosophy and Classics (2003 – 2013)

Undergraduate

Free Will

Determinism and agent causation; compatibilism and incompatibilism

Moral Character and Responsibility

Voluntariness; responsibility for the self, actions and inactions

Aristotle's Moral and Political Thought

Virtues and the good life; justice and political authority

Moral Judgement

Cognitivism and non-cognitivism; internalism and externalism

Ethics of Organisations

Groups as agents; collective responsibility

Biomedical Ethics

Treatment refusal; mental capacity assessment; surrogate decision-making

Postgraduate

Cambridge Autonomy group

Forum for discussion of work-in-progress on autonomy

Autonomy and Mental Health

Interdisciplinary exploration of mental disorder and its impact on autonomy

Supervision

One-to-one tuition at undergraduate and postgraduate levels in the following areas:

Ethics, Philosophy of Mind, Political Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy and Metaphysics

Recent graduate supervision

PhD thesis on decisional capacity (2008 – 2011)

M.Phil. thesis on human rights (2012-13)

M.Phil. essays on rule-following and objectivity in ethics (2012-13) and tacit consent (2012-13)

Examining

MPhil Philosophy (2012)

History and Philosophy of Science (2011)

Philosophy of Mind, Ethics, Ancient Philosophy (2005, 2006)

Recent graduate examination

MPhil dissertations on animal belief, the right to revolution, and cultural appropriation (2012-13)

MPhil essays on phenomenology of thought, race and gender oppression, the meaning of 'woman', representation in photography, the demandingness of consequentialism, Quong's political liberalism, government intervention and public goods.

Part III Dissertation on intellectual property (2011)

UNIVERSITY ADMINISTRATION

Year Abroad and Erasmus Co-ordination in Philosophy

SECL, University of Kent (2013 – 2015)

Liberal Arts Curriculum Design and Co-ordination: Modes of Reasoning

SECL, University of Kent (2014 - 2015)

Research Fellow and Member of the Governing Body

Cambridge University, Clare Hall (2003 – 2007)

Fellowship Committee Member

Cambridge University, Clare Hall (2005 – 2007)

Director of Studies in Philosophy

College admission, academic guidance, and pastoral care for 12 undergraduate students at New Hall and Downing College (2004 – 2006)

PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES

Current collaborative projects

Southern Normativity Group: <http://southnorm.wordpress.com/>

STAGEIRA: www.ub.edu/stageira/

Volitional Action, European Network for Social Intelligence: <http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/>

International Autonomy Research Network Co-ordinator

Cambridge University, Faculty of Philosophy (2009 – 2012)

Springboard for collaborative projects between academics from different institutions, incl. the Universities of Amsterdam, Birmingham, Cambridge, Essex, Harvard, Hull, Macquarie, Massachusetts, Nottingham, Oxford, Otago and Warwick, KCL, MIT, and UCL.

Organisation of Conferences and Scholarly Encounters

32 *Autonomy research seminars* bringing together philosophers, psychiatrists, legal scholars, and social scientists. Faculty of Philosophy, University of Cambridge. 15/10/2009 – 30/06/2012.

Autonomy and Mental Health. International conference. CRASSH, University of Cambridge. 7-8/1/2010.

Substance-related Disorders and Personal Autonomy. Workshop. Faculty of Philosophy, University of Cambridge. 26/2/2010.

Depression and Dysthymia as Possible Challenges to Autonomy. Workshop. Faculty of Philosophy, University of Cambridge. 12/3/2010.

Intellectual Disabilities and Personal Autonomy. Workshop. Trinity Hall, University of Cambridge. 27/5/2010.

Vulnerability, Mental Disorder and Paternalism. Round-table discussion. Faculty of Philosophy, University of Cambridge. 10/6/2010.

Autonomy and Mental Health. Round-table discussion. UWE, Bristol. 3/9/2010.

Incentives for Health. International workshop. Trinity Hall, University of Cambridge. 10/9/2010.

Cognitive Enhancement. International workshop. Trinity Hall, University of Cambridge. 17/9/2010.

Rethinking 'Property' in Intellectual Property: The case of Biomedical Innovation. International workshop. Trinity Hall, University of Cambridge. 23/9/2010.

Referee for Academic Presses and International Journals

Oxford University Press

Mind

Southern Journal of Philosophy

Moral Theory and Ethical Practice

Journal of Value Inquiry

Journal of Applied Philosophy

Political Studies

Philosophy and Public Issues

Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology

Journal of Medicine and Philosophy

Journal of Public Health Ethics

Journal of Business Ethics

Neuroethics

External Referee for the Wellcome Trust, UK

Research projects in ethics

External Referee for the Czech Science Foundation

Research projects in ethics, philosophy of mind, political philosophy and ancient philosophy

Philosophy Societies Member

American Philosophical Association

Aristotelian Society

British Philosophical Association

British Society for Ethical Theory

Cambridge Philological Society

European Society for Philosophy of Medicine and Healthcare

Society for Applied Philosophy